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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY AND INSIDER TRADING 
 
by 
Xiaoqiong Wang 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017 
Under the Supervision of Professors Qinghai Wang and Donghyun Kim 
 
            The dissertation explores several asset pricing and corporate finance related issues including 
mutual funds, insider trading and institutional investors. My first essay examines risk taking and 
performance of bond mutual funds. The second essay investigates insider trading, informativeness and 
price efficiency around the world. The third essay explores whether firms benefit from scale of their 
nearby institutions in terms of stock prices and corporate policies. 
            In the first essay, we investigates the risk exposures of bond mutual funds and how risk-taking 
behavior affects bond fund performance. Bond mutual funds often outperform their respective benchmark 
bond indexes, but underperform after adjusting for bond market risk factors. We show that risk-taking 
behavior helps to explain the different performances of bond funds with and without controlling for the 
risk factors. Results suggest that risk taking leads to higher returns relative to benchmarks in normal 
credit risk periods, but lower returns in high credit risk periods, and that risk taking is persistent and is 
primarily driven by poor long-term past performance. Finally, we also find weak evidence that risk-taking 
funds attempt to conceal their risky bets at mandatory disclosure. The results also indicate that fund 
investors typically do not differentiate the skill and risk components of fund performance in their 
investment decisions, thereby inducing bond funds to take risky bets and to affect flows of new money. 
            The second essay provides the first direct evidence on the impact of enforcing insider regulations 
on the informativeness of insider trades and stock price efficiency across 44 countries with varying levels 
iii 
 
of insider trading regulations. Results suggest that insider purchases earn abnormal profits, especially in 
countries with active enforcement of insider trading regulations.  Our study then evaluates the impact of 
insider trading regulation on stock price efficiency by examining insider trades around corporate earnings 
announcements. The results show that while insiders trade less before earnings announcements in 
countries with active enforcement, their stock prices react more to earnings news than those in countries 
without active enforcement. Overall, our results support the view that effective insider trading regulation 
promotes price efficiency. Without active enforcement, insider trading not only discourages market 
information acquisition and reduces stock price efficiency, but also renders insider trading itself less 
informative.                 
            In the third essay, we study whether and how the geographic mismatch of investors and public 
firms affects corporate policies, firm valuation and firm performance. Both the U.S. money managing 
industry and public firms are clustered geographically, but there is considerable misalignment between 
the two. In this paper, we study whether and how the geographic mismatch between investors and public 
firms affects corporate financial policies, firm valuation, and firm performance. We measure the investor-
firm misalignment at the state level based on the ratio of the aggregate asset under management (AUM) 
of institutions in a state to the total market capitalization of public firms in the same state (AM Ratio). We 
find that firm valuation is high when firms are located in states with high AM Ratios and the effects are 
stronger for firms with higher level of equity dependence. We show that a greater presence of local 
institutional investors mitigates the financial constraints of local firms. Firms in high AM Ratio states 
invest more but their investments are less dependent on internal cash flow. These firms are more likely to 
issue equity while local institutions hold more of the newly issued equity. The high firm valuation in the 
high AM Ratio states seems to be persistent, but can be affected by shocks to the money managing 
industry. 
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Chapter 1
Risk Taking and Performance of Bond
Mutual Funds
1.1 Introduction
Last year, 79% of intermediate-term bond funds – which hold a mix of government and
corporate bonds maturing in five to 10 years – beat the comparable bond index. Over
the past 12 months, investment-research firm Morningstar estimates, intermediate bond
funds have surpassed the indexes against which they measure themselves by an average
of 1.8 percentage points; long-term government bond funds have beaten their chosen
benchmarks by 2.5 points.
Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2013.1
Can bond mutual funds easily beat their benchmarks? Extensive empirical evidence on mutual
fund performance has suggested that bond fund managers, like their equity fund counterparts, are
unable to outperform their benchmarks. However, the above quote from the Wall Street Journal
indicates that many bond mutual funds do beat their benchmark indexes, at least for some specific
time periods. While bond funds in the U.S. are about 60% as large as domestic equity funds,2
1“The Bond Market Can’t Be This Easy to Beat – Can It?”, Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2013
2As of 2013 year end, the total net asset value of bond funds was 22% of the $15 trillion worth of U.S. mutual
fund assets, and that of equity funds was 38%. See Investment Company Fact Book, 2014.
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there is relatively little research on bond fund risks and performance. The few studies that have
examined bond fund performance find that, after controlling for bond market and economic risk
factors, bond funds generally do not yield positive alphas. In this paper, we intend to fill this
gap by examining the risk exposure of bond funds and how their different risk exposures affect
performance.
Existing studies on bond funds examine fund performance by specifying and explicitly control-
ling for bond market risk factors. Blake, Elton, and Gruber (1993) find that on average, bond
funds underperform their benchmarks after controlling for multiple bond risk factors (as proxied
by bond indexes). Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995) conclude that the magnitude of bond fund
underperformance, after controlling for fundamental economic risk factors, is approximately equal
to the fund expense ratio. Consistent with these two studies, Ferson, Henry, and Kisgen (2006)
show that the risk-adjusted pre-expense excess return of bond funds is just enough to cover the
expenses. Chen, Ferson, and Peters (2010) find that, even though bond funds exhibit some market
timing ability, they still underperform after expenses. Employing fund holdings data, Cici and
Gibson (2012) find no evidence of selection ability and weak evidence of timing ability in corporate
bond funds.
Our study evaluates bond fund performance by assessing the risk exposure of bond funds relative
to their benchmarks and then investigates the effects of risk exposure on fund performance. Each
fund is classified based on its investment objective, and its performance is compared with that
of a matched bond index (hereafter ”index-adjusted performance”) and is also evaluated in a
multi-factor model (hereafter “risk-adjusted performance”). Using these two different performance
measures allows us to assess how differences in risk exposures between bond funds and bond indexes
affect fund performance. We further develop methodologies to evaluate risk taking by bond funds
and to explore the determinants of their risk-taking decisions.
We start by examining the performance of bond funds relative to their index benchmarks and
to a multi-factor model. Based on annual fund returns, our results indicate that a substantial
number of bond funds outperform their respective matched benchmarks in different time periods
over the full sample period of 1998 to 2013, and that most funds outperform their benchmarks after
the 2008 financial crisis. Interestingly, index-adjusted performances of bond funds with different
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investment objectives vary substantially over time and are negatively correlated with levels of
credit market risks. Based on the multi-factor model, however, bond funds on average generate
significantly negative risk-adjusted alphas. In comparison to their time-varying index-adjusted
outperformances, risk-adjusted bond fund returns are fairly stable and are consistently negative.
These findings suggest that bond mutual funds exhibit different risk characteristics from their
matched bond indexes.
We next examine how the risk characteristics of bond funds differ from those of their bench-
marks. We investigate the risk-adjusted performance of bond funds across normal and high credit
risk periods. Results show that risk-adjusted performance differs substantially between normal
and high credit risk periods, and that it is significantly lower during high risk periods. We then
decompose the index-adjusted performance of bond funds into a risk component and a non-risk or
skill component that is based on the risk-adjusted return from the multi-factor model. We exploit
the financial crisis of 2008-2009 as a natural experiment to determine the contribution of each
component to fund performance. Our analysis suggests that the return due to the risk component
reverses, while the skill component remains stable, from the normal period to the crisis period. We
rule out the explanations that bond style classification issues or time varying manager skills are
responsible for the different performance results. Taken together, these results suggest that fund
risk taking (i.e., funds have greater risk exposure than their bond index benchmarks) drives the
differences between the index-adjusted and risk-adjusted performances.
Why do bond funds take excessive risks relative to their benchmarks? Several empirical studies
on equity mutual funds have shown that, because mutual funds are often evaluated annually, those
that have performed poorly in the early part of the year tend to invest in more risky assets in order
to improve performance prior to year end. To examine such short-term risk-shifting behavior, we
follow Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and classify funds into winner and loser funds based on
their performance during the early part of the year (over the six- or nine-month period). We then
compare the frequency distribution of increasing risk between winner and loser funds based on fund
return volatility and the risk component of fund returns in the later part of the year. Our findings
suggest that loser funds are not more likely to increase their risk levels than winner funds, thereby
indicating that short-term risk shifting is unlikely the main driver for the observed risk-taking
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behavior of bond funds.
We consider another possibility that bond fund managers may decide to take greater risks and
such risk-taking behavior could be more pronounced than observed in equity mutual funds.3 Unlike
equity fund risk taking, bond fund risk taking, in the form of increasing credit risk (lower credit
quality) and/or increasing interest risk (longer maturity), can more reliably generate higher returns
under normal market conditions. Competition pressure may motivate bond fund managers to
assume greater risks compared with their benchmarks. In this case, longer-term poor performance
may drive risk taking. To test this hypothesis, we examine the relation between fund risk taking
and longer-term fund performance over two- to three-year periods. We find that funds that have
performed poorly over longer periods in the past tend to take greater risks – these funds have higher
returns in normal credit risk periods but lower returns during high credit risk periods.
Competition induced risk-taking behavior could also persist for longer periods and could per-
meate the bond fund industry. For example, if some funds perform better than others, because of
either skills or risk taking, some poorly performing funds may decide to take greater risks in order
to improve their relative performance. The increased competition pressure could subsequently in-
duce more funds to take risks or to assume greater risk among funds that are already in a riskier
position. Our earlier evidence and the above quote from the Wall Street Journal article imply that
bond fund risk taking is likely to be pervasive. One possible explanation for why fund managers
would assume greater risk taking behavior prior to yearend is to engender better performance and
as a result, attract greater flows of new money.
If fund investors care only about raw performance (i.e., performance relative to a benchmark),
such investment behavior can incentivize fund managers to take risk. We test this by analyzing
fund flows in relation to risk-adjusted and index-adjusted fund performances. We find that investors
respond positively to both risk-adjusted returns and benchmark-adjusted returns. In particular,
bond fund raw returns are significantly positively related to subsequent fund flows even after con-
trolling for the effects of risk-adjusted returns. These results suggest that bond fund investors may
reward rather than penalize bond fund managers for taking risks if such behavior can help deliver
higher returns.
3See Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) for studies on long-term risk shifting in equity mutual funds.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the bond mutual fund
sample and bond benchmarks used in the study. Section 3 presents empirical results on bond fund
performance and risk taking. Section 4 explores potential causes of risk taking in bond mutual
funds, while Section 5 examines the risk taking behavior of bond funds on flows of new money.
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Bond Mutual Funds
The bond mutual fund data are from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database.
We use the sample period from 1998 to 2013 since detailed classifications of bond funds by Lipper
became available from 1998 onwards.4 We form the initial broad sample of bond funds by includ-
ing funds with CRSP objective codes of ‘IC’, ‘IG’ and ‘I’ but excluding municipal bond funds and
mortgaged-backed bond funds.5 Our bond fund classifications follow the Lipper objective codes,
which are based on the investment objectives specified by the mutual funds. We classify bond funds
into 10 investment objectives: three types of government bond funds (general, short maturity, and
intermediate maturity funds), five types of corporate bond funds (short maturity, intermediate ma-
turity, high quality, BBB-rated, and high yield funds), and two types of government and corporate
bond funds (short maturity and intermediate maturity funds). Appendix A details the objective
codes used to classify these funds.
Since the CRSP mutual fund dataset reports fund characteristics based on the fund class level
instead of the fund level, we combine the different fund classes into a single fund using the CRSP
mutual fund class code. Table 1.1 reports the number of funds in our sample for each fund style
classification by year. The total number of bond funds is stable over the sample period and reaches
its peak in 2000 and 2001. High yield corporate bonds constitute the largest proportion of the total
4We choose the shorter sample period in order to match more precisely bond funds with their index benchmarks
based on the uniform Lipper classification. We also obtain very similar results based on a longer sample period of
1993 to 2003. Because the CRSP mutual fund database does not contain Lipper classification prior to 1998, for the
1993-1997 period in the sample, we convert Standard & Poor’s Strategic Insight objective codes into Lipper objective
codes. The results are available upon request.
5‘IC’, ‘IG’ and ‘I’ represent three broad categories of domestic bond funds: corporate bond funds, government
bond funds and general bond funds.
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number of funds, whereas short maturity government/corporate bonds form the least. Among the
funds, intermediate maturity government/corporate bond funds experience dramatic increases from
1998 to 2013.
Table 1.2 reports the time series cross-sectional averages of monthly fund returns, expense
ratios, and total net assets (TNA) by fund type. Mean bond fund returns range from 0.269%
(short maturity government bond funds) to 0.484% per month (high yield corporate bond funds).
With the lowest return among all funds in the sample, short maturity government bond funds
also have the smallest standard deviation of returns (0.383%), with high yield corporate bond
funds having the largest standard deviation of 2.507% per month. Expense ratios vary across the
investment types and the average monthly expense ratio is 0.067% with high-yield bond funds
having the highest expense ratio of 0.090%. Corporate bond funds generally are larger in terms of
size compared with government bond funds. For example, the TNA of government bond funds is
between $545.66 millions to $663.76 millions, compared to $968.71-$2,756.98 millions for corporate
bond funds.
1.2.2 Bond Index Benchmarks
Most bond mutual funds use Barclays bond indexes as their benchmarks. We obtain these indexes
from DataStream and compute their monthly returns. We select the following 10 Barclays bond
indexes for bond mutual funds based on their respective investment objectives: Barclays U.S. aggre-
gate government index, Barclays U.S. Treasury 1-3 year index, Barclays U.S. Treasury intermediate
index, Barclays U.S. credit 1-3 year index, Barclays corporate intermediate index, Barclays corpo-
rate A+ index, Barclays U.S. aggregate corporate BAA index, Barclay U.S corporate high-yield
index, Barclays government/credit 1-3 year index, and Barclays intermediate government/credit
index. We also manually check the prospectus of each fund to verify that the above investment
objectives of the funds are accurate. Furthermore, we compute the cross-correlation coefficients
between bond funds of each type and the 10 benchmarks employed. The unreported correlation
coefficient is the largest and statistically significant between the fund type and its comparable
benchmark than between the fund type and the other benchmarks. Appendix A provides the link
between each fund objective and the corresponding benchmark bond index.
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1.2.3 Other Variables
We employ various bond risk variables in our empirical analysis. We use credit spreads as measures
for credit risks to classify periods of high and normal credit risks. Monthly data are obtained from
Federal Reserve’s website’s H.15 historical data. We compute both long-term and short-term credit
spreads. The long-term credit spread is measured as the yield of AAA or BAA corporate bonds
minus a 10-year Treasury bond yield. We take the difference between the yield of 3-month financial
or non-financial commercial papers and a 3-month T-bill yield to construct the short-term credit
spread. Figure 1.1 plots the time series of the yields of different debt securities. In addition, we
construct several factors for the empirical analyses. Barclays U.S. aggregate index return (Agg) is
the return of the aggregate bond market and captures the market-wide risk. The default premium
(Def) is the difference in returns between the high-yield bond index and intermediate government
index, the term premium (Term) is the return spread between the intermediate- and short-term
government bond indexes, and the return on the S&P 500 stock index (S&P500) is a proxy for
equity market performance. These variables follow closely those employed in Elton, Gruber, and
Blake (1995).
1.3 Bond Fund Performance and Risk Taking
In this section, we examine bond fund performance based on two different approaches. The first
approach is widely employed in the mutual fund industry, popular press, and is emphasized by fund
management companies, where bond fund returns are measured relative to their respective bond
index benchmarks – the index-adjusted return. The second method is mainly adopted in academic
research, where fund performance is evaluated while explicitly controlling for bond market risk
factors – the risk-adjusted return. We compare fund performance based on the two metrics and
then investigate whether different risk exposures between funds and their benchmarks are the
plausible causes driving their performance differences.
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1.3.1 Index-Adjusted Bond Fund Returns
Table 1.3 reports the difference between the equal-weighted fund return within each fund classifi-
cation and its corresponding benchmark, as well as the percentage of bond funds that outperform
their benchmarks by year. Panel A shows that bond fund performance after expenses relative to
the benchmark is generally negative for the sample period, but the average negative performance
is largely driven by the extremely low returns in 2008. For example, for the intermediate-maturity
government/corporate bond funds that use the Barclays intermediate government/credit index as
their benchmark, the average underperformance is 33.3 basis points, and their poor performance of
-12.558% in 2008 can explain their overall underperformance over the entire sample period. For the
post-2008 sample period, a majority of the funds have outperformed their respective benchmarks,
and similar patterns are also observed during the few years prior to the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
On average, about 48.59% of the funds in the intermediate-maturity government/corporate bond
fund category have outperformed the benchmark based on post-expense returns. Again, this low
average percentage of under performing funds (for example, 7.14% in 2007, 12.30% in 2008, and
6.67% in 1998) is mainly attributable to the extremely low percentages of outperforming funds in
some few years of the sample period.
We observe similar patterns in other fund classification types, except high yield and BBB-
rated corporate bond funds, the two bond types with the greatest credit risk. Consistent with
the above-mentioned Wall Street Journal article, the intermediate government bond funds show
outperformance of 1.279% after expenses in 2012. Similarly, the percentage of outperforming funds
also has increased dramatically from 2009 onwards with many fund classifications having over 50%
outperforming funds. Panel B provides the counterpart results with expenses added back to fund
returns and hence, shows a greater percentage of outperforming funds. For example, 59.50% of the
funds in the intermediate maturity government/corporate bond fund category have outperformed
their benchmarks based on pre-expense returns. Overall, the evidence of outperformance in recent
years is even more striking in Panel B for most fund categories.
In our analysis, we have also computed the return differences between actively managed funds
and index funds in each category by year. Our untabulated results show that, except for several
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major financial and debt crisis years, most classification types show positive (post-expense) return
differences and the percentage of outperforming funds, especially corporate bond funds, is over
60%. Additionally, more funds outperform index funds and the outperformance is more prevalent
and larger in terms of magnitude in recent years. The percentage of outperforming high-yield funds
is nearly 100% since 2009.
The table also displays a significant variation in the relative performance of bond funds over
the sample period. During major financial market downturns, most bond fund classifications, as
well as their comparable benchmarks, exhibit significantly lower returns. Still, the relative perfor-
mance of funds broadly covaries with bond market conditions. For example, the recent financial
crisis contributes to the annual underperformance of intermediate-maturity government/corporate
bond funds by -12.558%, but their relative performance rebounds in 2009 when the credit market
conditions improve. The time variation of the relative performance of bond funds is not unique to
the 2008-2009 financial crisis period.
In summary, the comparison of actively managed bond funds with their comparable benchmarks
shows strong evidence of outperformance over the recent few years and of significant time varia-
tion in relative performance over the sample period. The results are consistent when returns are
measured before as well as after expenses. In the next two subsections, we compare index-adjusted
returns with risk-adjusted returns, and explore the causes for the different performance results.
1.3.2 Risk-Adjusted Bond Fund Returns
In this subsection, we evaluate bond fund performance based on standard multi-factor models
that are commonly employed in the mutual fund performance evaluation literature. Blake, Elton,
and Gruber (1993) adopt a six-factor model to measure bond fund performance. Elton, Gruber,
and Blake (1995) add two fundamental economic variables to the six factors. Chen, Ferson, and
Peters (2010) develop a model to measure bond fund market timing. We evaluate bond fund
performance using the Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995) multi-factor model. But given that our
sample excludes government mortgage-backed securities funds, any mortgage-related factor and
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fundamental variables would not be incorporated into our model below.
ri,t − rf,t = αi + β1,i(Aggt − rf,t) + β2,iDeft + β3,iTermt + β4,i(SP500t − rf,t) + i,t, (1.1)
where ri − rf is the return on a bond fund in excess of a risk free rate, rf . The four risk factors
are: (1) the Barclays U.S. aggregate index return (Agg), defined as the return of the aggregate
bond market index and captures the market-wide risk; (2) the default premium (Def), defined as
the difference in returns between the Barclays high-yield bond index and intermediate government
index; (3) the term premium (Term), defined as the return spread between the intermediate- and
short-term government bond indexes; and (4) the return on the S&P 500 stock index (SP500), a
proxy for equity market performance.
Various prior studies on bond mutual fund performance, including Blake, Elton, and Gruber
(1993), find that the bond market risk factors in model (1.1) are adequate to capture the varying
risk exposures of bond funds across different investment objectives. In these studies, the multi-
factor model is employed to control for fund risk exposures regardless of bond fund styles. Based
on the model, the α in model (1.1) can be interpreted as the portion of the return that cannot
be explained by these risk factors. We employ this multi-factor model to investigate risk-adjusted
returns of bond funds in our sample.
Within each fund type, we first run time series regressions at the fund level for the entire sample
period and then take the average of the α estimates. To ensure robustness of the results, we delete
funds with less than 24 monthly observations from the regressions. Table 1.4 reports the average
α’s, along with the percentage of positive and negative α’s, as well as coefficient estimates of the
risk factors, from time-series fund-level regressions by fund type.
In Panel A, column 2 shows that the risk-adjusted returns, i.e., α’s, are all significantly negative
at conventional levels. The α value ranges from -0.018% per month for short-maturity government
bond funds to -0.114% per month for BBB-rated corporate bond funds, or from -0.216% to -1.368%
per annum. Within each fund category, more than half of the funds have significantly negative α’s,
and most of the α’s are statistically significant at the 5% level. In comparison, only about two
percent of the positive α’s are statistically significant. Short-maturity government/corporate and
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short-maturity government bond funds have the highest percentage of statistically significant and
positive α’s of 10.39%. Without considering the statistical significance level, the percentages of
positive and negative α’s exhibit a broadly similar pattern across different fund types.
Panel B reports similar results with fund expenses added back to fund returns. Risk-adjusted
returns of short-maturity government bond funds and short-maturity corporate bond funds become
positive and statistically significant. However, the risk-adjusted returns for the other classification
types are all insignificant, varying from -0.043 % to 0.043% per month. The coefficients of risk fac-
tors are fairly stable across Panels A and B since expenses contribute largely to underperformance
and have no bearing on the risk factors. These results from the larger, and more recent sample of
bond funds are generally consistent with the findings reported in Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995).
The evidence seems to support the view that, “There is no evidence that managers, on average, can
provide superior returns on the portfolios they manage, even if they provide their services free of
cost” (Elton, Gruber, and Blake, page 1252).In addition, we also run regression of return difference
between bond funds and benchmark indexes on four risk factors in the multi-factor model as shown
in Appendix Table 1.2. In column 2, almost all the α’s are significantly negative ranging from
-0.107% to -0.011% indicating that bond fund risk-adjusted outperformance/underperformance
against their benchmark indexes are indeed significantly negative. This evidence provides further
support for our argument that bond funds after adjusting for risk factors do significantly under-
perform.
While Table 1.3 shows that bond funds exhibit substantial annual variations in index-adjusted
returns, Table 1.4 indicates that risk-adjusted returns are significantly negative over the full sample
period. To facilitate a direct comparison between index-adjusted returns with risk-adjusted returns,
we run a 3-year rolling window regression at the fund level and compute the average α’s for every
year for each classification type. Table 1.5 reports the rolling-window results by year. Starting
from 2001, all the bond fund categories exhibit significantly negative α’s every year. The average of
time-series rolling-window α’s varies from -0.101% to -0.009% per month and is mostly statistically
significant at the 1% level. The positive index-adjusted returns in recent years, as shown in Table
1.3, can also be explained by these risk factors and have become significantly negative, implying that
after adjusting for risk factors, fund managers do not deliver abnormal returns during the recent
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period. Compared with Table 1.3, risk-adjusted α’s in Table 1.5 exhibit consistently negative values
for every period starting from 2001 with few exceptions. The risk-adjusted returns do not show
significant variations over the sample period and differ from the results based on index-adjusted
returns.
Our above analysis indicates that the two different fund performance evaluation approaches yield
drastically different results. If we measure bond fund performance relative to their benchmarks,
many bond funds outperform their benchmarks even after fund expenses. Such outperformance
exhibited by funds also varies over time and correlates with bond market conditions. However, if
we evaluate bond fund performance based on the standard multi-factor model, bond funds show
reliably negative risk-adjusted returns, and the negative risk-adjusted returns are largely stable and
persist over the sample period. Clearly, the risk exposures of bond funds differ substantially from
their benchmarks.
1.3.3 Risk Taking and Bond Fund Performance
Thus far, we have shown that index-adjusted and risk-adjusted fund returns differ vastly, possibly
indicating that bond funds and their benchmarks have different risk exposures. A natural question
that arises from the comparison is: Are these results due to bond fund classification errors, fund
manager skills (including both security selection and market or risk timing skills), or systematic
risk taking? In this subsection, we assess the robustness of our findings and explore the possible
causes of the different risk exposures.
It is possible that Lipper bond fund classifications are not accurate enough to categorize bond
fund investment objectives, or the Barclays indexes may not match perfectly with the fund invest-
ment objectives. In the former case, riskier funds within the Lipper classification may outperform
the benchmark based on index-adjusted returns, but underperform after risk-adjustment. In the
latter case, if the funds are typically riskier than the Barclays indexes because of a mismatch be-
tween the index and the bond fund’s true benchmark, these funds may also outperform the index
before risk-adjustment and underperform after risk-adjustment. We will leave the investigation
of this issue to the next section, where we examine fund past performance and fund risk taking.
We find that, in contrast to the fund misclassification explanation, funds that underperform their
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benchmarks in the past tend to have greater subsequent risk exposures and higher returns relative
to their benchmarks. Based on the evidence we have presented so far, fund misclassification or
inaccuracies in benchmarking is unlikely to explain the magnitude of the return differences.
Another possible explanation is that bond fund manager skills, particularly time varying bond
fund manager skills in either security selection, market timing, or both, could drive the different
performance results. For example, Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) show
that equity fund managers exhibit security selection skills in boom markets and market timing skills
in recessions. Chen, Ferson, and Peters (2010) indeed find that bond fund managers exhibit some
overall market-timing skills. However, market timing skills should help to improve fund performance
during high-risk periods, which we do not observe across broad market swings. Similarly, security
selection skills alone could contribute to the performance results with or without risk-adjustments,
and are thus unlikely to explain the different performances of bond funds.
Does fund manager risk taking drive the performance results? To formally test this possibility
and to contrast with the explanations based on fund manager skills, we examine the relation
between fund risk exposure and fund performance across different risk periods. Our first test uses
the relation between credit risk levels and bond returns to distinguish the possible explanations of
manager skills and risk taking. We divide the full sample period into high and normal credit risk
periods and assess fund returns and fund risk exposures under different market conditions. The
intuition behind our test is straightforward. If fund manager skills drive the results, fund returns or
fund risk exposures should not differ systematically across the different credit risk periods (based
on security selection) or should improve fund performance during high credit risk periods (based
on time-varying security selections or market timings). If, however, fund manager risk taking is
responsible for the different risk exposures, then fund returns will be lower during the high credit
risk periods after adjusting for average fund risk exposure through the sample period.
In the previous multi-factor model results, we have shown that bond funds yield significantly
negative risk-adjusted returns over the full sample period. We now introduce a high credit risk
indicator to differentiate risk-adjusted performance between normal and high credit risk periods.
We measure credit risk as the difference between yields of corporate bonds and yields on treasury
securities. Figure 1.1 presents the credit spread plot over time based on different debt instruments
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and the patterns are largely consistent across the different debt securities. We construct the high
credit risk indicator using the BAA and 10-year Treasury yield spread. The most recent 2007
financial downturn displays the highest credit spread. In our regression analysis, we set the high
credit risk indicator to 1 if the credit spread of a specific month is above one standard deviation
from the mean; otherwise, the credit risk indicator equals 0. This method provides us with the
monthly high credit risk dummy variable.
In this subsection, we employ a variant of the multi-factor model regression (1.1) by adding
the high credit risk indicator to the model. Table 1.6 presents the coefficients of the high credit
risk indicator variable and the average α’s, along with the percentages of positive and negative
α’s. The α intercept now captures the fund performance during a normal credit risk period. All
fund types generate significantly negative risk-adjusted returns between -0.106% and -0.017% per
month, indicating that funds significantly underperform their benchmarks during normal credit
risk periods. Except for those of short and intermediate government bond funds, most coefficients
of the high credit risk indicator are significantly negative, suggesting that fund returns are even
lower during the high than the normal credit risk periods. The difference in the monthly return
between the high credit and normal credit risk period fluctuates between -0.191% and -0.044% and
is statistically significant at the 5% level. We obtain qualitatively similar results from regressions
based on bond fund pre-expense returns, and based on different specifications of the high credit
risk period. For example, we obtain similar results when we use 0.5 standard deviation from the
mean to define the high credit risk indicator.6
The substantially lower returns during the high credit risk periods confirm the robustness of our
earlier results on the different risk exposures of bond funds and their benchmarks. The evidence
lends support for the risk-taking based explanations for the different risk exposures. When bond
funds take greater risks than their benchmark, they may outperform their benchmarks based on
raw returns during normal credit risk periods, but may underperform their benchmarks during
high credit risk periods. During periods of high credit risk, funds are likely to underperform their
benchmarks based on raw returns, and can significantly underperform after adjusting for average
6Because government bond funds may have different risk exposures than corporate bonds, we also separately
examine the relation between fund performance and fund risk taking for government funds based on high and normal
risk periods classified by term spread (10-year Treasury bond yield and 3-month T-bill yield); the results remain
materially unaltered.
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risk exposure.
Our second test exploits the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 as a natural experiment to
investigate how risk taking by bond funds contributes to bond fund performance. Based on Figure
1.1, the highest credit risk during the most recent financial crisis is from 2007:8 to 2009:7. To be
consistent, we define equal-length of normal and high-credit risk periods from 2003:8 to 2005:7,
2005:8 to 2007:7, and 2007:8 to 2009:7, respectively. Because the significantly higher credit risk
during the financial crisis is largely unexpected and the large jump in credit risk significantly affects
the bond market, we can clearly identify risk taking and its effects on bond fund performance.
To facilitate a comparison of fund risk-taking behavior between normal and high risk periods, we
define two pre-crisis subperiods (2003:8 to 2005:7 and 2005:8 to 2007:7) and examine the differences
between these two.
To implement the test, we decompose bond fund performance relative to a benchmark into a
skill component (Skill) and a risk component (Risk). To do so, we run a time-series multi-factor
model regression for each fund from the combined three sub-periods of 2003:8 to 2009:7. We define
the α estimated from the whole period as the skill component of fund performance (Skill), as
it captures the average risk-adjusted return over the three subperiods both before and during the
financial crisis. We then compute index-adjusted returns for the two pre-crisis periods and the crisis
period, and calculate the differences between index-adjusted returns and risk-adjusted returns (α).
We designate the three different values for the three subperiods as the ‘risk’ components of fund
performance (Risk).
If bond fund managers do not take excessive risks and the performance is only attributed to
managers’ skills, then the risk component of the performance or Risk is the residual that is not
explained by fund manager skills specified in the model. Risk should be uncorrelated between the
two contiguous periods or positively correlated if the model fails to fully capture fund manager
skills. However, if part of the fund performance is attributed to risk taking, such risk-component
performance is more likely to reverse from a normal to a high credit risk period since potential risks
are realized during the high risk period. Consequently, the higher performance during the pre-crisis
period could predict lower performance during the financial crisis period.
Table 1.7 reports the results based on the decomposition of fund risk and skill over the three
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sub-periods. In Panel A, we sort all funds into three groups based a fund’s Risk in the pre-crisis
period (2005:8 to 2007:7).7 We report the average values of Risk for the three groups of funds
over the pre-crisis period (2005:8 to 2007:7) and the crisis period (2007:8 to 2009:7). Between the
pre-crisis and crisis periods, Risk reverses for the majority of the classification types – funds with
high Risk in the pre-crisis period tend to have low Risk during the crisis. In comparison, we also
sort funds into three groups based on Risk in the first pre-crisis period (2003:8 to 2005:7) and
report the average values of Risk for the three groups of funds during the second pre-crisis period
(2005:8 to 2007:7). Risk, however, does not exhibit any reversal between the two pre-crisis periods.
A fund manager’s Skill estimated over the full period should provide a more reliable gauge on
fund manager skill . Thus, Skill is stable and is naturally persistent across the three subperiods.
In order to assess the validity of our approach and the robustness of our earlier results, we also
run the multi-factor regression for each fund for each of the three sub-periods and define the α
estimated from each sub-period as the skill component of fund performance (Skill). Skill in Panel
B, following the same format as in Panel A. The results show substantially different patterns from
those reported in Panel A – Skill exhibits persistence rather than reversals. We also examine Risk
results based on the α estimated over the three sub-periods and find qualitatively similar results.
Overall, the results based on fund performance surrounding the recent financial crisis offer direct
support for the risk-taking hypothesis. Funds that have performed well due to greater risk exposure
during the pre-crisis period performed poorly during the financial crisis. In contrast, the estimated
fund manager skills do not show patterns of reversals across the sub-periods but exhibit some level
of persistence.
To sum up, the results in this section suggest that bond funds differ systematically from their
index benchmarks in their risk exposures. The difference in risk exposure helps to reconcile the
different results in fund performance evaluation with and without controlling for bond market risk
factors. The greater risk exposures exhibited by bond funds are not driven by fund classification
errors, or driven by investment strategies associated with manager skills. The generally greater risk
exposure in bond funds increases fund returns during normal credit risk periods and reduces fund
returns during high credit risk periods. Such risk taking behavior helps to explain the time-series
7We find similar results if we use different cutoff points such as three equal-numbered groups.
16
variation in bond fund performance relative to their benchmarks.
1.4 What Drives Bond Fund Risk Taking?
In the previous section, we have found that on average, bond funds take greater risks than their
benchmarks. In this section, we explore potential causes of such risk-taking behavior. We focus
on the following questions: What drives bond fund risk taking, and why do some fund managers
decide to deviate from their proper risk benchmarks?
1.4.1 Short-Term Risk Shifting in Bond Funds
Several studies on equity mutual funds (see, e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and
Ellison (1997)) provide evidence that, because mutual funds are often evaluated annually, poorly
performing funds in the early part of the year may have an incentive to shift to higher risk assets
in order to improve the performance within the year. This type of short-term risk-shifting behavior
may not completely explain the evidence of risk taking we documented in the previous section, but
the existence of such risk-shifting behavior can at least help us understand some of the motives
behind bond fund risk taking.
To examine such short-term risk-shifting behavior within a calendar year, we follow Brown,
Harlow, and Starks (1996) and classify funds into winner and loser funds based on their performance
during the early part of the year (over the six- or nine-month period). We then compare the
frequency distribution of increasing risk between winner and loser funds in the later part of the
year. Within each fund style classification, we form three groups based on a fund’s performance
during the first M months of a year. For each fund j, the cumulative return, RTN , over month M
is computed as:
RTNj,M =
M∏
t=1
(1 + rj,t) − 1, (1.2)
where rj,t is the monthly return for fund j in month t. Within each classification type, we rank
funds based on their RTNs and then divide them into into three groups. We define winners as the
top ranking group and losers as the bottom ranking group. We select the first half of each year as
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our performance evaluation period (i.e., M = 6).
For the volatility based test, we compute the ratio of volatility (RAR) based on fund return
volatility before and after month M in order to examine changes in fund risk levels across the three
performance groups. For each fund j at month M , RAR is calculated as:
RARj,M =
√∑12
t=M+1(rj,t − rj,12−M )2
(12−M) − 1 /
√∑M
t=1(rj,t − rj,M )2
(M − 1) (1.3)
RAR is the ratio of fund return standard deviation after month M relative to return standard
deviation before month M in a given year. Without risk-shifting behavior, RAR will be close to
1 and similar for all the funds within each classification type. If poorly performing funds take
greater risk during the second period of the year in order to catch up with other funds in the same
classification type, RAR will be greater for these loser funds.
To examine the risk-shifting behavior of funds, we rank funds based on RAR, and within each
style classification, we sort them into three groups. We define the top RAR group as high RAR
and the bottom as low RAR. In the end, we will have a (RTN , RAR) pair for each fund and a 2x2
classification scheme based on performance and volatility ratio: High RTN , High RAR; High RTN ,
Low RAR; Low RTN , High RAR; and Low RTN , Low RAR. The null hypothesis is that, without
systematic risk shifting, these two classification methods are independent; hence, the frequency of
funds falling into one of the four categories is the same (i.e., 25%). We employ a chi-square statistic
to test whether the frequencies are significantly different across the four categories.
Table 1.8 reports the results for the frequency distribution based on fund performance and
volatility ratios in the first five columns of the results. Among all the bond fund style classifications,
high-yield corporate bond funds and intermediate maturity corporate bond funds show significantly
higher frequencies for Low RTN , High RAR and High RTN , Low RAR. This implies that for these
two types of bond funds, loser funds shift to more risky assets so as to improve performance in the
second half of the year. However, winner funds invest in safer assets in the second half of the year
which results in decrease in RAR. The rest of the classification types is either insignificant or exhibit
significantly lower frequencies for Low RTN , High RAR and High RTN , Low RAR.Such results
suggest that, based on the fund return volatility measure, loser bond funds do not increase risk or
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significantly decrease risk and winner bond funds do not decrease risk or significantly increase risk
over the short-term horizon.
We further employ the performance decomposition methodology to directly assess changes in the
risk component of fund performance during the calendar year. The fund performance attributable
to skill is the risk-adjusted return (α) from the multi-factor model and that due to risk (Risk) is
the difference between the index-adjusted return and risk-adjusted return. Hence, Risk captures
the portion of the return performance attributable to fund risk taking. The underlying arguments
for this test are the same as those for the volatility-ratio tests in Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996)
and Busse (2001). If poorly performing funds take more risks to improve performance after month
M , these funds’ Risk’s ought to increase over the second part of the year. Thus, we can use Risk
to gauge the probability of funds shifting risk between the two periods.
The methodology of return-based risk-shifting test follows closely the volatility-ratio based test.
Within each classification category, we first sort funds into three groups based on raw cumulative
returns during the first M months of the year to obtain winner and loser funds. We next compute
the risk component of fund performance for winner and loser funds using risk-adjusted returns
from the rolling-window multi-factor regressions over the previous three-year period. We compute
the risk component of fund performance for winner and loser funds in the two periods of the year:
before and after month M based on the index-adjusted returns and risk-adjusted returns. We sort
winner and loser funds into three risk groups based on the risk component of fund performance
during the first M months of the year, with the top-ranking funds defined as “High Risk1” and
the bottom ranking funds as “Low Risk1”. Similarly, we rank fund risks for the second part of the
year and obtain funds with high (“High Risk2”) and low risks (“Low Risk2”). This method also
generates a 2x2 frequency table with the (Risk1, Risk2) pair.
If poorly performing bond funds take risk to improve performance, we expect to observe signif-
icantly higher than 25% frequency for Low Risk1/High Risk2 for these funds. Again, we employ a
chi-square test to investigate the frequency of winning and losing funds in the high/low risk-taking
category in the first M months moving into a high/low risk-taking category in the remaining 12-M
months of the year. Unlike the volatility-ratio based test, the return-based test allows us to exam-
ine fund risk-shifting over a shorter window in the second part of the year. Table 1.8 reports two
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evaluation periods based on the first 6- and 9-months of a calendar year, respectively: (6, 6) and
(9, 3). In both panels of the table, we find significantly lower than 25% frequency for loser funds to
move from Low Risk1 to High Risk2, or for winner funds to move from High Risk1 to Low Risk2.
In fact, low risk loser funds tend to stay in the low risk category in the second period and high risk
winner funds tend to stay in the high risk category in the second period. The results indicate that
winner and loser bond funds do not move to different risk categories in the second part of the year.
To sum up, the results from both the standard volatility-ratio and return-based tests provide no
evidence that bond funds systematically shift risks during the year based on prior six- to nine-month
performance of the year. Unlike equity funds, bond funds do not seem to shift risks frequently over
a short term.
1.4.2 Long-term Performance and Bond Fund Risk Taking
We now consider the possibility that bond fund managers may decide to take greater risks over time
and that such risk-taking behavior could be more persistent than observed in equity mutual funds.
Unlike equity fund risk taking, bond fund risk taking, in the form of increasing credit risk (lower
credit quality) and/or increasing interest risk (longer maturity), can more reliably generate higher
returns in normal market conditions. Competition pressure may motivate bond fund managers to
take greater risks to outperform their benchmarks. In this case, longer term poor performance
may induce bond funds to assume greater risk. To test this hypothesis, we examine the relation
between fund performance over a longer time period of two to three years and fund risk taking in
the subsequent period.
To measure fund risk-taking, we again employ the risk component of fund performance defined
by the difference between the index-adjusted return and risk-adjusted return. We estimate risk-
adjusted returns (α’s) based on the rolling-window multi-factor regressions and then compute the
risk component of fund performance for each month. Our main variable of interest is fund perfor-
mance (index-adjusted return) over the past N-year period (N = 2, 3), and we intend to examine
how fund performance over a longer period relates to fund risk taking.
We have shown previously that risk taking can have distinctive impacts on fund performance
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during high and normal risk periods. Risk taking can lead to higher returns during normal credit
risk periods, but leads to lower returns during high credit risk periods when such high risks are
realized. In order to identify and sharpen the test on the relation between fund past performance
and fund risk taking, we examine the relation separately for the high and normal risk periods.
Examining the results from the two different credit risk periods will further reinforce our evidence
that it is not driven by model specifications.
In our empirical analysis, if the Baa-Treasury spread is above 0.5 standard deviation from the
mean in a given month, we classify that month as a high credit risk month. We use the Fama-
MacBeth (1973) methodology and run the cross-sectional regression month by month, but compute
the mean and t-value for normal credit risk periods and high credit risk periods, separately.
The cross-sectional regression is specified as follows,
Riski,t = β1,i + β2,iPast Performancet−1 + β3,iExpt−1 + β4,iFlow Ratet−1
+β5,iLogFamily TNAt−1 + β6,iBond TNA/Family TNAt−1 + β7,iLogAget−1
+β8,iLogTNAt−1 + i,t (1.4)
where Risk is the risk component of fund performance and is defined as the difference between the
monthly index-adjusted return and its past N-year multi-factor model α, Past Performance is the
cumulative past performance relative to a benchmark (index-adjusted return), Exp is the ratio of a
bond fund’s operating expenses borne by shareholders to the total investment value and is expressed
in percentage, Flow Rate is the ratio of fund flow at t to its total net asset value (TNA) at t− 1,
Age is the number of years since the first formation date of a fund, Family TNA is defined as the
total TNA of all the funds within a mutual fund management firm, and Bond TNA/Family TNA
is the ratio of total TNA of the bond funds to the total TNA of all the mutual funds managed by
an investment firm. The cross-sectional regressions also control for unreported fund style effects.
Table 1.9 reports Fama-MacBeth regression results. To ensure robustness of our results, we
measure fund risk taking based on α’s from 2-year and 3-year rolling-window regressions. The
measurement period of past fund performance corresponds to the estimation period of α. We
compute mean values of the estimation coefficients and their associated t-values for the normal
21
credit risk period and high credit risk period, separately. As shown in the table, past performance
is significantly negatively related to the risk-component performance in both panels for normal
credit risk periods, indicating that underperforming funds tend to take more risks. For high risk
periods, past performance is positively and significantly related to fund risk taking, suggesting a
different outcome from risk taking. Thus, underperformance induces funds to take greater risks,
but such a strategy would result in lower returns especially in periods when credit risks are high.
Our evidence is consistent across two assessment periods of α.
The results show a positive relation between fund flow and Risk; the coefficient of flowrate is
consistently positive across all periods, but it is at least marginally significant in normal credit
risk periods. In addition, bond funds in larger fund families tend to take more risks than their
counterparts from smaller families. The larger the proportion of bond funds in a fund family,
the more risk bond funds will take during normal risk periods. Government bond funds may
have different risk exposures than corporate bond funds. For example, interest rate risk can be
particularly important for this type of funds. We also separately examine the relation between fund
performance and risk taking for government funds across high and normal risk periods, determined
by term spreads (10-year Treasury bond yield and 3-month T-bill yield), and the results remain
qualitatively similar.
Overall, this section provides evidence on the relation between long-term fund performance and
fund risk taking. It is likely that bond fund managers may decide to increase fund risk exposures
when fund performance lags their peers. Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011) find some evidence
that poorly performing equity funds tend to increase risks over time. However, unlike equity
fund risk taking, bond fund risk taking can have a more direct and reliable impact on bond fund
performance. Competition pressure may motivate bond fund managers to take greater risks not
only to beat their benchmarks, but also to outperform their peers. Hence, risk taking by some
funds could improve the performance ranking of these funds and may motivate other funds to take
risks as well. Consequently, the competition induced risk taking in bond funds could persist for
longer periods and could permeate the bond fund industry.
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1.4.3 Risk Taking and the Performance-Flow Relation
Existing research has documented that equity mutual fund investors chase past performance. These
studies document an asymmetric flow-performance relation in that mutual fund investors tend to
invest in funds with superior performance but not to adequately penalize poor performers (Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Huang, Wei, and Yan, 2007; Ferreira et al., 2012). This
asymmetric flow-performance relation can spur mutual funds to strategically alter risk levels to
attract large new money flows (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997;
and Koski and Pontiff, 1999; Goetzmann et al., 2007; Huang, Sialm, and Zheng, 2008). Berk and
van Binsbergen (2015) show, however, that investors are unable to observe manager skills, mutual
fund investors select funds mainly based on the funds’ realized performance.
In this subsection, we evaluate whether fund managers take greater risks in order to improve
performance and to attract flows of new money. If investors make their investment decisions based
on a fund’s raw performance (i.e., performance relative to a benchmark) rather than managerial
skill (or risk-adjusted return), then their investment behavior could induce fund managers to make
risky bets. We investigate whether risk-adjusted fund returns or raw bond fund performances
influence the investment decisions of fund investors.
To examine the performance and fund flow relation for bond funds, we conduct Fama-Macbeth
(1973) cross-sectional regressions to estimate the sensitivity of fund flows to risk-adjusted returns
and raw returns of bond mutual funds, while controlling for fund characteristics such fund age and
TNA. The model specification is as follows.
Flow Ratei,t = β1,i + β2,iAlphat−1 + β3,i(Rawt−1 −Bencht−1) + β4,iExpt−1 + β5,iLogAget−1
+β6,iLogTNAt−1 + i,t. (1.5)
In (1.5), a bond fund’s flow rate is computed by dividing the quarterly (yearly) flows by the
beginning-of-quarter (year) TNA, where the quarterly (yearly) flow is defined as the sum of monthly
flows within the quarter (year).8 Alpha is obtained from the monthly 3-year rolling window multi-
8Each fund’s flow is computed in the following manner. Flowi,t = TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 × (1 + ri,t). Note that any
assets acquired by a fund through mergers with other funds are excluded from the flow.
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factor model regression, and Rawt−1 − Bencht−1 is measured as a fund’s monthly rolling window
return difference relative to its benchmark. Both monthly Alpha and (Raw−Bench) are accumu-
lated on a quarterly or yearly basis to obtain their quarterly or yearly equivalents. We estimate
regression model (1.5) for varying flow rates and return performances measured over three months,
six months, and twelve months. Table 1.10 highlights only estimates of β2 and β3 coefficients
together with their t-values.
The results suggest that investors respond positively to both risk-adjusted returns and raw
returns. In particular, raw returns of bond funds are significantly positively related to subsequent
fund flows, even after controlling for the effects of risk-adjusted returns, Alpha. The β2 and β3
coefficients are mostly positive and statistically significant for fund flows measured over a three-
month and a six-month horizons, but their levels of statistical significance reduce when the flows
are measured over a one-year horizon. Our evidence suggests that bond fund investors seem to
reward rather than penalize risk-taking bond fund managers if such risk-taking behavior can help
deliver higher returns.
1.5 Conclusion
Mutual fund companies and news media tend to report bond fund performance in comparison
to bond index benchmarks. Based on this comparison, the performance of U.S. bond mutual
funds has been impressive for the longer time period from 1998 to 2013 and especially after the
financial crisis of 2008-2009. In this study, we examine risk exposures of bond mutual funds and
how their risk exposures affect their performance. Using bond fund information from the CRSP
survivor-bias-free U.S. mutual fund database, we show that bond funds typically outperform their
investment-objective matched benchmarks at different times of our full sample period. Their return
performance correlates negatively with the level of credit market risk. However, bond funds generate
significantly negative risk-adjusted returns, which are substantially stable over time. The different
performance results suggest that bond funds exhibit different risk characteristics from those of their
benchmarks.
We show that the different performance results are due to risk taking rather than different risk
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exposures caused by fund style misclassification or by time-varying manager skills. We disentangle
the effects of manager skill and risk-taking on fund performance by decomposing fund performance
into risk and skill components and exploit the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment to
evaluate their relative contributions to fund performance. We find evidence of return reversals
associated with the risk component, while the skill component remains fairly stable, between normal
and high credit risk periods.
We examine the causes of bond fund risk taking. Fund risk taking seems to be persistent within
a calendar year, indicating that short-term risk shifting may not account for the observed risk-
taking behavior of bond funds. We argue that bond funds that have experienced poor performance
over longer periods might have more incentives to take risks. Specifically, bond funds facing intense
competition pressure may choose to elevate their risk exposures by increasing credit or interest rate
risks of their bond holdings that could help engender greater returns. Consistent with this argument,
we find that funds that have performed poorly over the past two or three-year periods take greater
risks. Finally, we test whether bond funds take more risks in order to improve performance and
to attract new fund flows. Our results suggest that fund flows are sensitive to bond fund raw
returns, even after controlling for the effects of risk-adjusted fund returns. This evidence suggests
that bond fund investors have little ability to distinguish bond fund managers who are skilful in
selecting better performing bonds from those who take greater risks to help deliver higher returns.
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Figure 1.1
Credit Spreads Across Time
This figure presents credit spreads measured using four methods across the sample period of 1998
to 2013. We construct both long-term and short-term credit spreads. AAAdif is measured as the
yield difference between AAA corporate bonds and 10-year Treasury constant maturities. BAAdif
is measured as the yield difference between BAA corporate bonds and 10-year Treasury constant
maturities. We take the difference between the yield of 3-month financial or nonfinancial commercial
paper and 3-month T-bill rate to construct Findif or Nonfindif.
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Appendix Table 1.1
Bond Fund Classifications
This table provides the detailed codes used in classifying each fund type and its matched benchmark index. First, we
form the initial broad sample by including funds with Lipper objective code IC, IG and I. Next, we use the specific
code shown in this table to determine a fund’s classification. Each classification is then matched with a benchmark
index to measure the performance of funds within the classification.
Bond Type CRSP code SI code Lipper Code Benchmark Index
Government Bond Funds
General IG GGN GUS, GUT Barclays U.S. Aggregate Government Index
Short Maturity IGDS GSM SUT, SUS Barclays U.S. Treasury 1-3 Year Index
Intermediate Maturity IGDI, IG GIM IUG, SIU, IGD Barclays U.S. Treasury Intermediate Index
Corporate Bond Funds
Short Maturity ICDS, IC CSM SID,SII Barclays U.S. Credit 1-3 year Index
Intermediate Maturity ICDI, IC CIM SID,SII Barclays Corporate Intermediate Index
High Quality ICQH, ICQM, I, IC CHQ A Barclays Corporate A+ Index
BBB Rated ICQM, ICQY CMQ BBB Barclays U.S. Aggregate Corporate BAA Index
High Yield ICQY, I CHY HY Barclay U.S Corporate High-Yield Index
Gov/Corp Bond Funds
Short Maturity I SID,SII Barclays Government/Credit 1-3 Year Index
Intermediate Maturity I, IGDS, IC CGN IID Barclays Intermediate Government/Credit Index
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Chapter 2
Insider Trading, Informativeness, and
Price Efficiency around the World
2.1 Introduction
Whether or not insider trading should be regulated has been the subject of a long-standing debate
among researchers and policymakers. Opponents of insider trading regulation contend that allowing
insiders to benefit from their information advantage in trading promotes more informationally
efficient financial markets (e.g., Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Leland, 1992; George and
Seyhun, 2002). Proponents of insider trading regulation, however, argue that unrestricted insider
trading can adversely affect the incentives of outside investors to acquire and produce information,
hence making stock prices less informationally efficient (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Khanna,
Slezak, and Bradley, 1994). Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) make the first attempt to look at
varying enactments and first-time prosecution of insider trading laws across 103 countries. They
find that only first-time legal prosecution of insider trading laws can reduce a country’s cost of
equity, thereby lending support of insider trading regulation.1 However, their study provides no
direct evidence on the informativeness of insider trades across different regulation regimes, the
potential tradeoff between the informational benefit of insider trading and the cost of reduced
information acquisition, and the overall impact of insider trading regulation on price efficiency.
1Our unreported results show that first-time prosecution has no effect on the informativeness of insider trading.
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Thus, the purpose of our study is to address all these important issues and provide evidence that
helps settle the debate.
Our research represents the first to directly evaluate and compare the information contents of
insider trading activities across different regulation and enforcement regimes. We exploit a newly
available global dataset which contains information of global insider transactions of senior corporate
executives and corporate directors from 44 countries over the period of 2007 to 2013. By examining
insider trading activities in this large number of countries with varying levels of insider trading
enforcement, we seek to provide the first comprehensive evidence on insider trading activities and
their informativeness across different markets, to understand the role of insider trading regulation
in determining insider trade informativeness, and to assess the relation between insider trading
regulation and stock price efficiency.
We start by examining insider trading activities and their informativeness across different in-
sider trading regulation regimes. All 44 countries in our sample have insider trading laws, but
enforcement of insider trading laws varies widely across these countries. To measure the extent
to which a country enforces its insider trading regulation consistently and rigorously, we construct
an “Active Enforcement” variable that is based on the prosecution of insider trading in a country
during the sample period of 2007-2013.2 Active Enforcement is a binary variable that equals one
if the country is actively enforcing its insider trading regulation in that it has at least one insider
trading prosecution case during the sample period; otherwise, it is zero. We measure the informa-
tiveness of insider trades based on abnormal stock returns subsequent to insider transactions. For
each country, we compute the average cumulative returns of stocks traded by insiders for buys and
sells, separately, in excess of the country index return for varying periods of 5 to 120 days following
the day of insider trades.
Several results emerge from the comparison of the large number of insider trades across the
countries. First, corporate insiders trade actively, and their trades, particularly their buy transac-
tions, are informative, and the effect is more pronounced in countries with active enforcement of
2We also construct the same variable using information five years prior to 2007. Both constructs yield qualitatively
similar results. Given varying start years of the availability of insider transactions for the sample of countries, we
choose to report the results based on the construct for the sample period.
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insider trading regulations than in countries without.3 Abnormal returns associated with insider
buy transactions over the different periods from 5 to 120 days subsequent to insider transaction
dates are positive and highly significant, while those associated with sell transactions show no
robust evidence. Furthermore, insider trading informativeness is related to various country-level
economic and legal characteristics, but the legal characteristic variables such as the rule of law, the
general effectiveness of law enforcement, investor protection, and the quality of government do not
substitute for the effects of enforcement of insider trading regulation. Second, insider trading reg-
ulations do not seem to affect the level of insider trading activities. The results show no significant
difference in overall insider trading activities (scaled by a country’s stock market capitalization)
between countries with and without active enforcement of insider trading regulations.
Why does active insider trading regulation result in more, not less, informative insider trades?
How does insider trading regulation affect stock price efficiency? To answer these questions, we
examine insider trading activities around an important corporate event – corporate earnings an-
nouncements, and also investigate the relation between insider trading regulation, insider trading
activity, and market reaction to earnings news. In countries with active enforcement of insider trad-
ing regulations, insiders trade less actively before corporate earnings announcements, but market
reactions to earnings news are stronger. These findings suggest that active enforcement of insider
trading regulation deters insiders from exploiting non-public and material corporate information in
their stock trading, but seems to facilitate market efficiency. Furthermore, insiders trade actively
before earnings announcements in countries without active enforcement of insider trading but with
lockout period requirements, implying that active enforcement of insider trading regulation, not
insider trading regulation itself, determines insider trading activity around earnings announce-
ments. All these results are robust after controlling for various country, market, and institutional
characteristics.
Finally, to further corroborate the informativeness of insider trades, we examine insider profits
around earnings announcement dates. If insiders are able to exploit their information advantage,
they should be able to make more profits from trading prior to earnings announcements. We find
3U.S. studies such as Ravina and Sapienza (2010) and Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) also find that insiders
still have the ability to trade on private information, in spite of the U.S.’s rigorous enforcement of insider trading
regulations.
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that insider trading profits are larger before earnings announcements in countries with active en-
forcement of insider trading regulation, but no difference in insider profits before and after earnings
announcements in countries without enforcement. Therefore, these findings indicate that insider
trading activities are informative only in countries that enforce their insider trading regulations.
In other words, insiders from countries without enforcement could exploit their information advan-
tage, such as corporate earnings news, in their trades, but market reactions to such news are weak,
thereby resulting in noisier stock prices, which in turn, reduce the potential information advantage
of insiders and subsequently lower the informativeness of their trades.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the newly available insider
trading database from a broad spectrum of countries affords us the opportunity to empirically
examine and compare insider trading activities and the informativeness of insider trading under
different regulation regimes. Our analysis not only expands the extensive literature that focuses
mainly on insider trading in a single country or in a small group of countries, but also provides
the first direct comparison of insider trading activities and their informativeness across countries.
These comparisons allow us to assess the effects of insider trading regulations on insider trading
activities and the informativeness of insider trades.
Second, our findings offer important insights on the opposing views regarding the effects of
insider trading regulation on price informativeness and market efficiency. We present the first
and direct evidence that insider trading regulation improves both the informativeness of insider
trades and the efficiency of stock prices. The evidence provides support to the argument that
insider trading regulation improves stock price efficiency. Several previous studies show that insider
trading restrictions lead to greater information acquisition efforts (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith,
2005) and that the first enforcement of insider trading laws improves stock price informativeness
(Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). Our results are consistent with the findings of the two studies,
but we provide direct evidence on the mechanism of how insider trading regulation can improve
the informativeness of stock prices. Specifically, we show that allowing insiders to freely exploit
their information advantage over the investor public has substantial adverse effects that can easily
overwhelm any informational benefits from insider trading. Such adverse effects not only lead to
noisier and less informative stock prices, but also reduce the informativeness of insider trades (and
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hence their information advantage).
Our study thus fills the gap of existing findings on insider trading regulation and stock price
efficiency in different countries. Bhattacharya et al. (2000) examine shares trading on the Bolsa
Mexicana de Valores and find that share prices do not react to company news in the Mexico stock
market. They argue that because insider trades may have already transmitted such information
to the market, company announcements do not add new information. Such arguments implicitly
assume that insider trades in unregulated markets are informative and that stock prices, if fully
reflecting insider information, could be efficient even if they do not respond to company announce-
ments. While our sample does not include Mexico, our evidence suggests that insider trades in
Mexico may not convey much information because their stock prices may not fully respond to any
corporate news, either through corporate announcements or insider trades.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief
discussion of the related literature. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 evaluates the
informativeness of insider trades and the impact of insider trading regulation on insider trade
informativeness. Section 5 employs a corporate event – corporate earnings announcements – to
examine the impact of insider trading regulation on stock price efficiency, and the final section
concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Over the past few decades, the economics of insider trading has remained a highly controversial
topic among securities authorities and academics. The main issue is whether insider trading is
economically inefficient and hence, ought to be subject to regulation. Critics of insider trading
regulation argue that without regulation, inside information will be efficiently allocated to investors
who value the information the most, and that the benefit of more efficient prices is a more efficient
allocation of resources (for example, Coase, 1960; Manne, 1966). Carlton and Fischel (1983) further
argue that increased price efficiency can reduce investor uncertainty and better protect corporation
information. Subsequent theoretical models (such as Dye, 1984; Leland, 1992; Shin, 1996; Noe,
1997) also suggest that insider trading makes stock prices more responsive to changes in the market.
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In other words, unimpeded insider trading facilitates the incorporation of information into stock
prices, thereby improving price informativeness.
Proponents of insider trading regulation, however, argue that under certain circumstances, the
adverse effects of insider trading could lead to less efficient stock prices. Manove (1989) shows that
insider trading increases trading costs of liquidity traders and hence, discourages liquidity trading
and decreases market liquidity. This liquidity discount can be incorporated into the firm’s stock
price, thereby increasing the firm’s cost of capital. Fishman and Hagerty (1992) put forth two
adverse effects of insider trading. First, insider trading discourages non-insiders from obtaining
information and trading, and this reduces the number of informed investors in the market. Sec-
ond, in the presence of better informed insiders, the information gets unevenly distributed across
investors in the market. As a result, the market becomes less competitive and stock prices become
less efficient.
It is worth pointing out that both the opponents and proponents of insider trading regulation
hold the view that unrestricted insider trading is more informative than regulated insider trading.
For the opponents, more informed insider trading leads to more efficient prices. For the proponents,
the highly informed insider trading, through its adverse effects on other market participants, leads
to less efficient prices.
There is an extensive empirical literature that examines the informational value of insider trad-
ing. Given the widely available US insider trades data, many of existing, especially earlier, studies
focus on US markets and find that insider trades are informative (Finnerty, 1976; Jaffe, 1974;
Seyhun, 1988; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; George and Seyhun, 2002; Brochet, 2010). Non-US stud-
ies also reach the same conclusion for Canada (Baesel and Stein, 1979), the UK (Pope, Morris,
and Peel, 1990), Hong Kong (Wong, Cheung, and Wu, 2000), Germany (Betzer and Theissen,
2009), Switzerland (Zingg, Lang, Wyttenbach, 2007), Australia (Hotson, Kaur, and Singh, 2007),
Thailand (Budsaratragoon, Hillier, and Lhaopadchan, 2012), the Netherlands (Degryse, de Jong,
and Lefebvre, 2014; Cziraki, de Goeij, and Rennenboog, 2014), and European countries (Fidrmuc,
Korczak, and Korczak, 2012). But other studies find that insider purchases contain no informa-
tional value in Norway (Eckbo and Smith, 1998), Spain (Del Brio, Miguel, and Perote, 2002), and
Australia (Brown, Foo, and Watson, 2003).
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These empirical studies are primarily based on a single country or a small group of countries
within a region. The findings do not offer systematic evidence on the informativeness of insider
trades across countries, and these studies do not attempt to compare and explain the differences in
the informativeness of insider trades across the countries. Because these studies typically investigate
insider trading under the same regulatory regime, they also do not address the core question of
the debate on insider trading regulation, i.e., whether or not insider trading regulation helps to
improve stock price efficiency.
Several recent studies have examined some aspects of the effects of insider trading regulation on
the financial market. For example, Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005) show that restriction of
insider trading leads to greater information acquisition efforts by financial analysts. Bhattacharya
and Daouk (2002) find that the first legal prosecution of insider trading can help to lower a coun-
try’s cost of equity, presumedly because of improved information efficiency. Studying the effects of
the first enforcement of insider trading laws, Denis and Xu (2009) find similar results for executive
compensation, and Chen et al. (2014) show similar effects for corporate investment. Fernandes
and Ferreira (2008) examine the impact of first enforcement of insider trading laws on the infor-
mativeness of stock markets. They find that price informativeness is substantially improved after
the first enforcement of insider trading laws in developed markets.
These recent studies provide some evidence on the potential effects of insider trading regulation
on stock price efficiency. However, none of these studies examine the effects of insider trading
regulation on insider trading activities and the informativeness of insider trades. Without such
direct evidence, we cannot study the mechanism through which insider trading regulation affects
stock prices and address the core question of the debate on insider trading regulation. The purpose
of our study is to address these issues.
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2.3 Data and Summary Information
2.3.1 Insider Transactions
Our global insider transactions data are obtained from Director Deals, a specialist global market
data company that monitors and analyzes share transactions made by directors and top executives
of firms. Director Deals gathers information of share transactions by insiders of about 40,000 firms
from 56 countries globally. The source of their data comes from company announcements made
public under disclosure regulations and from stock exchanges. For a given transaction, this dataset
includes stock identifiers (ISIN and SEDOL), market capitalization at the time of the transaction in
US dollars, company information, the country where the trade took place, ticker symbol, personal
information of the insiders (name, title, date of birth), transaction type (award, buy, sell, transfer,
exercise, given away, etc.), transaction date, price and number of shares traded, total value of
transaction (in British pounds, euros and US dollars), and the date an insider trade was announced
or reported.
Our sample focuses on insider transactions in the home country where the firm’s headquarter
is located and where the transaction occurred and reported.4 We exclude countries with fewer
than five firms with reported insider transactions for the entire sample period, and also exclude
one major developed market, Japan, where insider trades are not required to be reported by law.
Furthermore, our analysis is restricted to open-market insider buys and sells as other types of
transactions are more likely attributable to liquidity and portfolio diversification considerations
(Ofek and Yermack, 2000; Carpenter and Remmers, 2001). As a result, our final sample consists of
44 countries with varying start years when information on insider transactions becomes available.
In Director Deals, the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands have the longest sample period from 1999
to 2013, whereas most emerging markets (such as Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, and Pakistan) have data
starting from 2013. As a result, our sample period is from 2007 to 2013.
Table 2.1 presents the sample period for each country. The table reports the number of unique
firms with reported insider transactions, average annual number of transactions, average annual
4These transactions include the vast majority of insider trades in the database.
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value of transactions (in US dollars) and average annual number of shares traded. The number of
unique firms with reported insider transactions varies from 5 in Czech Republic to 6,501 in the US,
and the total number of unique firms employed in this study is 24,135. The average annual number
of transactions ranges from 20 for Hungary to 45,558 for the US. The average ratio of the annual
total value of transactions relative to total market capitalization varies from 0.005% for Brazil to
1.723% for Greece.
2.3.2 Insider Trading Laws
Table 2.1 also reports the year in which insider trading laws came into existence in a country and the
year of first insider trading prosecution under insider trading laws. Information on the enactment of
insider trading laws is obtained from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). All countries in our sample
have adopted insider trading laws starting from 1934 (the US) to 1999 (Cyprus). Bhattacharya
and Daouk also provide information on the first insider trading prosecution in a country up to
1998. We use the same source and supplement the first enforcement information for our sample of
countries. The year that the initial prosecution under insider trading laws took place is between
1961 and 2012, and only two countries in the sample have not enforced their insider trading laws.
With the exception of Egypt (2009) and Estonia (2012), the first enforcement of insider trading
laws in most countries occurred much earlier than our sample period. Our analysis has found that
the first-time enforcement variable exhibits no impact on the informativeness of insider trades, and
hence, we do not report the results in the subsequent tables.
In this paper, we develop a new measure of insider trading regulation based on how rigorously
and actively one country enforces insider trading laws. Even though most countries in our sample
have had at least one insider trading prosecution (for example, the initial prosecution), many
countries do not pursue such cases rigorously. During our sample period of 2007-2013, there was
not a single case of insider trading litigation in 15 countries in the sample.5 We thus define a
variable “Active Enforcement” to measure the extent to which a country enforces its insider trading
regulation consistently and rigorously. “Active Enforcement” is a dummy variable that equals 1
5The results remain qualitatively similar even if we construct our enforcement variable based on a five-year period
prior to 2007.
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if the country has a prosecution event under insider trading laws within the sample period, and
0 if otherwise. We collect information on such prosecution events from three major data sources:
(1) the market regulator’s official announcements and direct communication with the regulatory
authorities; (2) news search; and (3) Capital IQ Key Development database. Capital IQ provides
corporate events internationally, and we manually check the events that have a key word of insider(s)
to ensure that the reported event is an insider trading prosecution event. The results are shown
in Table 2.1. Among the 44 countries in our sample, 29 have recent enforcement of insider trading
laws over the sample period, while 15 countries do not have any active enforcement events.
2.3.3 Other Variables
Our analysis includes several country-level variables relating to legal, institutional, and economic
development characteristics of the sample of countries. These variables could affect insider trading
regulation and the enforcements, or could potentially serve as substitutes to the more specific insider
trading regulation enforcement variable we constructed above. The country-level characteristic
variables we employ in our empirical analysis are listed in Appendix Table 2.1.
Legal Origin is a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if the origin of the country’s legal
system is common law and 0 if otherwise, and such information is from Table II of La Porta et
al. (1998). Anti-self-dealing is obtained from Djankov et al. (2008) and is a measure of investor
protection against expropriation by corporate insiders.6 The table also presents time-series averages
of three law or regulation enforcement variables, namely the rule of law (Rule of Law), government
effectiveness (Effectiveness), and regulatory quality (RegQuality), from 1999 to 2013. These three
variables are obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, 2014 Update.
These aggregate indicators combine views and survey results and intend to measure governance
quality at the country level. Rule of law reflects the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement and
property rights. Government effectiveness reflects the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
6The anti-self-dealing index was constructed to measure minority shareholder protection based on private enforce-
ment mechanisms, such as disclosure and litigation, that govern a hypothetical self-dealing transaction. It does not
cover insider trading. See Djankov et al. (2008) for detailed description on the construction of the index.
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formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such
policies. RegQuality reflects the ability of the government to formulate and implement policies
and regulations. The value of all these variables ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. As shown in the table,
Pakistan has the lowest governance indicators: -0.851 for Rule of Law, -0.574 for Effectiveness,
and -0.636 for RegQuality. Finland, on the other hand, has the highest Rule of Law (1.946) and
Effectiveness (2.152), and Singapore maintains the highest RegQuality of 1.927.
The sample of countries are divided into developed and developing countries based on World
Bank classifications. We use the ratio of country-level stock market capitalization to annual GDP
to measure the level of stock market development in a country. Our data source for the time-
series annual GDP is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The stock
market development variable and the developed country status serve as additional control variables
in our empirical analysis.
2.4 Regulation Enforcement and Insider Trading
In this section, we study insider trading activities across 44 countries and evaluate their informa-
tional contents. We first document insider trading profits of varying time horizons in the sample
of countries and then examine whether insider trading regulation enforcement has any influence on
both insider trading activities and the informativeness of insider trades around the world.
2.4.1 Insider Trading Profits
We obtain daily stock prices from Compustat Global and North America, and further supplement
stock return information from DataStream to compute insider trading profits. Drawn from the
existing literature, for each country, we measure insider trading profits for insider buys and sells,
separately, and we compute the profits based on the cumulative returns of the traded stocks in
excess of the country index return over 5, 10, 20, 30, 60, 90, and 120 days after insider transaction
dates.7 To conserve space, Table 2.2 reports the overall results on insider trading profits estimated
7The reporting requirements of insider trading differ across countries. For our sample period, the majority of the
countries require reporting within two days of transaction.
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over 5, 10, 20, 60, and 120 days after transaction dates by country.
As Table 2.2 indicates, average cumulative excess returns associated with insider buys are mainly
positive and those related to insider sells are primarily negative. For example, the 5-day cumulative
excess returns for insider buys are positive in 38 countries, and 29 of them are statistically significant
at the 5% level. On the other hand, 32 of the 44 countries yield negative 5-day average cumulative
excess returns for insider sells, and about half of these returns are statistically significant at the 5%
level. For insider buys, average cumulative excess returns range from -0.759% in Luxembourg to
1.530% in Ireland, and for insider sells, they are between -0.954% in Hungary and 1.550% in Czech
Republic. Similar patterns are observed in cumulative returns computed over longer horizons up
to 120 days. Insider profits are higher for most countries when measured over longer horizons, but
they also vary vastly across the countries.
Our findings are broadly consistent with the results of most prior studies based on some of
the individual countries, but they contradict the evidence shown in a few studies. For example,
our findings of profitable insider purchases are in accord with the findings of numerous studies
on insider purchases, such as Seyhun (1988), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jeng, Metrick, and
Zeckhauser (2003) on US firms, Baesel and Stein (1979) on Canadian firms, Pope, Morris, and Peel
(1990) on UK firms, Wong, Cheung, and Wu (2000) on Hong Kong firms, Betzer and Theissen
(2009) on German firms, Zingg, Lang, Wyttenbach (2007) on Swiss firms, Hotson, Kaur, and Singh
(2007) on Australian firms, Budsaratragoon, Hillier, and Lhaopadchan (2012) on Thai firms, and
Degryse, de Jong, and Lefebvre (2014) on Dutch firms. Our finding is also in line with Del Brio,
Miguel, and Perote (2002) on Spanish firms; the authors find no profitability in insider purchases
or sales in Spain.
Our evidence differs from the findings of a few studies, such as Eckbo and Smith (1998) on
Norwegian firms and Brown, Foo, and Watson (2003) on Australian firms. Using a similar method-
ology, Eckbo and Smith (1998) find insider sales but not purchases, are profitable, whereas our
analysis delivers the opposite results. Eckbo and Smith’s study is based on insider trades of stocks
in 197 companies from 1985 to 1992, whereas ours looks at insider trades of 262 Norwegian stocks
between 2007 and 2013. Brown, Foo, and Watson find that directors’ sales, but not purchases, are
profitable during the 1996-2000 period. On the contrary, our analysis shows that insider purchases
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are profitable over the 2007-2013 period.
In summary, the above results broadly suggest that insider trades, particularly insider buys,
are informative in the global stock markets. Insiders exploit their information advantage and profit
from their trades. There also seem to be substantial variations in the profits of insider trades
across the countries, as well as over different time horizons. We next turn to the analysis on the
determinants of the informativeness of insider trades by exploiting the different insider trading
regulation enforcement regimes and the different institutional characteristics across our sample of
44 countries.
2.4.2 Active Enforcement and Insider Trading Profits
In this subsection, we investigate whether active enforcement of insider trading regulation influences
insider trading activities and their informativeness as measured by insider trading profits over
varying horizons. We also examine how insider trading regulation enforcement relates to the legal
environments in a country and whether any enforcement effects on informativeness and insider
trades are driven by country-specific characteristics and general regulatory environments.
In our analysis, we estimate the following multivariate panel regression with various combina-
tions of country-specific variables that are described above.
IT Profitsi,t = β1 + β2Active Enforcementi,t + β3Legal Origini,t + β4Rule of Lawi,t
+β5Effectivenessi,t + β6RegQualityi,t + β7Anti-Self-Dealingi,t + β8Stock Devi,t
+β9Devi,t + i,t, (2.1)
where IT Profits denote profits associated with insider transactions in year t. We first compute
insider trading profits separately for insider buys and insider sells over different time horizons. For
each country and each year, we then compute the average insider trading profits for buy and sell
transactions for the different horizons. Active Enforcement is the indicator variable as defined
earlier. In our discussion below, we use active enforcement and enforcement interchangeably if the
context is clear. We include several legal environment variables in the analysis to see whether insider
trading regulation enforcement plays any unique role in different legal environments. These legal
54
environment variables are more broadly defined and they could encompass the effects of insider
trading regulation enforcement; they are Rule of Law, Effectiveness, and RegQuality as defined
in the previous section. Anti-Self-Dealing is a proxy for investor protection against corporate
insider self-dealing in business decisions. As shown in Appendix Table 2.2, the three law and
regulation variables are highly correlated. The high correlation is not surprising as the three
variables substantially measure similar quality of a country’s regulatory environment. Hence, in
our subsequent analyses, our regression model only incorporates these variables one at a time.
Additionally, we include several broad country-level characteristics in our baseline model. Legal
Origin equals 1 if the country has a common law origin, 0 if otherwise. Stock Dev is defined as
the ratio of a country’s stock market capitalization to its annual GDP, and proxies for the level of
stock market development. The countries in the sample are divided into developed and developing
countries, and we include a developed country indicator (Dev) in the regressions.
We estimate model (1) using insider trading profits measured over varying horizons as separate
dependent variables. To conserve space, Table 2.3 reports results based on insider trading profits
measured over 5, 10, 20, and 120 day intervals for insider buys and sells, separately. Our unreported
results, based on other time horizons, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.3.
Several results emerge from the table. First, the results show strong evidence that informative-
ness of insider buys measured over both short (5-day, 10-day, 20-day) and long horizons (120-day)
correlates highly with active enforcement of insider trading regulation. The coefficients of Active
Enforcement are robustly significant across the model specifications in columns (1)-(9) and across
the four panels spanning the different time horizons. In contrast, the results for insider trading
profits based on sell transactions in columns (10)-(18) produce significantly weaker evidence of in-
formativeness. For example, in Panel A, the Active Enforcement coefficient is fairly stable at 0.003
with a t-value greater than 2 for buy transactions across varying horizons. In contrast, not all
of the Active Enforcement coefficients associated with sell transactions are statistically significant.
We find some significant, though weaker, results for insider sells for the short-horizon of 5 days.
However, moving beyond the 5-day horizon, the significant insider-sell results disappear completely.
The different results for buy and sell transactions are not surprising, given the well-documented
evidence in the literature that insider buy transactions are informative while insider sell transac-
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tions are not. In general, the evidence reveals that active insider trading regulation enforcement is
associated with more, not less, informative insider trading.
Second, the results show that other variables that measure the broad legal environments do
not subsume the effects of insider trading regulation enforcement. Because of the high correlation
among the three legal environments variables, we include them separately, along with Active En-
forcement in the regressions. Rule of Law, Effectiveness, and RegQuality are significantly related
to insider trading profits in a small number of specifications for the short horizons, but neither
of these variables substitutes the effects of Active Enforcement. Other broad measures of coun-
try characteristics, such as the Dev dummy and stock market development (Stock Dev), also do
not materially alter the significance of the Active Enforcement effects. Our findings highlight the
unique role of insider trading regulation and suggest that the main determinant of insider trading
profits is the effectiveness of insider trading regulation and not the overall effectiveness of the legal
system in a country.
We also examine the potential effects of insider trading regulation on overall insider trading
activities. It is possible that a lax insider trading regulation could lead to rampant insider trading,
thereby resulting in, on average, less informed insider trading. It is also possible that differences
in the effectiveness of insider trading regulation may lead to differences in legal vs. illegal insider
trading and to differences in reported and unreported insider trading across the countries. We
estimate regressions similar to those specified in model (1) with the dependent variable of insider
trading activity, defined as insider buy and sell transactions in dollar value scaled by the firm’s
market capitalization. Regression results for insider buys and sells are presented separately in
Table 2.4. We exclude the specifications with the two variables of Effectiveness and RegQuality
from the table as these two variables are highly correlated with Rule of Law, and the results are
qualitatively similar.
As shown in Table 2.4, insider trading regulation is not significantly related to reported insider
trading activities. For both insider buys and sells, the coefficients on our main variable of interest,
Active Enforcement, are not statistically significant across all the 12 models. None of the other
country characteristics are consistently and significantly associated with insider trading activities.
The results suggest that there is no statistical difference between the level of insider trading activity
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in countries with and without active regulation enforcement. While the analysis here does not rule
out the possibility that there could be systematic differences in insider trading reports, the evidence
and particularly our analysis on insider trading activity before corporate earnings announcements
in the next section indicate that such differences, if any, are unlikely to lead to systematic biases
in our results.
To sum up, this section shows that total insider trading activities, based on the value of insider
transactions to market capitalization, do not differ significantly across countries. But insider trades
are more informative in countries that actively enforce insider trading laws. These results are
surprising. If insiders could exploit less from their information advantage, they should earn greater
profits in their trades, all other things being equal. Opponents of insider trading regulation also
stress that allowing insiders to freely use their information leads to more informative insider trading
and consequently promotes market price efficiency. Our results contradict these views. In the next
section, we investigate how active insider trading regulation enforcement leads to more, not less,
informative insider trading and more informative prices.
2.5 Regulation Enforcement and Insider Trading around Earnings
Announcements
In the preceding section, we have established that informativeness of insider trades varies across
countries with different insider trading regulation regimes. Specifically, insider trading informative-
ness is more pronounced in countries with active enforcement of insider trading laws. In this section,
our research design focuses on insider trading activities around corporate earnings announcements
to examine how insiders behave around earnings announcements across countries with varying de-
grees of enforcement in insider trading. This approach contrasts the recent work by DeFond, Hung,
and Trezevant (2007) who find that earnings announcements are more informative in countries
with higher earnings quality, stronger investor protection, or in countries that have implemented
enforcement of their insider trading laws for the first time. Our analysis of insider trading around
this important corporate event allows us to assess the effects of insider trading regulation on insider
trading activities, the informativeness of insider trading, and how insider trading activities under
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different regulation regimes affect price efficiency.
2.5.1 Insider Trading around Earnings Announcements
The global earnings announcement data are obtained from the I/B/E/S database, which provides
extensive coverage on analyst recommendations and forecasts from brokerage firms across the world.
I/B/E/S contains earnings announcement dates of firms covered by analysts, firm names, analyst
earnings forecasts, and actual earnings.
We compute 10-day, 20-day, and 30-day insider buying and selling activities before and after
earnings announcement dates, whose information is available from the I/B/E/S database. Due to
data availability in the I/B/E/S database, we are only able to compute Pre-Buy or Pre-Sell ratios
for 40 countries. For an N-day trading activity around earnings announcements, we calculate the
Pre-Buy (Pre-Sell) ratio as follows. The Pre-Buy (Pre-Sell) ratio is the amount of insider buys
(sells) over N days prior to an earnings announcement date divided by insider buys (sells) over
N days before and N days after the announcement date. We measure insider buys (sells) based
on the number of shares, or based on the share value traded. For example, the 10-day Pre-Buy
ratio is the ratio of insider buy transactions in the 10-day period before earnings announcements
to the sum of insider buy transactions in the 10-day period before and 10-day period after earnings
announcements.
Table 2.5 reports Pre-Buy and Pre-Sell ratios over varying lengths of windows around earnings
announcements and also highlights the Pre-Buy and Pre-Sell ratios that are significantly different
from 0.5 at the 5% level by using an asterisk. Results show that insiders tend to buy or sell less
prior to than after earnings announcements. Across all countries, their Pre-Buy and Pre-Sell ratios
are mostly lower than 0.5. Based on the ratios computed over a 10-day period, 35 of the Pre-Buy
ratios are statistically significant, whereas 30 of the Pre-Sell ratios are statistically significant at the
5% level. The Pre-Buy ratio based on shares ranges from 0 (Hungary) to 0.445 (Greece), while the
Pre-Sell ratio varies between 0 (Czech Republic, Ireland, and Luxembourg) and 0.598 (Hungary);
these ratios are 0.072 and 0.165, respectively, for the US. Note that none of the Pre-Buy and
Pre-Sell ratios of greater than 0.5 is statistically significant at conventional levels.
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The results on insider trading reveal that insider trading regulation has substantial effects on
insider trading activities around earnings announcements. The lower trading activity prior to earn-
ings announcements could possibly indicate the joint effects of general insider trading regulation,
insider trading lockout periods before earnings announcement imposed at the country level, and/or
corporate internal policies prohibiting any insider from trading prior to earnings announcements.8
On average, such regulations or policies deter insiders from trading on any material information
contained in the earnings reports prior to the release of such information to the public. However,
we do observe considerable insider trading activities, even during the short 10-day window before
earnings announcements, in most of the countries. Also, insider trading activities vary substantially
across the countries. Based on the 10-day results, insiders in Sweden and the UK rarely trade before
earnings announcements (with ratios of 0.038 and 0.042, respectively), but insiders in Greece and
the Philippines trade almost as much before earnings announcements as after (with ratios of 0.445
and 0.439, respectively).
We perform the following multivariate regression to examine whether insider trading behavior
around earnings announcements is related to insider trading regulation enforcement.
Pre-Buyi,t (or Pre-Selli,t) = β1 + β2Active Enforcementi,t + Control Variables + i,t, (2.2)
where Pre-Buy and Pre-Sell are country-year observations. Active Enforcement, together with
the control variables, are defined earlier. In this multivariate regression, we also include year
fixed effects and report adjusted standard errors clustered at the country level. Table 2.6 reports
regression results using Pre-Buy and Pre-Sell ratios calculated over 10 days, 20 days, or 30 days
around earnings announcement dates as dependent variables.
The multivariate regression results corroborate the univariate ones shown in Table 2.5. Cor-
porate insiders tend to buy less before earnings announcements in countries that actively enforce
their insider trading laws. Enforcement actions deter insiders from trading prior to earnings an-
nouncements. For example, the coefficient of Active Enforcement in columns (1)-(6) of Panel A
is consistently negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, even after controlling for the
country’s legal origin, rule of law, anti-self dealing, and stock market development. The Active En-
8We examine the issue of lock-up periods in a following subsection.
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forcement coefficient varies between -0.066 (t =-2.18) and -0.103 (t =-2.43). In contrast, for insider
sells, almost all of the Active Enforcement coefficients are statistically insignificant, suggesting that
insider trading regulation affects only insider buys but not sells. One possible explanation for the
insider sell results is that in many countries insiders could schedule their transactions, mostly sell
transactions, in advance and conduct transactions based on such schedules. These transactions are
not affected by corporate events and are largely immune to concerns of illegal insider trading.
Furthermore, the variables, Legal Origin and Rule of Law, have a consistently negative impact
on both Pre-Buy and Pre-Sell ratios computed over varying windows, and their coefficients are
mainly statistically significant. Their negative effects on Pre-Buy suggest that in countries with
strong investor protection and better law and order, insiders tend to buy significantly less before
earnings announcements. We find similar results for Anti-self-dealing regulations.
In summary, the results show that insiders from countries without rigorous enforcement of
insider trading regulation are far more likely to exploit material corporate information in their
trading decisions than insiders from countries with rigorous enforcement. Even though corporate
earnings announcements are high profile events that are closely followed and observed by investors
and regulators alike, the substantial differences in reported insider trading activities across the
countries suggest that insiders in countries without active enforcement not only conduct but also
disclose their trades before earnings announcements. The results further suggest that different
reporting requirements across countries, if any, or non-reporting by insiders for sensitive trades are
unlikely to systematically affect our findings in the paper.
2.5.2 Insider Trading and Price Reaction to Earnings News
The extant literature has shown that earnings announcements generate significant price reactions.
Recent studies also find that market reactions to corporate news, including corporate earnings
news, differ across markets (see, e.g., Bhattacharya et al, 2000; DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant,
2007). We examine market price reactions to earnings announcements in our sample of countries
and investigate the association between price reactions and insider trading regulations and between
price reactions and insider trading activities before earnings announcements.
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We compute three different measures of price reactions, namely the cumulative return difference,
return difference standard deviation, and abnormal return variance. Following existing studies, we
focus on the price reaction of the [-1, 1] event window, which is arguably less noisy. These three
measures are defined as follows.
(i) Abnormal return variance: The abnormal return variance is the stock return variance over
the event window [-1, 1], scaled by stock return variance over the estimation window [-120,
-21]. Stock return variance over the event window is the average of squared prediction errors
from the market model during the event window [-1, 1], whereas the stock return variance
over the estimation window is the variance of residuals from the market model estimated over
the estimation period [-120, -21].
(ii) Cumulative return difference: The absolute value of the cumulative stock return in excess of
the country index return over the event window [-1, 1].
(iii) Return difference standard deviation: Standard deviation of stock returns in excess of the
country index return over the event window [-1, 1].
All the price reaction measures are computed first by taking an average of the variables for each
firm and then averaging within each country.
Table 2.7 presents results of the three price reaction measures. These measures indicate that
price reactions around earnings announcements vary widely across the sample of countries. The
average price reaction is 2.317 for abnormal return variance, 6.758% for cumulative return differ-
ence, and 2.728% for return difference standard deviation. The abnormal return variance varies
from 1.214 (Hungary) to 4.554 (UK), cumulative return difference ranges between 3.562% (Chile)
and 11.430% (Indonesia), and return difference standard deviation is between 1.394% (Chile) and
5.746% (Indonesia). Similar to the findings of DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007), our results
suggest that developed countries such as the US and UK have stronger price reactions, whereas
emerging countries such as Chile and the Philippines have the weakest.
We now examine whether and how each price reaction measure is related to insider trading
regulation and insider trading activities. We first regress price reactions on Active Enforcement,
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along with the control variables, and the results are shown in Table 2.8. We find a consistently
positive relation between active insider trading regulation enforcement and market price reactions
to earnings news. Independent of the price reaction measure employed, Active Enforcement has
a positive and statistically significant effect on market price reaction. The coefficients on Active
Enforcement are all positive and statistically significant mostly at the 5% level. These results are
consistent with our earlier findings that active enforcement of insider trading laws enhances price
informativeness. In countries that rigorously enforce insider trading regulation, corporate earnings
announcements contain substantial information, and stock price reacts strongly to earnings news.
We next examine the link between insider trading activities and price reactions around earnings
announcements. We have documented that insiders actively trade around earnings announcements.
In countries without active regulation enforcement, insiders in fact trade actively before earnings
announcements. A natural question to ask is whether such trading activities have any substan-
tial influence on price reactions to earnings announcements. We therefore estimate the following
regression model.
Price Reactioni,t = β0 + β1BuySi,t (or BuyVi,t) + Control Variables + i,t, (2.3)
where Price Reaction is again measured by the abnormal return variance, cumulative return differ-
ence, and standard deviation of return difference. BuyV (BuyS) is the ratio of the total dollar value
(the number of shares) of insider buys before earnings announcement dates to the sum of the total
dollar value (the number of shares) of insider buys before and after earnings announcement dates.
Both the price reactions and insider trading variables are country-year averages. Our regression
models focus on insider buys as a measure of insider trading intensity before earnings announce-
ments in the regression, because insider buys are generally more informative and also, insider buy
ratios before earnings announcements are closely related to insider trading regulation.
Table 2.9 provides evidence on the relation between insider trading activity around earnings an-
nouncement (over a 10-day window) and market price reaction to earnings news. The main variables
of interest are BuyS in columns (1)-(6) and BuyV in columns (7)-(12) with varying combinations
of control variables. We find that insider trading activities before earnings announcements signif-
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icantly dampen market price reaction to earnings news. The coefficients of BuyS and BuyV are
consistently negative and highly significant across different measures of price reactions. Unreported
results based on insider trading activities over different event windows (20-day and 30-day) show
similar results. Stock prices on average react less to earnings news when insiders trade actively be-
fore earnings announcements. These findings are consistent with our earlier evidence documented
above: enforcement of insider trading regulation affects insider trading activity before earnings an-
nouncements, and such enforcements are also strongly associated with price reactions to earnings
news.
2.5.3 Lockout Periods, Insider Trading, and Price Reaction
As part of insider trading regulation, some countries explicitly impose lockout periods around
earnings announcement dates. While some countries do not explicitly impose such restrictions, it is
generally understood that insiders should refrain from trading on non-public material information,
including corporate earnings information. Additionally, for some countries, corporations impose
their own internal lockout periods for high level corporate executives and board directors (see,
e.g., Bettis et al, 2000). During an explicit lockout period, corporate insiders are not allowed to
buy or sell their shares before or shortly after the earnings announcement date. One may argue
that countries that actively enforce their insider trading laws could be more likely to adopt explicit
lockout periods. Hence, the relatively lower insider trading activity prior to earnings announcement
dates in those countries and the relation between insider regulation and insider trading activity
might be due to lockup restrictions. If this is the case, such lockout restrictions might potentially
affect our key findings. In this subsection, we examine whether incorporating lockout periods into
our analysis would alter our main results.
We collect information on lockout periods of our sample of 40 countries from publications of the
countries’ security regulatory agencies, by direct communications with the agencies, or both. Ap-
pendix Table 2.3 presents the information about their policies on lockout periods. Our information
indicates that only 18 of the countries have lockout periods but with varying lengths. For example,
in Austria, insiders are not allowed to trade three weeks before the release of quarterly financial
reports and six weeks before the annual financial report release. In the Philippines, however, insid-
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ers are prohibited from trading during the period within which a material non-public information
is obtained and up to two trading days after the sensitive information is being released. However,
despite these legally imposed lockout periods in place, none of these countries appear to enforce
their lockout periods. As shown in Table 2.5, insiders from these 18 countries still continue to
trade during the announcement period, although their trading activity is lower before than after
announcement dates. In addition, we find no evidence that the existence of lockup periods in
a country is significantly correlated with the enforcement of insider trading regulation. We first
examine whether there is any difference in the Pre-Buy or Pre-Sell ratio between countries with
lockout periods and those without. Our unreported test results find no statistical difference in the
ratios between the two groups of countries, and that the evidence is robust across the Pre-Buy and
Pre-Sell ratios computed over varying intervals.
To further address the concern that lockup period adoption could affect our main findings, we
replicate our results reported in Tables 2.6, 2.8, and 2.9 by including a lockout indicator, which
takes the value of 1 if the country has a lockout period and 0 if otherwise, in the regression. Our
regression analysis also includes an interaction variable of the lockout indicator and Active Enforce-
ment to evaluate any joint effects of the two variables. These results are reported in Table 2.10.
Briefly, the lockup period variable and the interaction term exhibit no effect on the documented
relation between Active Enforcement and insider trading activities before earnings announcements
(columns 1-4). While the lockup period and interaction variables are significant in some spec-
ifications (columns 5-6), they do not materially change the significant relation between Active
Enforcement and price reaction. Nor do they alter the significant relation between insider trading
activity and price reaction in columns 9 to 12.
2.5.4 Regulation Enforcement, Insider Trading, and Price Efficiency
We have presented evidence on the link between enforcement of insider trading regulation, insider
trading activities, and price reactions around earnings announcements. Our results show that
insiders trade significantly less before corporate earnings announcements in countries with active
enforcement of insider trading regulations and that these insiders are less inclined to exploit material
corporate information in their trading decisions. In countries with more rigorous insider trading
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enforcement, stock price reactions to corporate earnings announcements are also stronger. These
results imply that insider trading regulation enforcement restrains insiders from trading on material
information and leads to stronger stock price reactions to corporate earnings announcements.
We now examine the potential mechanism through which insider trading regulation affects in-
sider trading and price efficiency. Do insider trading activities before earnings announcements
reduce stock price informativeness without advancing price discovery, or do insider trades help in-
corporate earnings-related information into stock prices prior to the announcements, thus reducing
stock price reactions to earnings announcements? In the former case, insider trades lead to less
informative prices, as the trades themselves add little information to the market. In the latter,
insider trades could affect when and what information gets impounded into stock prices, but may
not affect the overall stock price efficiency.
In Table 2.11, we examine and compare gains associated with insider buys 10 days before and
10 days after earnings announcements in countries with and without active regulation enforcement.
We use two variables to measure pre-announcement insider trading gains: insider trading gains over
the period up to one day before earnings announcement and insider trading gains over the period
up to one day after earnings announcement. The first variable measures the informativeness of
insider trading excluding the public announcement of earnings information, and the second variable
measures the informativeness of insider trading including the earnings information. For example,
if an insider trade occurs on day -10 (where day 0 is the earnings announcement day), we compute
the insider’s trading profits from day -9 to day -2 by summing up the stock return in excess of
the country return from day -9 to day -2. Then, we take the average of the profits of all insider
transactions that occur within each year for each country. This represents the insider trading profits
excluding earnings announcement returns. For profits including earnings announcement returns,
we would compute the insider’s trading profits from day -9 to day 1 by summing up the stock
return in excess of the country return from day -9 to day 1. If an insider trade occurs on day 1,
we compute the insider’s trading profits from day 2 to day 11 by summing up the stock return in
excess of the country return during this period, and then compute the average of the profits of all
insider transactions that occur within each year for each country. All insider trading gains after
earnings announcements are measured over the 10-day period after the transaction. We employ a
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“Before” dummy to denote insider trading gains from pre-announcement trading activities. The
first six models use insider trading gains excluding earnings announcement abnormal returns. Such
gains measure insider trading profits before earnings information becomes public.
The results show that independent of whether or not we include the 3-day stock returns around
earnings announcements, insider trading around earnings announcements is more informative in
countries with active enforcement of insider trading regulation than in those without. Based on
insider trading gains that include earnings announcement abnormal returns, the interaction of
Active Enforcement and “Before” dummies is positive and mainly significant at the 10% level.
The implication is that in countries where insider trading regulation is actively enforced, insider
trades are more informative before earnings announcements. However, in countries without active
enforcement, there is no significant difference between pre- and post-announcement insider trades,
thereby indicating that these trades are not informative at all. Our results are consistent with
the interpretation that in countries with lax regulatory environments, active insider trading before
earnings announcements reduces stock price informativeness without advancing earnings news or
helping to incorporate earnings information into stock prices.
It should be noted that the analysis here is based on reported insider trades around earnings
announcements. Because of the potential litigation concerns, even in countries without active
enforcement, insiders may refrain from trading based on highly profitable non-public information
before earnings announcements. For example, Huddart et al. (2007) find that US insiders avoid
profitable trades before quarterly earnings are announced. It is likely that such litigation concerns
have a greater impact on insider trading in countries with active enforcement than in countries
without active enforcement. Even with this potential caveat, insider trades are more profitable in
countries with active enforcement than in countries without active enforcement.
To summarize, our results suggest that active enforcement of insider trading regulations leads
to more informative insider trading and greater stock price efficiency. Even though insiders from
countries with weak insider trading regulations could exploit their information advantage, such as
corporate earnings news, in their trades, market reactions to corporate news are weaker, resulting
in noisier stock prices. At the same time, the noisier stock prices reduce the potential information
advantage of insiders and hence, lower the informativeness of insider trades.
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2.6 Conclusion
This study offers direct evidence that active insider trading enforcement engenders more, and not
less, informative insider trades. These findings are in stark contrast to the arguments that insider
trading regulation reduces the informativeness of insider trades and hinders price efficiency. These
results remain robust after controlling for various country-level institutional characteristics that in-
clude the rule of law and the general effectiveness of law enforcement. Our analysis of insider trading
activities around corporate earnings announcements provides insights on why active insider trading
enforcement results in more informative insider trades and more efficient stock prices. In countries
with active enforcement of insider trading regulations, (i) insiders trade significantly less prior to
corporate earnings announcements over 10- to 30-day intervals; (ii) insiders tend to refrain from
trading on material non-public information; and (iii) stock price reactions to corporate earnings
announcements are stronger. In countries without active insider trading enforcement, insiders trade
more before earnings announcements, but their trades do not help to incorporate earnings-related
information into stock prices, and stock prices also react less to earnings announcements.
Perhaps our most striking finding is that enforcement of insider trading regulation leads to both
more informative insider trading and greater stock price efficiency. Opponents of insider trading
regulation argue that unrestricted insider trading leads to more informed trading and to more
efficient prices; however, our results show no support for this argument. While proponents of in-
sider trading regulation contend that unrestricted insider trading could lead to less informationally
efficient stock prices, they also tend to hold the view that such insider trades can be highly infor-
mative. Our results show that less informative prices render less informative insider trades. The
evidence suggests that informativeness of insider trades and stock price efficiency are simultaneously
determined, parallel results.
Our research has additional public policy implications. Enforcement of insider trading laws,
not the establishment of the insider trading laws, facilitates stock market efficiency and promotes
informative insider trading. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and several subsequent studies find
that initial enforcement of insider trading regulation could significantly affect price efficiency. Our
study shows that continuous and active enforcement of insider trading regulation could help to
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achieve regulators’ primary goal of monitoring insider trading activities and improving stock market
efficiency.
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Table 2.1
Insider Trading Activity, Regulation, and Enforcement around the World
This table provides by country, the market type (developed (DEV) or emerging (EMG)), start year of insider trades
at Director Deals, number of unique firms that report insider trades, average annual number of insider trades, average
value of trades in millions $, average annual trade value relative to market capitalization in %, the year the insider
trading (IT) law was established, the year IT law was first enforced, and a dummy variable (Active Enforcement)
that equals 1 if insider trading prosecution occurred during the sample period, and 0 otherwise.
Market Start # of # of Insider Trades IT Laws First Active
Country Type Year Firms Trades Value (mil $) Value (%) Existence Enforcement Enforcement
Australia DEV 2008 1723 3044 1116.36 0.085 1991 1996 1
Austria DEV 2008 63 181 319.03 0.331 1993 2000 1
Belgium DEV 2007 116 352 751.88 0.229 1990 1994 0
Brazil EMG 2013 103 421 463.26 0.005 1976 1978 1
Canada DEV 2009 2517 14440 4609.26 0.218 1966 1976 1
Chile EMG 2013 60 394 636.26 0.240 1981 1996 0
China EMG 2010 1228 3750 3670.44 0.098 1993 2000 1
Croatia EMG 2008 24 76 10.75 0.046 1995 no 0
Cyprus EMG 2008 25 42 13.10 0.184 1999 2000 0
Czech Republic EMG 2007 5 25 9.28 0.016 1992 1993 0
Denmark DEV 2007 177 429 330.12 0.108 1991 1996 1
Egypt EMG 2009 75 283 68.03 0.113 1992 2012 1
Estonia EMG 2007 18 54 26.90 0.824 1996 2009 1
Finland DEV 2013 54 379 335.84 0.111 1989 1993 0
France DEV 2007 582 2026 4548.90 0.210 1967 1975 1
Germany DEV 2007 516 1261 1658.31 0.031 1994 1995 1
Greece DEV 2008 193 2941 1386.44 1.723 1988 1996 0
Hong Kong DEV 2009 848 3254 5714.20 0.197 1991 1994 1
Hungary EMG 2009 11 20 10.66 0.047 1994 1995 1
India EMG 2008 1363 3759 865.09 0.067 1992 1998 1
Indonesia EMG 2013 28 130 113.30 0.033 1991 1996 0
Ireland DEV 2007 47 69 99.37 0.100 1990 2000 1
Israel EMG 2010 247 716 280.84 0.151 1981 1989 1
Italy DEV 2007 281 1656 1667.62 0.184 1991 1996 1
Luxembourg DEV 2010 7 31 15.31 0.007 1991 2000 0
Malaysia EMG 2009 832 4270 1574.94 0.361 1973 1996 1
Netherlands DEV 2007 116 281 245.89 0.023 1989 1994 1
New Zealand DEV 2008 105 199 95.10 0.033 1988 2000 0
Norway DEV 2007 262 737 748.27 0.277 1985 1990 1
Pakistan EMG 2013 57 414 26.33 0.045 1995 no 0
Philippines EMG 2009 167 979 1132.32 0.614 1982 1994 1
Poland EMG 2010 374 1086 756.27 0.322 1991 1993 1
Portugal EMG 2009 38 226 819.94 0.502 1986 2000 0
Singapore DEV 2008 542 1268 807.30 0.093 1973 1978 1
South Africa EMG 2008 308 942 570.57 0.068 1989 2000 1
South Korea EMG 2011 1197 2650 1968.77 0.166 1976 1988 1
Spain DEV 2007 132 719 2009.44 0.206 1994 1998 0
Sri Lanka EMG 2010 154 397 89.71 0.474 1987 1996 0
Sweden DEV 2007 289 1573 1302.90 0.196 1971 1990 1
Switzerland DEV 2007 228 1529 1854.53 0.155 1988 1995 1
Thailand EMG 2010 378 2299 867.61 0.101 1984 1993 0
Turkey EMG 2010 160 1064 682.89 0.268 1981 1996 1
United Kingdom DEV 2007 1984 3630 2316.78 0.046 1980 1981 1
United States DEV 2007 6501 45588 44812.71 0.044 1934 1961 1
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Table 2.2
Insider Trading Profits Over 5 to 120 Days from Transaction Dates
This table reports insider trading profits for insider buys (Buy) and sells (Sell), separately, over varying
periods from the transaction dates. Insider trading profits are the average cumulative excess return (i.e., the
return of a stock in excess of its country-level index) over 5 days, 10 days, 20 days, 60 days and 120 days
after the insider transaction date. Insider trading profits are expressed in percentage with their statistical
significance at the 5% level denoted by an ∗.
5-Day 10-Day 20-Day 60-Day 120-Day
Country Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell
Australia 0.613∗ -0.160 0.718∗ -0.185 0.573∗ 0.114 0.728∗ 1.079∗ 2.646∗ 1.359∗
Austria 0.727∗ 0.262 0.899∗ -0.465 1.603∗ -0.217 3.805∗ 1.640 7.708∗ 5.833∗
Belgium 0.671∗ -0.237 0.934∗ -0.062 0.958∗ -0.227 1.822∗ -0.063 1.608∗ -0.415
Brazil -0.021 -0.531∗ 0.462 -0.930∗ -0.606 -1.780∗ -1.898 -2.232∗ -4.167 -6.050∗
Canada 0.664∗ 0.061 1.109∗ 0.232∗ 1.985∗ 0.705∗ 4.000∗ 2.014∗ 6.944∗ 3.416∗
Chile 0.583∗ -0.087 0.837∗ -0.984∗ 1.463∗ -0.903 2.999∗ -2.997 -2.077 -7.759∗
China 0.455∗ -0.652∗ 0.892∗ -0.643∗ 1.138∗ -0.433∗ 3.070∗ 1.147∗ 4.871∗ 3.167∗
Croatia 0.023 0.116 0.066 -0.556 -0.298 -1.098 -1.124∗ -1.025 -1.910∗ -1.812
Cyprus 0.799 0.744 0.121 -1.280 -1.214 -2.745∗ 4.195 -6.905∗ 4.897 -7.742∗
Czech Republic 1.434 1.550∗ 1.414 0.144 0.863 -0.625 1.706 -1.255 5.222∗ 3.786
Denmark 0.586∗ 0.277 0.798∗ 0.429 0.473 0.859∗ 0.341 1.445∗ 3.515∗ 1.762
Egypt 0.049 -0.430∗ -0.017 -0.724∗ -0.602 -0.920∗ -0.060 -3.414∗ 1.348 -0.555
Estonia 0.624 -0.559 0.600 -0.558 2.034∗ -0.981 0.603 -2.557 0.080 -3.969
Finland 0.099 -0.520∗ -0.527 -0.599 -1.481∗ -1.894∗ -4.528∗ -5.533∗ -5.283∗ -6.061∗
France 0.247∗ -0.263∗ 0.434∗ -0.358∗ 0.675∗ -0.499∗ 1.170∗ -0.818∗ 1.138∗ -1.472∗
Germany 1.319∗ -0.386∗ 1.818∗ -0.439∗ 2.150∗ -0.500∗ 3.010∗ -0.926∗ 4.232∗ -0.370
Greece 0.326∗ -0.208 0.644∗ -0.296 1.217∗ -0.924∗ 2.314∗ -3.713∗ 4.641∗ -5.238∗
Hong Kong 0.566∗ -0.277∗ 0.843∗ -0.283 1.009∗ -0.020 1.644∗ 0.184 3.446∗ 2.159∗
Hungary 1.139 -0.954∗ 2.922 -1.132∗ 3.591 -1.443∗ 2.939 -2.105∗ 5.534 -1.541
India 0.120∗ -0.110∗ 0.186∗ -0.094 0.345∗ 0.352∗ 0.861∗ 1.179∗ 1.420∗ 2.376∗
Indonesia -3.333 0.202 -4.054 2.744 0.476 3.036 2.911∗ 2.679 -2.697∗ 6.756
Ireland 1.530∗ 0.490 1.466∗ 0.302 1.432∗ 0.360 1.927 4.361∗ -0.152 4.559
Israel 0.779∗ 0.022 0.977∗ 0.651∗ 1.217∗ 0.317 2.283∗ 1.177 0.229 1.742
Italy 0.220∗ -0.237∗ 0.432∗ -0.418∗ 0.523∗ -0.679∗ 0.334 -1.786∗ 0.510∗ -3.413∗
Luxembourg -0.759∗ -0.209 -1.186∗ 0.555 -0.927 0.488 -4.292∗ 2.590 -5.192∗ -0.551
Malaysia 0.187∗ -0.374∗ 0.405∗ -0.554∗ 0.868∗ -0.863∗ 2.225∗ -1.108∗ 3.918∗ -2.928∗
Netherlands -0.162 -0.578∗ 0.112 -0.605∗ -0.099 -0.797∗ -0.657 -3.783∗ 0.485 -5.160∗
New Zealand 0.610∗ 0.594∗ 0.712∗ 0.445 1.029∗ 0.365 0.941 0.517 4.876∗ 4.868∗
Norway 0.911∗ -0.308 1.017∗ 0.100 0.835∗ 0.494 0.888∗ 0.954 1.520∗ 1.948
Pakistan 0.301 0.664 1.124 0.698 -0.183 0.452 1.028 2.358∗ -7.652∗ -0.432
Philippines 0.198 -0.106 0.293 -0.304∗ 0.635∗ -0.592∗ 1.212∗ -0.948∗ 1.647∗ -0.262
Poland 0.430∗ -0.144 0.527∗ -0.501∗ 0.893∗ -0.641∗ 0.951∗ -0.975∗ -0.137 -4.093∗
Portugal -0.006 -0.583 -0.016 -0.763 -0.102 -1.320∗ -0.493 0.444 0.352 -2.202
Singapore 0.245∗ -0.292 0.538∗ -0.729∗ 0.799∗ -0.653∗ 2.117∗ 1.068∗ 3.021∗ 2.693∗
South Africa 0.614∗ -0.142 0.777∗ -0.200 1.135∗ 0.076 2.277∗ 0.007 6.382∗ 2.490∗
South Korea 0.787∗ -0.322∗ 1.270∗ -0.233 2.789∗ -0.135 4.187∗ 1.806∗ 8.540∗ 5.750∗
Spain -0.002 -0.261∗ -0.174 -0.751∗ -0.396∗ -1.547∗ -0.925∗ -2.870∗ -3.130∗ -7.819∗
Sri Lanka 1.302∗ -0.187 1.050∗ -1.103 2.314∗ -0.613 2.977∗ -1.019 5.594∗ 2.228
Sweden 0.337∗ -0.323∗ 0.452∗ -0.461∗ 0.558∗ -0.745∗ 1.086∗ -0.517 1.489∗ -1.184∗
Switzerland 0.040 -0.009 -0.028 -0.002 -0.029 -0.106 -0.165 -0.987∗ -0.336 -2.312∗
Thailand 0.303∗ -0.102 0.541∗ 0.102 0.454∗ 0.128 1.002∗ 0.452 -0.917 0.863
Turkey 0.323∗ -0.946∗ 0.718∗ -1.041∗ 1.073∗ -1.392∗ 1.172∗ -4.260∗ -1.350∗ -9.266∗
UK 1.146∗ 0.064 1.327∗ 0.039 1.297∗ -0.111 1.578∗ 0.390 2.291∗ 1.407∗
US 1.384∗ -0.037∗ 1.796∗ 0.092∗ 2.449∗ 0.397∗ 5.062∗ 1.189∗ 8.695∗ 2.424∗
70
T
a
b
le
2
.3
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
R
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
P
ro
fi
ts
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
p
a
n
el
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
a
g
g
re
g
a
te
in
si
d
er
tr
a
d
in
g
p
ro
fi
ts
(I
T
P
ro
fi
ts
)
o
n
A
ct
iv
e
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
a
n
d
co
u
n
tr
y
-l
ev
el
co
n
tr
o
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s,
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
y
ea
r-
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
fo
r
in
si
d
er
b
u
y
s
a
n
d
se
ll
s,
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
.
IT
p
ro
fi
ts
a
re
co
m
p
u
te
d
b
y
fi
rs
t
cu
m
u
la
ti
n
g
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
s
in
ex
ce
ss
o
f
co
u
n
tr
y
-l
ev
el
in
d
ex
es
o
v
er
N
d
a
y
s
a
n
d
th
en
ta
k
in
g
a
n
a
v
er
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
p
ro
fi
ts
w
it
h
in
ea
ch
y
ea
r
fo
r
ea
ch
co
u
n
tr
y.
A
ct
iv
e
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
ri
a
b
le
th
a
t
eq
u
a
ls
1
if
th
er
e
is
a
n
IT
la
w
p
ro
se
cu
ti
o
n
ev
en
t
w
it
h
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
o
f
th
e
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
o
u
r
sa
m
p
le
,
0
o
th
er
w
is
e.
L
eg
a
l
O
ri
g
in
id
en
ti
fi
es
th
e
le
g
a
l
o
ri
g
in
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
a
n
y
la
w
o
r
co
m
m
er
ci
a
l
co
d
e
o
f
ea
ch
co
u
n
tr
y
(c
o
m
m
o
n
la
w
o
r
ci
v
il
la
w
).
It
eq
u
a
ls
to
1
if
th
e
la
w
o
ri
g
in
o
f
a
co
u
n
tr
y
is
co
m
m
o
n
la
w
a
n
d
0
o
th
er
w
is
e.
R
u
le
o
f
L
a
w
re
fl
ec
ts
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
ex
te
n
t
to
w
h
ic
h
a
g
en
ts
h
a
v
e
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
a
n
d
a
b
id
e
b
y
th
e
ru
le
s
o
f
so
ci
et
y,
a
n
d
in
p
a
rt
ic
u
la
r
th
e
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
a
n
d
p
ro
p
er
ty
ri
g
h
ts
.
E
ff
ec
ti
v
en
es
s
re
fl
ec
ts
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
se
rv
ic
es
,
th
e
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
th
e
ci
v
il
se
rv
ic
e
a
n
d
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
it
s
in
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
fr
o
m
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
p
re
ss
u
re
s,
th
e
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
p
o
li
cy
fo
rm
u
la
ti
o
n
a
n
d
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
th
e
cr
ed
ib
il
it
y
o
f
th
e
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t’
s
co
m
m
it
m
en
t
to
su
ch
p
o
li
ci
es
.
R
eg
Q
u
a
li
ty
re
fl
ec
ts
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
th
e
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
to
fo
rm
u
la
te
a
n
d
im
p
le
m
en
t
so
u
n
d
p
o
li
ci
es
a
n
d
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
s
th
a
t
p
er
m
it
a
n
d
p
ro
m
o
te
p
ri
v
a
te
se
ct
o
r
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t.
T
h
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
th
es
e
th
re
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
2
0
1
4
W
o
rl
d
w
id
e
G
o
ve
rn
a
n
ce
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
.
A
n
ti
-S
el
f-
D
ea
li
n
g
is
a
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
in
v
es
to
r
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
a
n
d
is
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
D
ja
n
k
o
v
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
8
).
S
to
ck
D
ev
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
co
u
n
tr
y
-l
ev
el
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
ca
p
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
to
G
D
P
a
n
d
is
a
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t.
D
ev
d
u
m
m
y
eq
u
a
ls
1
if
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
is
d
ev
el
o
p
ed
,
0
o
th
er
w
is
e.
t-
st
a
ti
st
ic
s,
b
a
se
d
o
n
cl
u
st
er
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
t
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
le
v
el
,
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
is
d
en
o
te
d
b
y
∗ ,
∗∗
,
a
n
d
∗∗
∗
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
P
a
n
el
A
:
5
-D
a
y
IT
P
ro
fi
ts
In
si
d
er
B
u
y
s
In
si
d
er
S
el
ls
V
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
(1
6
)
(1
7
)
(1
8
)
A
ct
iv
e
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
*
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
3
*
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
(2
.7
3
)
(2
.6
0
)
(2
.1
6
)
(2
.3
0
)
(2
.2
2
)
(2
.1
9
)
(2
.1
8
)
(2
.2
4
)
(2
.2
8
)
(-
1
.4
6
)
(-
1
.6
3
)
(-
2
.1
0
)
(-
2
.0
1
)
(-
2
.1
1
)
(-
1
.3
0
)
(-
2
.0
0
)
(-
2
.2
1
)
(-
2
.0
8
)
L
eg
a
l
O
ri
g
in
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
(2
.9
3
)
(3
.0
3
)
(2
.8
7
)
(2
.9
2
)
(1
.4
9
)
(2
.9
5
)
(3
.1
1
)
(3
.0
6
)
(2
.3
6
)
(2
.5
0
)
(2
.3
8
)
(2
.4
4
)
(2
.5
3
)
(3
.0
7
)
(2
.4
1
)
(2
.7
8
)
R
u
le
o
f
L
a
w
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
*
0
.0
0
1
*
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
2
*
(2
.3
3
)
(2
.3
5
)
(0
.4
3
)
(0
.4
3
)
(1
.7
8
)
(2
.0
2
)
(1
.7
3
)
(1
.7
8
)
E
ff
ec
ti
v
en
es
s
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
1
(1
.8
0
)
(1
.6
6
)
R
eg
Q
u
a
li
ty
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
(1
.6
9
)
(2
.2
4
)
A
n
ti
-S
el
f-
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
4
D
ea
li
n
g
(-
0
.2
3
)
(-
0
.9
7
)
S
to
ck
D
ev
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
*
(0
.0
1
)
(-
0
.4
0
)
(-
2
.2
1
)
(-
1
.7
9
)
D
ev
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
(1
.3
3
)
(1
.3
7
)
(-
0
.6
6
)
(-
0
.4
3
)
N
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
1
3
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
1
4
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
7
9
0
.0
8
9
0
.0
8
5
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
8
8
0
.0
8
5
0
.0
9
1
0
.0
8
7
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
1
6
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
71
T
a
b
le
2
.3
-
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
R
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
P
ro
fi
ts
P
a
n
el
A
:
1
0
-D
a
y
IT
P
ro
fi
ts
In
si
d
er
B
u
y
s
In
si
d
er
S
el
ls
V
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
(1
6
)
(1
7
)
(1
8
)
A
ct
iv
e
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
4
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
(2
.3
2
)
(2
.1
6
)
(1
.8
8
)
(1
.8
8
)
(1
.8
5
)
(1
.7
1
)
(1
.8
5
)
(1
.8
7
)
(1
.8
4
)
(-
0
.1
4
)
(-
0
.2
3
)
(-
0
.5
5
)
(-
0
.4
6
)
(-
0
.5
7
)
(-
0
.9
8
)
(-
0
.5
9
)
(-
0
.6
3
)
(-
0
.6
4
)
L
eg
a
l
O
ri
g
in
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
(2
.1
7
)
(2
.1
8
)
(2
.1
3
)
(2
.1
5
)
(1
.6
9
)
(1
.7
9
)
(2
.2
3
)
(1
.8
3
)
(1
.2
1
)
(1
.2
1
)
(1
.1
9
)
(1
.1
6
)
(0
.8
2
)
(0
.9
3
)
(1
.3
4
)
(1
.1
5
)
R
u
le
o
f
L
a
w
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
(0
.8
9
)
(0
.8
1
)
(0
.5
3
)
(0
.5
3
)
(2
.1
4
)
(1
.8
5
)
(-
0
.1
7
)
(-
0
.1
7
)
E
ff
ec
ti
v
en
es
s
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
(0
.7
5
)
(1
.3
9
)
R
eg
Q
u
a
li
ty
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
(0
.7
8
)
(1
.8
5
)
A
n
ti
-S
el
f-
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
D
ea
li
n
g
(-
0
.4
2
)
(0
.1
2
)
S
to
ck
D
ev
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
(0
.3
6
)
(0
.3
1
)
(0
.3
5
)
(-
0
.0
7
)
D
ev
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
(0
.3
2
)
(0
.2
5
)
(1
.1
6
)
(1
.1
9
)
N
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
1
3
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
1
4
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
5
4
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
2
1
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
2
3
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
72
T
a
b
le
2
.3
-
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
R
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
P
ro
fi
ts
P
a
n
el
A
:
2
0
-D
a
y
IT
P
ro
fi
ts
In
si
d
er
B
u
y
s
In
si
d
er
S
el
ls
V
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
(1
6
)
(1
7
)
(1
8
)
A
ct
iv
e
0
.0
0
8
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
(2
.6
3
)
(2
.4
2
)
(2
.0
1
)
(2
.0
3
)
(1
.9
6
)
(2
.0
8
)
(2
.0
5
)
(2
.0
6
)
(2
.0
8
)
(0
.7
7
)
(0
.6
4
)
(0
.3
1
)
(0
.3
9
)
(0
.2
8
)
(0
.2
3
)
(0
.2
9
)
(0
.2
6
)
(0
.2
6
)
L
eg
a
l
O
ri
g
in
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
8
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
(1
.2
8
)
(1
.2
7
)
(1
.2
5
)
(1
.2
6
)
(1
.8
0
)
(0
.8
4
)
(1
.3
6
)
(0
.9
2
)
(1
.4
8
)
(1
.4
5
)
(1
.4
4
)
(1
.3
8
)
(1
.4
7
)
(1
.1
2
)
(1
.5
9
)
(1
.3
5
)
R
u
le
o
f
L
a
w
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
2
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
(1
.1
3
)
(0
.8
9
)
(0
.2
9
)
(0
.2
9
)
(1
.9
6
)
(1
.6
9
)
(-
0
.1
2
)
(-
0
.1
2
)
E
ff
ec
ti
v
en
es
s
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
(0
.5
7
)
(1
.2
1
)
R
eg
Q
u
a
li
ty
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
*
(0
.8
2
)
(1
.7
1
)
A
n
ti
-S
el
f-
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
2
D
ea
li
n
g
(-
0
.8
2
)
(-
0
.2
7
)
S
to
ck
D
ev
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(0
.8
9
)
(0
.8
2
)
(0
.5
0
)
(0
.1
1
)
D
ev
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
(0
.5
8
)
(0
.4
5
)
(1
.1
1
)
(1
.1
2
)
N
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
1
3
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
1
4
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.0
4
5
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
4
5
0
.0
4
3
0
.0
4
4
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
4
2
0
.0
4
2
0
.0
3
8
0
.0
2
3
0
.0
2
7
0
.0
2
9
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
2
9
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
2
8
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
73
T
a
b
le
2
.3
-
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
R
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
P
ro
fi
ts
P
a
n
el
A
:
1
2
0
-D
a
y
IT
P
ro
fi
ts
In
si
d
er
B
u
y
s
In
si
d
er
S
el
ls
V
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
(1
6
)
(1
7
)
(1
8
)
A
ct
iv
e
0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
0
.0
2
8
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
2
1
0
.0
2
2
0
.0
2
2
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
2
0
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
(3
.4
5
)
(3
.2
0
)
(3
.1
2
)
(3
.0
5
)
(3
.2
1
)
(3
.2
4
)
(3
.1
6
)
(3
.2
5
)
(3
.2
5
)
(1
.5
2
)
(1
.3
4
)
(0
.9
9
)
(1
.0
1
)
(1
.0
3
)
(1
.0
7
)
(1
.0
0
)
(0
.9
7
)
(0
.9
8
)
L
eg
a
l
O
ri
g
in
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
1
3
*
0
.0
2
3
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
1
4
*
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
1
9
(1
.6
5
)
(1
.6
5
)
(1
.6
5
)
(1
.7
4
)
(1
.6
6
)
(1
.2
8
)
(1
.7
8
)
(1
.4
4
)
(1
.3
7
)
(1
.3
5
)
(1
.3
3
)
(1
.3
3
)
(1
.4
5
)
(1
.0
4
)
(1
.4
3
)
(1
.1
7
)
R
u
le
o
f
L
a
w
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
0
*
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
(-
0
.0
9
)
(-
0
.2
3
)
(-
0
.5
7
)
(-
0
.5
7
)
(1
.7
2
)
(1
.4
8
)
(0
.1
9
)
(0
.1
9
)
E
ff
ec
ti
v
en
es
s
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
9
(-
0
.0
2
)
(1
.1
6
)
R
eg
Q
u
a
li
ty
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
8
(-
1
.0
1
)
(0
.9
9
)
A
n
ti
-S
el
f-
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
1
7
D
ea
li
n
g
(-
0
.5
1
)
(0
.6
5
)
S
to
ck
D
ev
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
(0
.7
5
)
(0
.6
1
)
(0
.3
4
)
(0
.1
8
)
D
ev
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
1
5
(0
.7
2
)
(0
.6
3
)
(0
.4
9
)
(0
.4
9
)
N
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
1
3
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
6
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
1
4
2
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.0
4
1
0
.0
4
3
0
.0
3
9
0
.0
3
9
0
.0
4
1
0
.0
7
9
0
.0
3
5
0
.0
3
5
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
2
9
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
1
4
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
74
T
a
b
le
2
.4
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
R
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
A
g
g
re
g
a
te
In
si
d
e
r
T
ra
d
in
g
A
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
p
a
n
el
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
a
g
g
re
g
a
te
in
si
d
er
tr
a
d
e
va
lu
es
o
n
A
ct
iv
e
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
a
n
d
co
u
n
tr
y
-l
ev
el
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
y
ea
r-
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
fo
r
in
si
d
er
b
u
y
s
a
n
d
se
ll
s,
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
.
IT
V
a
lu
e
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
b
y
fi
rs
t
su
m
m
in
g
u
p
in
si
d
er
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
va
lu
es
w
it
h
in
ea
ch
y
ea
r
sc
a
le
d
b
y
co
u
n
tr
y
-l
ev
el
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
ca
p
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
.
A
ct
iv
e
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
th
a
t
eq
u
a
ls
1
if
th
er
e
is
a
n
IT
la
w
p
ro
se
cu
ti
o
n
ev
en
t
w
it
h
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
o
f
th
e
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
o
u
r
sa
m
p
le
,
0
o
th
er
w
is
e.
L
eg
a
l
O
ri
g
in
id
en
ti
fi
es
th
e
le
g
a
l
o
ri
g
in
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
a
n
y
la
w
o
r
co
m
m
er
ci
a
l
co
d
e
o
f
ea
ch
co
u
n
tr
y
(c
o
m
m
o
n
la
w
o
r
ci
v
il
la
w
).
It
eq
u
a
ls
to
1
if
th
e
la
w
o
ri
g
in
o
f
a
co
u
n
tr
y
is
co
m
m
o
n
la
w
a
n
d
0
o
th
er
w
is
e.
R
u
le
o
f
L
aw
re
fl
ec
ts
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
ex
te
n
t
to
w
h
ic
h
a
g
en
ts
h
av
e
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
a
n
d
a
b
id
e
b
y
th
e
ru
le
s
o
f
so
ci
et
y,
a
n
d
in
p
a
rt
ic
u
la
r
th
e
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
a
n
d
p
ro
p
er
ty
ri
g
h
ts
.
T
h
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
R
u
le
o
f
L
aw
is
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
2
0
1
4
W
o
rl
d
w
id
e
G
o
ve
rn
a
n
ce
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
.
A
n
ti
-S
el
f-
D
ea
li
n
g
is
a
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
in
v
es
to
r
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
a
n
d
is
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
D
ja
n
k
ov
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
8
).
S
to
ck
D
ev
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
co
u
n
tr
y
-l
ev
el
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
ca
p
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
to
G
D
P
a
n
d
is
a
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t.
D
ev
d
u
m
m
y
eq
u
a
ls
1
if
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
is
d
ev
el
o
p
ed
,
0
o
th
er
w
is
e.
t-
st
a
ti
st
ic
s,
b
a
se
d
o
n
cl
u
st
er
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
t
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
le
v
el
,
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
is
d
en
o
te
d
b
y
∗ ,
∗∗
,
a
n
d
∗∗
∗
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
In
si
d
er
B
u
y
s
In
si
d
er
S
el
ls
V
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
A
ct
iv
e
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
-1
.0
2
7
-0
.9
7
9
-0
.9
3
1
-1
.1
4
2
-0
.9
2
3
-0
.9
7
2
-0
.1
9
5
-0
.1
4
4
-0
.0
2
9
-0
.3
0
6
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
2
3
(-
1
.1
0
)
(-
1
.0
9
)
(-
1
.0
7
)
(-
1
.2
0
)
(-
1
.0
5
)
(-
1
.1
0
)
(-
0
.3
3
)
(-
0
.2
5
)
(-
0
.0
5
)
(-
0
.5
3
)
(-
0
.0
1
)
(-
0
.0
4
)
L
eg
a
l
O
ri
g
in
-0
.6
3
0
-0
.6
2
2
0
.4
5
2
-0
.5
8
8
-0
.5
8
3
-0
.6
4
9
*
-0
.6
2
2
*
-0
.0
2
8
-0
.5
2
7
-0
.6
2
8
*
(-
1
.4
6
)
(-
1
.4
7
)
(0
.8
8
)
(-
1
.3
1
)
(-
1
.4
9
)
(-
1
.8
5
)
(-
1
.9
1
)
(-
0
.0
8
)
(-
1
.6
1
)
(-
1
.9
0
)
R
u
le
o
f
L
a
w
-0
.1
9
4
-0
.1
8
0
-0
.6
4
5
-0
.4
6
0
*
-0
.4
2
3
-0
.3
7
8
(-
0
.9
7
)
(-
0
.8
8
)
(-
0
.7
9
)
(-
1
.8
1
)
(-
1
.6
2
)
(-
0
.5
8
)
A
n
ti
-S
el
f-
-2
.1
1
9
-1
.0
1
9
D
ea
li
n
g
(-
1
.2
5
)
(-
0
.8
5
)
S
to
ck
D
ev
-0
.0
2
3
-0
.0
6
2
(-
0
.2
7
)
(-
0
.8
5
)
D
ev
0
.9
4
0
-0
.1
7
1
(0
.6
4
)
(-
0
.1
4
)
N
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
2
7
2
2
7
2
2
7
2
2
7
2
2
7
2
2
7
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.0
3
7
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
4
5
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
4
1
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
3
4
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
3
0
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
75
Table 2.5
Insider Trading Activities around Earnings Announcements
This table reports insider trading activities around earnings announcement dates by country. Pre-Buy (Pre-Sell)
Ratios are computed over 10-day, 20-day, and 30-day insider buy (insider sell) activities surrounding earnings
announcement dates (EA). For an N-day trading activity around earnings announcement dates, the Pre-Buy
(Pre-Sell) Ratio is the insider buys (sells) over N-days prior to the announcement date divided by insider buys
(sells) over N days before and N days after the announcement date. We measure insider buys (sells) based on
the number of shares traded (Share), or on the share value traded (Value). ∗ denotes a significant difference in
insider buys (sells) between pre- and post-earnings announcement dates.
10 Days Around EA 20 Days Around EA 30 Days Around EA
Pre-Buy Ratio Pre-Sell Ratio Pre-Buy Ratio Pre-Sell Ratio Pre-Buy Ratio Pre-Sell Ratio
Share Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share Value
Australia 0.091∗ 0.091∗ 0.153∗ 0.152∗ 0.127∗ 0.129∗ 0.183∗ 0.182∗ 0.159∗ 0.385∗ 0.290∗ 0.290∗
Austria 0.179∗ 0.173∗ 0.100∗ 0.100∗ 0.302∗ 0.305∗ 0.244∗ 0.244∗ 0.383∗ 0.159∗ 0.221∗ 0.220∗
Belgium 0.172∗ 0.173∗ 0.125∗ 0.126∗ 0.208∗ 0.209∗ 0.220∗ 0.219∗ 0.299∗ 0.297∗ 0.361∗ 0.359∗
Brazil 0.140∗ 0.140∗ 0.196∗ 0.197∗ 0.261∗ 0.263∗ 0.369∗ 0.369∗ 0.323∗ 0.325∗ 0.357∗ 0.357∗
Canada 0.176∗ 0.173∗ 0.190∗ 0.187∗ 0.238∗ 0.233∗ 0.241∗ 0.237∗ 0.301∗ 0.298∗ 0.304∗ 0.300∗
Chile 0.169∗ 0.169∗ 0.433 0.433 0.214∗ 0.215∗ 0.519 0.520 0.312∗ 0.216∗ 0.191∗ 0.190∗
China 0.283∗ 0.283∗ 0.135∗ 0.135∗ 0.299∗ 0.298∗ 0.161∗ 0.161∗ 0.384∗ 0.313∗ 0.553 0.555
Czech Republic 0.217 0.217 0.000 0.000 0.185∗ 0.187∗ 0.255∗ 0.256∗ 0.253 0.385∗ 0.310∗ 0.311∗
Denmark 0.061∗ 0.061∗ 0.103∗ 0.103∗ 0.076∗ 0.077∗ 0.132∗ 0.132∗ 0.140∗ 0.255 0.262 0.262
Finland 0.162∗ 0.162∗ 0.176∗ 0.176∗ 0.174∗ 0.174∗ 0.268∗ 0.267∗ 0.218∗ 0.394∗ 0.397∗ 0.393∗
France 0.179∗ 0.177∗ 0.191∗ 0.190∗ 0.293∗ 0.293∗ 0.284∗ 0.283∗ 0.368∗ 0.141∗ 0.154∗ 0.154∗
Germany 0.276∗ 0.276∗ 0.319∗ 0.319∗ 0.346∗ 0.349∗ 0.322∗ 0.322∗ 0.393∗ 0.432∗ 0.425 0.428
Greece 0.445 0.444 0.371∗ 0.368∗ 0.432∗ 0.432∗ 0.492 0.489 0.480 0.223∗ 0.342∗ 0.345∗
Hong Kong 0.080∗ 0.079∗ 0.138∗ 0.138∗ 0.088∗ 0.088∗ 0.114∗ 0.114∗ 0.159∗ 0.372∗ 0.356∗ 0.352∗
Hungary 0.000 0.000 0.598 0.600 0.070∗ 0.069∗ 0.647 0.647 0.142∗ 0.066∗ 0.076∗ 0.076∗
India 0.254∗ 0.253∗ 0.218∗ 0.216∗ 0.349∗ 0.347∗ 0.356∗ 0.356∗ 0.373∗ 0.485 0.507 0.508
Indonesia 0.093∗ 0.097∗ 0.500 0.500 0.166∗ 0.170∗ 0.197∗ 0.196∗ 0.313 0.156∗ 0.216∗ 0.213∗
Ireland 0.039∗ 0.039∗ 0.000 0.000 0.041∗ 0.042∗ 0.022∗ 0.022∗ 0.055∗ 0.142∗ 0.437 0.436
Israel 0.247∗ 0.247∗ 0.109∗ 0.109∗ 0.311∗ 0.311∗ 0.155∗ 0.156∗ 0.329∗ 0.321 0.156∗ 0.156∗
Italy 0.223∗ 0.218∗ 0.252∗ 0.253∗ 0.373∗ 0.372∗ 0.391∗ 0.389∗ 0.441∗ 0.055∗ 0.011∗ 0.011∗
Luxembourg 0.042∗ 0.042∗ 0.000 0.000 0.103∗ 0.103∗ 0.100∗ 0.100∗ 0.256∗ 0.327∗ 0.267∗ 0.267∗
Malaysia 0.162∗ 0.163∗ 0.251∗ 0.246∗ 0.166∗ 0.164∗ 0.235∗ 0.234∗ 0.284∗ 0.374∗ 0.402∗ 0.404∗
Netherlands 0.151∗ 0.150∗ 0.158∗ 0.159∗ 0.183∗ 0.187∗ 0.174∗ 0.175∗ 0.253∗ 0.438∗ 0.443∗ 0.438∗
New Zealand 0.097∗ 0.097∗ 0.083∗ 0.083∗ 0.095∗ 0.095∗ 0.105∗ 0.106∗ 0.115∗ 0.458∗ 0.498 0.493
Norway 0.092∗ 0.093∗ 0.094∗ 0.094∗ 0.161∗ 0.161∗ 0.196∗ 0.196∗ 0.220∗ 0.377∗ 0.396 0.399
Pakistan 0.333 0.333 0.195 0.193 0.549 0.550 0.347 0.345 0.531 0.256∗ 0.100∗ 0.100∗
Philippines 0.439 0.432 0.373∗ 0.371∗ 0.452 0.450 0.438 0.436 0.438 0.283∗ 0.369∗ 0.368∗
Poland 0.182∗ 0.182∗ 0.189∗ 0.187∗ 0.268∗ 0.270∗ 0.320∗ 0.319∗ 0.343∗ 0.255∗ 0.238∗ 0.238∗
Portugal 0.261∗ 0.261∗ 0.162∗ 0.165∗ 0.400 0.401 0.263∗ 0.258∗ 0.457 0.219∗ 0.230∗ 0.231∗
Singapore 0.038∗ 0.038∗ 0.019∗ 0.015∗ 0.168∗ 0.167∗ 0.208∗ 0.204∗ 0.269∗ 0.116∗ 0.149∗ 0.149∗
South Africa 0.056∗ 0.056∗ 0.089∗ 0.089∗ 0.056∗ 0.056∗ 0.102∗ 0.099∗ 0.073∗ 0.436 0.488 0.484
South Korea 0.421∗ 0.422∗ 0.488 0.488 0.441∗ 0.443∗ 0.490 0.488 0.453∗ 0.534 0.320 0.319
Spain 0.243∗ 0.242∗ 0.319∗ 0.320∗ 0.350∗ 0.351∗ 0.415∗ 0.417∗ 0.431∗ 0.355∗ 0.362∗ 0.366∗
Sri Lanka 0.264∗ 0.263∗ 0.381 0.381 0.355∗ 0.357∗ 0.377 0.374 0.376∗ 0.455 0.321∗ 0.315∗
Sweden 0.038∗ 0.038∗ 0.057∗ 0.057∗ 0.055∗ 0.055∗ 0.097∗ 0.096∗ 0.200∗ 0.201∗ 0.213∗ 0.210∗
Switzerland 0.142∗ 0.141∗ 0.106∗ 0.105∗ 0.169∗ 0.168∗ 0.149∗ 0.147∗ 0.214∗ 0.268∗ 0.331∗ 0.327∗
Thailand 0.241∗ 0.239∗ 0.298∗ 0.290∗ 0.235∗ 0.229∗ 0.339∗ 0.337∗ 0.310∗ 0.302∗ 0.411∗ 0.410∗
Turkey 0.325∗ 0.325∗ 0.443 0.443 0.334∗ 0.338∗ 0.455 0.451 0.365∗ 0.369∗ 0.511 0.505
UK 0.042∗ 0.042∗ 0.038∗ 0.038∗ 0.048∗ 0.048∗ 0.046∗ 0.045∗ 0.065∗ 0.156∗ 0.227∗ 0.223∗
US 0.072∗ 0.071∗ 0.165∗ 0.163∗ 0.106∗ 0.105∗ 0.184∗ 0.181∗ 0.156∗ 0.072∗ 0.121∗ 0.119∗
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Table 2.7
Market Price Reactions to Earnings Announcements
This table reports price reaction around earnings announcements over the event window of [-1, 1]
for the sample period from 2007 to 2013. Price reaction is measured in three ways: abnormal return
variance, cumulative absolute return difference, and return difference standard deviation. Abnormal
return variance is the stock return variance over the event window [-1, 1], scaled by the stock return
variance over the estimation window [-120, -21]. Cumulative absolute return difference is computed
by cumulating the absolute value of stock return in excess of country-level indexes over the event
window [-1, 1]. Return difference standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation of stock
return in excess of country-level indexes over the event window [-1, 1]. Stock return variance over
the event window is the average of squared prediction errors from the market model during the
event window [-1, 1]. The stock return variance over the estimation window is the variance of
residuals from the market model estimated over the estimation period [-120, -21]. All the price
reaction measures are computed first by taking an average of the measures for each firm and then
average within each country. Cumulative absolute return differences and return difference standard
deviation are expressed in percentage.
Price Reactions
Abnormal Cumulative Return Return Difference
Country Return Variance Difference in (%) Standard Deviation in (%)
Australia 2.636 8.747 3.441
Austria 2.093 6.053 2.311
Belgium 2.635 6.216 2.515
Brazil 1.630 6.826 2.774
Canada 2.204 6.417 2.563
Chile 1.399 3.562 1.394
China 1.561 6.184 2.326
Czech Republic 1.634 5.069 2.080
Denmark 2.965 7.827 3.175
Finland 3.624 7.988 3.156
France 3.024 6.577 2.661
Germany 2.115 10.327 4.667
Greece 1.512 6.375 2.452
Hong Kong 3.003 7.956 3.157
Hungary 1.214 5.824 2.146
India 2.163 7.371 2.825
Indonesia 1.969 11.430 5.746
Ireland 2.623 9.207 3.679
Israel 1.878 5.554 2.123
Italy 1.980 5.821 2.259
Luxembourg 2.439 7.284 2.870
Malaysia 1.750 5.466 2.244
Netherlands 4.236 6.985 2.754
New Zealand 2.830 5.327 2.176
Norway 2.584 8.771 3.539
Pakistan 1.661 5.226 1.823
Philippines 1.228 4.009 1.596
Poland 1.690 6.637 2.600
Portugal 1.676 5.136 2.045
Singapore 1.914 6.107 2.413
South Africa 2.314 5.743 2.264
South Korea 1.591 9.057 3.893
Spain 1.873 5.488 2.126
Sri Lanka 1.844 7.387 3.196
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Thailand 2.126 5.359 2.154
Turkey 1.611 5.275 2.016
United Kingdom 4.554 8.530 3.427
United States 3.994 6.158 2.546
Average 2.317 6.758 2.728
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Appendix Table 2.1
Summary of Country Characteristics
This table provides country variables used in our study. Legal Origin is obtained from La Porta et al.
(1998), and Anti-Self-Dealing is obtained from Djankov et al. (2008). The remaining variables are
the average values from 1999 to 2013 and are obtained from The Worldwide Governance Indicators,
2014 Update.
Anti-Self- Rule of Government Regulatory
Country Legal Origin Dealing Law Effectiveness Quality
Australia Common 0.76 1.749 1.739 1.649
Austria Civil 0.21 1.849 1.812 1.512
Belgium Civil 0.54 1.305 1.726 1.255
Brazil Civil 0.27 -0.279 -0.058 0.179
Canada Common 0.64 1.736 1.872 1.603
Chile Civil 0.63 1.261 1.198 1.457
China Civil 0.76 -0.424 0.009 -0.258
Croatia Civil 0.25 0.018 0.450 0.335
Cyprus Common 1.020 1.304 1.224
Czech Republic Civil 0.33 0.850 0.859 1.073
Denmark Civil 0.46 1.898 2.126 1.805
Egypt Civil 0.20 -0.123 -0.378 -0.385
Estonia Civil 0.913 0.915 1.353
Finland Civil 0.46 1.946 2.152 1.777
France Civil 0.38 1.405 1.575 1.114
Germany Civil 0.28 1.643 1.653 1.490
Greece Civil 0.22 0.714 0.633 0.774
Hong Kong Common 0.96 1.354 1.608 1.904
Hungary Civil 0.18 0.813 0.818 1.091
India Common 0.58 0.091 -0.074 -0.333
Indonesia Civil 0.65 -0.716 -0.348 -0.376
Ireland Common 0.79 1.638 1.573 1.703
Israel Common 0.73 0.919 1.223 1.083
Italy Civil 0.42 0.538 0.571 0.876
Luxembourg Civil 0.28 1.801 1.808 1.732
Malaysia Common 0.95 0.471 1.061 0.529
Netherlands Civil 0.20 1.761 1.902 1.815
New Zealand Common 0.95 1.846 1.747 1.788
Norway Civil 0.42 1.914 1.916 1.388
Pakistan Common 0.41 -0.851 -0.574 -0.636
Philippines Civil 0.22 -0.431 -0.024 -0.029
Poland Civil 0.29 0.597 0.563 0.819
Portugal Civil 0.44 1.119 1.068 1.021
Singapore Common 1.00 1.568 2.146 1.927
South Africa Common 0.81 0.104 0.547 0.487
South Korea Civil 0.47 0.894 0.943 0.751
Spain Civil 0.37 1.187 1.346 1.196
Sri Lanka Common 0.39 0.071 -0.238 -0.050
Sweden Civil 0.33 1.869 1.983 1.579
Switzerland Civil 0.27 1.857 1.976 1.666
Thailand Common 0.81 0.104 0.260 0.265
Turkey Civil 0.43 0.034 0.138 0.308
UK Common 0.95 1.677 1.720 1.773
US Common 0.65 1.556 1.649 1.539
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Appendix Table 2.2
Correlation Matrix
This table displays the correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression analysis. Active Enforcement is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an insider trading law prosecution event within the sample period of the
countries in our sample, 0 if otherwise. Legal Origin identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code
of each country (common law or civil law). It equals 1 if the law origin of a country is common law and 0 if otherwise.
Rule of Law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and
in particular the quality of contract enforcement and property rights. Effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. RegQuality
reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development. The definition of these three variables are obtained from the 2014
Worldwide Governance Indicators. Anti-Self-Dealing is a proxy for investor protection and is obtained from Djankov
et al. (2008). Stock Dev is defined as the ratio of country-level stock market capitalization to GDP and is a proxy for
stock market development. Dev dummy equals 1 if it is a developed country, 0 if otherwise.
Legal Origin Rule of Law Effectiveness RegQuality Anti-Self-Dealing Stock Dev DEV
IT Active Enforce 0.057 0.301 0.302 0.334 0.201 0.169 0.265
(0.397) (<.001) (<.001) (<.000) (0.003) (0.011) (<.001)
Legal Origin 0.017 0.052 0.041 0.826 0.365 -0.041
(0.795) (0.436) (0.540) (<.001) (<.001) (0.543)
Rule of Law 0.955 0.953 0.107 0.233 0.766
(<.001) (<.001) (0.119) (<.001) (<.001)
Effectiveness 0.937 0.186 0.276 0.698
(<.001) (0.006) (<.001) (<.001)
RegQuality 0.170 0.283 0.722
(0.013) (<.001) (<.001)
Anti-Self-Dealing 0.396 0.050
(<.001) (0.464)
Stock Dev 0.276
(<.001)
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Appendix Table 2.3
Lockout Periods around Earnings Announcements
This table summarizes lockout periods around earnings announcements for 40 countries. A lockout period refers to
the period in which insiders are banned from trading before and after financial report releases. The lockout period
information is obtained directly from either the security exchange’s official website of a country or contacting the
country’s regulation authorities.
Country Lockout Period Details of Lockout Periods
Australia No
Austria Yes 3 weeks before quarterly financial report release, 6 weeks before annual financial report release
Belgium Yes 15 days
Brazil No
Canada No
Chile No
China Yes 10 days before earnings pre-announcements and 30 days before the formal financial report is issued
Czech Republic No
Denmark No
Finland No
France Yes 2 weeks prior to the publication of its half-yearly or annual financial statements
Germany Yes Insiders are prohibited from trading with their securities from the moment of the origin of the
inside information up to its announcement
Greece No
Hong Kong Yes 30 to 60 days
Hungary Yes 15 days
India Yes No retail trading for the period between the 20th trading day prior to the last day of any
financial period for which results are required to be announced by the issuer of the securities and
the second trading day after the disclosure of such financial results
Indonesia No
Ireland Yes 30 days before quarterly financial report release, 60 days before annual financial report release
Israel No
Italy No
Luxembourg No
Malaysia No
Netherlands No
New Zealand No
Norway No
Pakistan Yes The closed period shall start from the day when any document statement, which forms the basis of
price sensitive information, is sent to the board of directors and terminate after the information is
made public
Philippines Yes During the period within which a material nonpublic information is obtained and up to two trading
days after the sensitive information
Poland Yes 2 weeks before quarterly financial report release, 1 month before annual financial report release, 2
months before annual financial report release
Portugal No
Singapore Yes Two weeks before the announcement of the company’s financial statements for the first three
quarters of its financial year, or one month before the half-year or financial year end
South Africa Yes In the case of reporting on a quarterly basis, the date from the end of the quarter up to the date of
the publication of the quarterly results
South Korea No
Spain No
Sri Lanka No
Sweden Yes 30 days before publishing of interim reports
Switzerland Yes 10 days prior to financial report release
Thailand No
Turkey Yes Insiders cannot make any transaction from the end of the financial period till the announcement day of the
financial reports. For annual reports banned period begins on January 1st and ends with the
announcement of a firm’ report. For semi-annual reports banned period begins on July 1st and ends
with the announcement of the firm’ report
UK Yes 2 months before publication of full year results, one month before publication of interims
US No
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Chapter 3
Local Institutional Investors and
Stock Prices
3.1 Introduction
Both the U.S. money managing industry and public firms are clustered geographically. The money
managing industry is mainly concentrated in certain areas. The top 5 states where the money
managing industry is headquartered are New York, Massachusetts, California, Pennsylvania, and
Illinois. The total AUM of financial institutions in these 5 states accounts for 70.80% of the U.S.
aggregate AUM of institutional investors. The north-eastern region has a long history as the
financial center, where the major exchanges are located. Since the first Europeans settled in New
England, the financial industry was developed in the north-eastern area. Money management has
been industrialized naturally in this region due to the ease of acquiring information and security
trades around major exchanges. In comparison, the AUM of the money managing industry of the
bottom 5 states is only 0.07% of the nationwide institutional AUM.1 The percentage of the top 5
states AUM among U.S. aggregate AUM is stable over time: 72.78% in 1980, 71.98% in 1997, and
70.45% in 2013, respectively. On the other hand, public firms are inclined to locate in New York,
California, Texas, Illinois, and New Jersey. The total market capitalization of firms in these states
constitutes 52.57% of the market capitalization of U.S. public firms. Firms located in the bottom 5
1The bottom 5 states are Arkansas, Mississippi, Idaho, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
88
states represent 10.88% of the aggregate market capitalization.2 The cluster trend of public firms
weakens overtime, ranging from 63.25% in 1980 to 53.60% in 2013. Regardless of the time-varying
trend, both the money managing industry and public firms display strong clustering preference for
certain geographic regions.
The U.S. money managing industry and public firms are also misaligned geographically. For
instance, from 1980 to 2013, the average number of firms in Texas is 468 with an average size of
$83.9 billion and the average number of financial institutions in Texas is 60 with an average size
of $1.3 billion. Whereas, in Massachusetts, one of the major clusters for the money managing
industry, the average number of firms and institutions is 301 and 118, and the average size of
firms and institutions is $23.9 billion and $90.2 billion, respectively. There are more firms and
fewer institutions in Texas and firm size is smaller compared with institutional investors’ AUM.
This mismatch phenomenon is prevalent in other states. Therefore, the questions are: Does the
mismatch of location clusters between the money managing industry and public firms have real
effects on firms? What are the real consequences of the skewed distribution of the money managing
industry in the financial market?
In this paper, we study whether and how the geographic mismatch of investors and public firms
affects corporate financial policies, firm valuation, and firm performance. We provide the first
piece of evidence on the real effects of the mismatch of location clusters between institutions and
firms and the economic implications of the concentration of the money managing industry. This
mismatch of location clusters matters for several reasons.
First of all, the concentration of the money managing industry has important economic im-
plications. The development of the financial industry is crucial for other economic sectors and
companies. The financial industry provides capital to companies and households.3 The developed
financial market facilitates the access to external financing for firms and results in better invest-
ment opportunities, mobilization of savings, innovations, and improvement of risk taking which
eventually leads to better economic growth.
Secondly, the U.S. financial market is not fully integrated and firm locations have corporate
2The bottom 5 states are West Virginia, Vermont, Montana, Alabama, and Wyoming.
3At the country level (Rajan and Zingales (1998)) and at the local level (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004)).
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finance and asset pricing implications. Previous studies have documented that firm location is
important in the aspect of stock returns comovement (Pirinsky and Wang (2006)), acquisitions
and leverage (Almazan et al.(2010)), dividend policy (Becker, Ivkovic, and Weisbenner (2011),
and investment policy (Dougal, Parsons, and Titman (2015)). Recent studies associate the aggre-
gate level of local individual investors’ risk tolerance with firm valuation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein
(2008)). Whereas, we relate the level of a firm’s stock price to its local market condition of financial
institutions.
It has been documented that institutional investors exhibit local preference in their portfolio
choice. Past literature offers two major explanations for local preference. The first explanation is
that local investors face low communication and information gathering costs, which further reduce
information asymmetry. Taking advantage of location proximity, investors are able to directly
inspect local firms and obtain information. In addition, local media enhances the coverage of local
firms. It is easier for local investors to build social networks with local managers and obtain soft
information.4 The second explanation rests on familiarity and awareness of local stocks.5 As a
result, institutions tend to contribute more capital to local firms.
In general, firms have two financing sources: equity financing and debt financing. Our study
mainly concentrates on the equity financing channel of firms since the cost of equity financing
has an important impact on firm capital structure and corporate decisions. The cost of external
equity financing diverges from other financing channels and influences the pattern of equity issuance
and firm policies (Baker, Stein, and Wurlgler (2003)). They show that equity financing matters
for corporate investment. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that the cost of equity
financing has a strong impact on merger activities. In particular, local equity financing is essential
for firms, especially for financially constrained and equity dependent firms. Local investors face low
4Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) argue that individual investors can earn an additional return of 3.2% from local
holdings which indicates that investors can exploit local information. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that local
stocks held by mutual funds exhibit return of 3% higher than local stocks not held by mutual funds. They suggest that
this is mainly driven by local investors’ information advantage. Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012)
show that local investors are effective monitors of public firms. As a result, firms have better internal governance,
are more profitable, and are less likely to manage earnings. Ayers, Ramalingegowda, and Yeung (2011) find that
managers use financial reporting discretion less frequently when local institutional ownership is high.
5Barber and Odean (2003) show that individual investors are net buyers of stocks that catch their attention. This
attention-driven strategy contributes to their investment style. Loughran and Schultz (2005) investigate the relation
between location and liquidity and find that after adjusting for risk factors, rural firms trade less, are covered by
fewer analysts, and have lower institutional ownership.
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information gathering and monitoring costs due to geographical proximity. As a result, geographical
proximity can better facilitate transmission of soft information, reduce information asymmetry, and
enhance monitoring effects.
Finally, over the past decades, institutional investors have expanded substantially. Given their
importance, growing theoretical studies highlight the asset pricing kernel of financial institutions
rather than households.6 Studies empirically emphasize the role of institutional investors to effec-
tively monitor public firms (Mccahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016)) and to influence stock prices
(Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008)). Our findings provide empirical
support for the theoretical literature that highlights the asset pricing role of financial institutions.
In order to study the role of local financial institutions as marginal investors and measure the
mismatch between financial institutions and firms, we construct a new variable, AM Ratio, defined
as the ratio of the aggregate AUM of institutions in a state to the total market capitalization of
public firms in the same state. This variable is a good proxy for aggregate risk tolerance of financial
intermediaries in the town and measures the mismatch between institutions and firms. AM Ratio
effectively captures the relative funding effect of local institutions and ease of access to such funding
in a state.7
We start by examining the stock-price consequences of local institutional investors on firms.
We show that firms located in states with high AM Ratios experience significantly high valuation.
We further investigate the joint effect of local bias and AM Ratio on firm valuation. The main
effect of AM Ratio comes from local bias which varies across states. Our findings indicate that
the positive effect of AM Ratio on firm valuation is significantly stronger in the states with high
local bias. Firms experience high valuation when nearby institutions have abundant funds and,
at the same time, exhibit strong preference for local stocks. Without sufficient local institutional
funding, simple local bias alone does not contribute to high valuation. In addition, we examine
the effect of AM Ratio for subsamples of firms based on firm size, age, payout ratio, credit rating,
6See Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Vayanos (2004), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
Adrian and Shin (2010), Basak and Pavlova (2013), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), He and Krishnamurthy (2013),
and He, Kelly, and Manela (2016).
7Local institutions have information advantage given their geographical proximity. Their investment in local firms
is better informed than non-local institutions. Reduced information asymmetry thus leads to lower cost of capital
and higher price efficiency.
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or KZ index. Small, young, low payout ratio, low credit rating, or high KZ index firms are more
likely to be affected by local funding since they face difficulty raising debt financing and are more
dependent on equity. We find that the valuation effect of local institutional funding is stronger for
equity dependent firms.
We further examine the channels of how firms benefit from local institutional funding by in-
vestigating two corporate policies: investment and issuance. These two corporate decisions are
affected by the cost of external financing. Mismatched clusters result in easier financing that leads
to more equity issuance when capital is needed, allowing companies to invest more. When a firm is
located in a state with plenty of institutional dollars, it does not have to rely on internally gener-
ated cash flow and could raise more equity.8 We show that firms indeed undertake more investment
opportunities and issue more equity but not more debt when they are located in high AM Ratio
states.
As the next step, we analyze whether being located close to more institutional capital eases
firms’ financial constraints. In a frictionless world, firms invest in accordance with their investment
opportunities proxied by Tobin’s Q. However, previous studies empirically show that firm invest-
ment is sensitive to internal cash flow, especially for financially constrained companies. We find
consistent evidence that greater nearby institutional capital leads to significantly lower investment-
cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, firms located in high AM Ratio states tend to be more positively
sensitive to investment opportunities. Being located in high AM Ratio states mitigates the con-
straints of internal cash flow on firm investment.
We then explore why companies in the states with more institutional capital are able to under-
take more investment. If AM Ratio proxies for the ease of funding from local institutions, firms in
those states are expected to issue more. We find more equity issuance of firms located in high AM
Ratio states. Furthermore, we show that firms with greater need of external finance issue more
equities when they are located in states with high AM Ratios. We also provide direct evidence that
financial institutions are the main players in reducing equity financing costs, since they indeed hold
a large proportion of new shares of local companies. In contrast, we do not find significant impact
of AM Ratio on debt issuance and leverage. Since institutional investors are more specialized in
8The increase in equity issuance is from institutional holdings of the firm’s stock.
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equity trading, it is plausible that AM Ratio is not related to debt issuance. This evidence confirms
that our results are driven specifically by the presence of institutional investors, but not by the
overall development of the local financial market.
To consolidate our findings, we perform additional analyses on the firm relocation subsample.
We document that when firms relocate, investors in their old locations significantly reduce holdings
of the moving firms while financial institutions in the new locations substantially hold more shares
of the moving firms. However, local institutional funding does not seem to be one of the major
reasons that drive firms to relocate. Overall, firms move from high AM Ratio states to low AM
Ratio states.
Finally, we examine the real effects of local institutions on firms: stock market performance per-
sistence and operating performance. The high valuation could be an overvaluation which reflects
inefficient investment of behaviorally biased institutional investors. Such overvaluation would be
likely to reverse in the long term. The high valuation could also be a result of efficient investment
and asset allocation leading to a persistent valuation effect. Our results support the efficient market
hypothesis as we find no significant evidence of return reversal and find better operating perfor-
mance. We also use the 2000 tech bubble as an exogenous shock to establish the causality between
AM Ratio and firm valuation. The non-technological companies in the states with large composi-
tion of technology companies in their aggregate institutional holding experience substantially lower
valuation during the period of technological bubble.
Our paper is closely related to Sulaeman and Wei (2014). They use the total AUM of local
institutional investors at the state level as a proxy for institutional presence and find that high
institutional presence leads to higher liquidity, faster information incorporation, lower cost of equity,
and less financing frictions. Their study mainly concentrates on the role of institutional investors as
enhancing informational efficiencies within the firm. In contrast, our study examines how market
valuation of firms are influenced by the mismatched location clusters of financial institutions and
firms. Thus, our main variable of interest, AM Ratio, considers both the asset under management
of institutional investors and the market capitalization of all firms located in a state. This variable
ensures that our results are not dominated by some states where total institutional AUM is high
and the total market capitalization of firms is also high.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and Section
3 evaluates the impact of AM Ratio on firm valuation. Section 4 explores local institutions and
corporate investment and financing decisions. Section 5 provides further evidence and examines
the implications for firm performance and the final section concludes.
3.2 Data and Summary Information
3.2.1 Data
Our sample is composed of U.S. domestic firms traded on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq from 1980 to
2013, which corresponds to the sample period of firm and institution location.
We collect state-level institutional investors’ location from 1980 to 2013. The main source of
institutional investors’ location is 13F filings in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We
acquire location information from 13F filings and match them with holdings in Thomson Reuters
S34 to link cik and mgrno. The filings in Edgar start from 1993 so many filings in early years are
missing. We complement the location data using Nelson’s Directories of Investment Managers and
Money Market Directories from 1980 to 1999. We include institutions located in 50 states and in
the District of Columbia. Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of the number of institutions for
the top 5, middle 5, and bottom 5 states ranked by the state-level AUM in 1980, 1997, and 2013.
The total number of institutions increases from 223 in 1980 to 3049 in 2013. The average number
of institutions varies from 1.13 for Alaska to 386.65 for New York. Institutional investors are more
likely to cluster in New York, California, Massachusetts, and Illinois. These four states are ranked
among the top 5 states for most of the years from 1980 to 2013.
We define a firm’s location as the headquarter of a firm following Coval and Moskowitz (1999),
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), and Loughran and Schultz (2005). Corporate headquarters are close
to major business activities and function as the information exchange center between suppliers and
investors.9 Headquarter state and county information is collected from COMPUSTAT annual files.
In addition, historical state and county information is cross-checked using Compact Disclosure.
9See Pirinsky and Wang (2006) and Davis and Henderson (2004).
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Combining these two data sources, Table 3.1 reports the average number of firms for the top 5,
middle 5, and bottom 5 states ranked by the state-level AUM in 1980, 1997, and 2013. The average
number of firms across states is 114.66. Alaska has the lowest average number of firms (3.18) while
California has the highest average number of firms (905.97).
Firm-level financial data is collected from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and
COMPUSTAT. We obtain stock prices and the number of shares outstanding from CRSP. Our
sample is restricted to common stocks (share code 10 or 11) traded on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq
(exchange code 1, 2 or 3). We exclude firms in the financial service industry (one-digit SIC codes of
6) in our analysis. Annual accounting information is obtained from COMPUSTAT. These two data
sources are then merged to construct firm-level and state-level variables. Institutional quarterly
stock holdings are drawn from Thomson Reuter 13F institutional holdings database. Institutional
investors (such as banks, insurance companies, mutual fund companies, and investment advisors)
with more than $100 million assets under discretionary management are required to disclose their
holdings to SEC every quarter.
3.2.2 Measuring Mismatch and Local Bias
In our paper, we develop a state-level funding easiness measure to capture the ease of funding
for a firm and two local bias measures to represent institutional investors’ local preference. AM
Ratio is defined as the ratio of the aggregate AUM of institutions in a state to the total market
capitalization of public firms in the same state. This variable proxies for the mismatch between
clusters of institutions and firms and the amount of relative funding available at state level. The
higher the AM Ratio, the higher the mismatch and the easier it is for firms to get access to local
institutional capital. According to Table 3.1, the average of AM Ratio across states ranges from
0.262 in 1980 to 0.771 in 2013. Massachusetts has a relatively high AM Ratio since it is a cluster
for financial institutions but not for firms.
Local bias is measured using two methods. The first method (State LB1) is defined as the
difference of the ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms held by local institutions to
the total AUM of local institutions and the ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms
to the total market capitalization of all firms. State LB1 is a traditional measure of local bias
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and it captures the fraction of local firms held by local institutions relative to the market weight
of investable assets considering all investors. The second method (State LB2) is defined as the
difference of the ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms held by local institutions
to the total AUM of local institutions and the ratio of the total market capitalization of local
firms held by all institutions to the total AUM of all institutions. The second measure captures
the fraction of local firms held by local institutions relative to the market weight considering only
institutional investors.
LB1 =
Total MV of Local F irms Held by Local Institutions
Total AUM of Local Institutions
− Total MV of Local F irms
Total MV of All F irms
(3.1)
LB2 =
Total MV of Local F irms Held by Local Institutions
Total AUM of Local Institutions
− Total MV of Local F irms Held by All Institutions
Total AUM of All Institutions
(3.2)
According to Coval and Moskowitz (1999), local bias measures the tendency of institutional
investors to select their portfolio choices locally relative to the market weights of investable assets.
If institutional investors do have local preference, these two measures should be positive. As shown
in Table 3.1, the average of local bias decreases from 0.069 in 1980 to 0.019 in 2013 and is positive
for most states. The reduction in local bias over the sample period reflects the integration of the
U.S. financial market and the expansion of financial institutions. Both local bias measures for New
York are small and negative in some years. Financial institutions in New York are generally large
and sophisticated investors and they are less likely to exhibit irrational local preference. Local bias
is more prevalent in small states where institutional investors are less developed.
To better illustrate AM Ratio measure, we graph the total AUM of institutions to state GDP
(Figure 3.1), the total market capitalization of firms to state GDP (Figure 3.2), and the AM Ratio
by state (Figure 3.3). The benefit of AM Ratio is that it considers the size of both institutions and
firms thus captures the relative easiness to access funding.
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3.2.3 Other Variables
Our study examines how local funding easiness affects firm valuation, through which corporate
policies firm valuation is influenced, and the real effects of local institutional funding. Besides
stock market performance, all other variables are measured at annual frequency and are defined in
Appendix Table 3.1.
Firm Valuation. Following Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008), we employ MB as a measure of firm
valuation. MB is defined as the log of market equity value to book equity value.
Investment. We employ four measures of investment: CAPXRND, R&D, CAPEX, and IN-
VESTMENT. CAPXRND is the sum of capital expenditures, research and development expen-
ditures, all scaled by lagged assets. R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by
lagged assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by lagged assets. INVESTMENT is the sum
of capital expenditures, research and development expenditures, and 30% of selling, general, and
administrative expenses, all scaled by lagged assets.
Issuance and Leverage. We perform analysis on both equity issuance and debt issuance. Equity
issuance is defined as the change in book equity and the change in deferred taxes, less the change in
retained earnings, all scaled by lagged assets. We measure debt issuance as the change in assets, less
the change in book equity, less the change in deferred taxes, all scaled by lagged assets. Leverage
is defined as the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities, all scaled by lagged assets.
Performance. We examine both stock market performance and operating performance. Stock
market performance is defined as the monthly excess stock returns. Operating performance is
defined as net income, scaled by lagged assets.
3.3 AM Ratio and Firm Valuation
In this section, we study the effect of AM Ratio on firm valuation. We first document whether the
location mismatch have any influence on firm valuation. Then we investigate the joint effect of AM
Ratio and local bias on stock prices. In the end, we examine when this influence is stronger and
what types of firms are affected more.
97
3.3.1 AM Ratio and Firm Valuation
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) examine how the aggregate risk tolerance of individual investors in
a region influences stock prices. They show that firms have higher stock prices when located in
low population density states . Supported by literature on the financial intermediary asset pricing
kernel, this section aims to examine the stock-price consequences of the relative size of local insti-
tutions. Different from traditional literature (Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012))
that measures institutional ownership at firm level, our study utilizes the state-level mismatch
measure to capture the potential investment of local institutions regardless of their actual hold-
ings. Unlike Sulaeman and Wei (2014), our main variable of interest, AM Ratio, considers both
the total AUM of institutional investors and the total market capitalization of firms located in a
state. This variable provides a valid measure of the mismatched location distributions of financial
institutions and firms. The design of AM Ratio also ensures that the results are not dominated
by some states where the institutional AUM is high and the total market capitalization of firms
are also high. Additionally, locating close to firms lowers information collecting cost and reduces
information asymmetry which eventually leads to lower cost of capital for firms.
Following Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008), we define the log of market equity value to book
equity value to measure firm valuation. We include the same independent variables to control for
future growth and profitability.10 In all the model specifications, we control for year and industry
fixed effects. Our regression results are displayed in Table 3.2. In column 1, without any control
variables, the coefficient of AM Ratio is 0.011, significant at 1% level. Such finding indicates that
firm stock prices increase with the level of location mismatch. In column 2 with control variables,
the coefficient of AM Ratio remains significantly positive. When firms have ease of access to external
financing from local institutions, they experience high market valuation. In column 3, when we
add HKS Ratio, the main variable of interest in Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008), we obtain similar
results. Including their variable does not alter the significant effect of AM Ratio on firm valuation.
The results together suggest that institutional investors are as important as individual households.
Overall, when firms are located in a state where relative AUM of local institutions is high, their
10The variables are: HKS Ratio , R&D Dummy, R&D-to-Sales, and ROE. Detailed definition of these variables are
described in Appendix Table 3.1.
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stock prices tend to be high.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we perform several additional analyses. Firstly, we
construct a neighboring states AM Ratio measure, defined as the ratio of the aggregate AUM of
institutions in neighboring states to the total market capitalization of firms in neighboring states.
We develop this measure to alleviate concerns that small states are potentially affected by adjacent
big states, such as New Jersey next to New York. As reported in column 4, the coefficient of AM
Ratio remains significantly positive. Secondly, we estimate similar regressions using region-level
AM Ratio measure as shown in column 5. The overall results are statistically consistent when
AM Ratio is measured at the region level. A region is a broader definition of clustering than a
state. As a result, it could potentially introduce some noisy factors. Thirdly, to make sure that our
results are robust across different methodologies, we employ the Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach
to estimate the regression model. Consistent with our panel regression evidence, the average of
coefficients is significantly positive as reported in columns 6 and 7. Finally, we perform additional
subsample analyses, 1980 to 1996 and 1997 to 2013, to examine the time varying effect of AM
Ratio on firm valuation. As shown in columns 8 and 9, the coefficients of AM Ratio are not
significant while the coefficient of HKS Ratio is significantly negative for the period of 1980 to
1996. Such results are expected in the early period of our sample given that institutional investors
just started to grow and expand. At that time, individual investors and households play dominant
roles in determining stock prices. In comparison, from 1997 to 2013, the role of financial institutions
becomes increasingly important. As displayed in columns 10 and 11, in the recent sample period,
firm valuation increases significantly as AM Ratio increases and the effect of households becomes
weak. Overall, our main results are consistent across various samples and two alternative measures
of AM Ratio. The robust results suggest that AM Ratio is a valid proxy for location mismatch and
funding access from local institutions. In our later analyses, we use the panel regression approach
rather than the Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach as the primary method.
To sum up, the results in this subsection imply that the mismatch of location clusters does
have an impact on firm valuation and that the ease of access to funding from local institutions is
beneficial to firms.
99
3.3.2 AM Ratio, Local Bias, and Firm Valuation
We have shown that the ease of access to local funding enhances firm valuation. AM Ratio measures
the potential capital from local institutional investors regardless of their actual investment decisions.
Previous studies provide evidence that both individual investors and institutional investors exhibit
strong local bias. The effect of AM Ratio mainly comes from local bias. If there is no local
preference, there will be no AM Ratio effect. As shown in Table 3.1, both local bias and AM Ratio
vary substantially across states. In this subsection, we examine the joint influence of AM Ratio
and local bias on firm valuation. We construct two measures of local bias at the state level. The
first measure captures local bias relative to the market weight of investable assets for all investors
while the second measure considers local bias relative to the market weight of investable assets for
institutional investors only.
We introduce an interaction term to examine the joint effect of AM Ratio and local bias on firm
valuation. The results are displayed in Table 3.3. We start by examining the pure effect of local
bias. As shown in columns 1 and 2, the relation between local bias and firm valuation is significantly
negative. Local bias is stronger in small states where financial institutions are less sophisticated.
The results imply that without sufficient funding, simply high local bias does not contribute to
firm valuation. We then examine the joint effect of local bias and AM Ratio. In columns 3 and 4,
the significantly positive coefficients of the interaction terms indicate that firms benefit more from
local institutional funding when they are located in high local bias states. The overall evidence
implies that local bias alone does not have valuation effect. Its impact is pronounced when states
have sufficient local equity funding supply from financial institutions.
3.3.3 Subsample Analysis
We have documented the aggregate effect of local funding supply on firm valuation. In this subsec-
tion, we split our sample into two subsamples and examine when the presence of local institutional
equity matters more. Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that all institutional investors prefer large
and liquid stocks across 27 countries. As a result, it is easier for large firms to obtain financing
from institutions regardless of their locations. Whereas, small and equity dependent firms need
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capital to grow but they are more likely to be neglected by non-local institutional investors. It is
difficult for them to raise capital at a distance. Thus, the ease of funding from local institutions
should contribute more to such firms.
We employ five measures to form subsamples: (1) Size. A firm is considered as small if its market
capitalization is below the 20% NYSE size breakpoints and large if its market capitalization is above
the 80% NYSE size breakpoints; (2) Age. A firm is considered as young if it had an IPO in the
past 5 years and old if it had an IPO more than 40 years ago; (3) Payout Ratio. We define payout
ratio as the sum of dividends and stock repurchases to net income and use the bottom and top
20% breakpoints to form low payout ratio and high payout ratio firms; (4)Credit Rating. A firm is
considered as financially constrained if it does not have an S&P credit rating or has an S&P credit
rating of below BBB-; (5) KZ index. The higher the KZ index, the more equity dependent a firm
is. To be consistent, we use the top and bottom 20% breakpoints to form equity dependent and
independent firms.11
The comparison results are displayed in Table 3.4. The coefficients of AM Ratio are significantly
and consistently positive for small, young, low payout ratio, low rating, or high KZ index firms.
These firms have difficulty accessing debt financing and are more dependent on equity financing.
In contrast, none of the coefficients of AM Ratio is significant for equity independent firms. Our
results suggest that the ease of access to local institutional funding mitigates the financial constrains
of equity dependent firms.
3.4 Local Institutions and Corporate Investment and Financing
Decisions
In the previous section, we document a positive relation between the state-level AM Ratio and
firm valuation. In this section, we explore the channels of this positive relation by examining
two corporate policies: investment and issuance. Previous literature addresses the importance
of institutional investors in improving corporate decisions and governance (Ferreira and Matos
(2008)). Recent studies highlight the role of local institutional investors in improving corporate
11We employ four-variable version of the KZ index as in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) equation 5.
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governance (Gaspar and Massa (2007)), engaging in monitoring activities (Kang and Kim (2008)),
increasing firm valuations (Ferreira and Matos (2008)), and encouraging dividend payout (Becker,
Ivkovic, and Weisbenner (2011b)). Overall, institutional investors contribute to better corporate
decision making and governance. Motivated by previous studies, we investigate the mechanism of
the relation between firm valuation and AM Ratio. We first study how state-level local institutional
funding affects corporate policies. Then we examine the channels through which firms have access
to local institutional funding.
3.4.1 AM Ratio and Investment
In a frictionless world, firms undertake investment in accordance with their investment opportunities
proxied by Tobin’s Q. In reality, firm investment decisions are influenced by both internal and
external financing. High AM Ratio proxies for low cost of external financing and low information
asymmetry. As a result, it makes it easier for firms to obtain external financing. With abundant
external financing, firms are expected to increase investment. We examine whether investment
policies of firms located in high and low AM Ratio states differ substantially. We employ four
measures of investment: CAPXRND, R&D, CAPEX, and INVESTMENT. R&D proxies for high
risk and intangible investment while CAPEX represents low risk and tangible investment policies.
CAPXRND and INVESTMENT capture firm aggregate investment policy. Given sufficient and
low cost external financing, firms should undertake more high risk and low risk investment. We
estimate the regression model of firm investment on AM Ratio to test our hypothesis.
Table 3.5 reports the regression analysis results. For four measures of investment in columns
1, 4, 7, and 10, the coefficients of AM Ratio are significantly positive at 5% level. Managers take
advantage of easily accessible external financing and allocate more capital to both high risk and low
risk investment. High AM Ratio is associated with reduced cost of financing and the ease of access
to external financing which in turn enables managers to explore more investment opportunities.
Furthermore, investment is affected by both internal and external financing. When firms have
difficulty accessing external financing, they would exhibit high investment-cash flow sensitivities
and low investment-Q sensitivities. However, when firms do not face external funding constraints,
they would rely less on internal cash flow to make investment decisions. Since AM Ratio prox-
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ies for the ease of external equity financing, investment of firms in high AM Ratio states should
become less sensitive to internal cash flow. In addition, firms that have more investment opportu-
nities are also in greater need of external finance. Thus, when located in high AM Ratio states,
firms tend to undertake investment according to their investment opportunities. To test our hy-
potheses, we examine the investment-cash flow sensitivity which proxies for financing constraints
and the investment-Q sensitivity to capture the relation between actual and potential investment
opportunities. We therefore estimate the following model.
Firm Investmentj,t = β1+β2AMRatioi,t−1+β3Cash F lowj,t or Qj,t−1+β4Interactionj,t−1+Xj,t−1+j,t,
(3.3)
where Firm Investmentj,t is defined using four measures. Cash flow is a proxy for internal
financing and Q proxies for investment opportunities. We also add the interactions of Cash Flow
(Q) and AM Ratio to test whether financing constraints are loosened when firms are located in
states with abundant local institutional funding.
We report the regression results in Table 3.5. In columns 2, 5, 8, and 11, the coefficients of the
interaction terms are significantly negative at 1% level. This finding suggests that the investment-
cash flow sensitivity is reduced for firms located in high AM Ratio states. When firms can access
local financing at low cost, their investments rely less on internal cash flow. Therefore, local
institutional funding mitigates the financial constraints of firms. Moreover, in columns 3, 6, 9, and
12, the parameter estimations of the interaction terms are significantly positive. When there are
more investment opportunities and enough external funding, firms are more likely to increase their
investments.
Overall, sufficient capital funding motivates firms to undertake more investment and their in-
vestments are less dependent on internal cash flow. High Q firms are able to make investment
decisions in accordance with their opportunities. Therefore, local institutional funding eases the
financial constraints of firms.
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3.4.2 Local Institutions and Issuance
In this subseciton, we examine how firms are able to undertake more investment by investigating
firm issuance policy. Corporate issuance is affect by the cost of external financing. When firms
are located in high AM Ratio states, they should issue more given low cost of equity financing,
especially for low cash flow and high Q firms. In addition, capital structure is influenced by firm
financing decisions. Thus, we also examine the relation between AM Ratio and firm leverage.
Table 3.6 reports the regression estimates for equity issuance, debt issuance, and leverage. The
results in column 1 indicate that locating in high AM Ratio states makes it easier and less costly for
firms to obtain external equity financing. Consequently, firms are inclined to issue more equity. In
column 2, the estimate of the interaction term is -0.309 with a t-value of -2.87 implying that equity
issuance sensitivity to cash flow becomes increasingly negative when AM Ratio is high. Low cash
flow firms are financially constrained and tend to issue more equity when the external financing
cost is low. As shown in column 3, equity issuance sensitivity to Q increases with AM Ratio. When
firms have more investment opportunities and are located in high AM Ratio states, their equity
issuance increases accordingly. The results suggest that high AM Ratio proxies for low financing
frictions. In comparison, when firms are located states with high level of mismatch, they do not
turn to debt for external financing, especially for low cash flow firms. These firms lack the ability
to meet debt payment and prefer to seek equity financing. The results together suggest that our
previous findings are not driven by the overall effects of the financial sector development. AM Ratio
is a valid proxy for equity financing and the development of equity financing sector has valuation
implications.
In our unreported results, we introduce a CF dummy, which takes the value of one if cash
flow is negative, zero otherwise. Firms with negative cash flows are regarded as truly financially
constrained. We show that equity issuance to cash flow becomes more negatively sensitive for firms
with negative cash flows. In addition, we replicate the regression analyses in Table 3.6 using two
alternative measures of equity issuance.12 We find robust evidence that equity issuance is more
12Two alternative measures of equity issuance are constructed by adopting a breakpoint of 3%. Issuance Alt is set
to be zero if Equity Issuance is less than 3% , equals to Equity Issuance otherwise. Issuance Dummy is an indicator
variable that takes the value of one if Equity Issuance is higher than 3%, zero otherwise.
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negatively sensitive to cash flow and more positively sensitive to Q as AM Ratio increases.
We have shown that low cash flow and high Q firms have the incentives to raise more equity
capital. To provide direct evidence that the increased equity capital is indeed raised from local
institutions, we examine the percentage of newly issued shares held by local institutions compared
with three benchmarks. This analysis is performed on a subsample of firms that have equity
issuance of higher than 3%.13 We construct three variables to capture the newly issued equity
absorbing effect by local institutions. Absorb is defined as the percentage of newly issued shares
held by local institutions. Measure 1 is defined as the difference of Absorb and the ratio of the
total AUM of local institutions to the total AUM of all institutions. It compares Absorb with the
proportion of local institutional AUM among all institutions. If this measure is positive, it implies
that local institutions invest unevenly more in newly issued shares than they should based on their
AUM weight. Measure 2 is defined as the difference of Absorb and the ratio of the total market
capitalization of local firms held by local institutions to the total market capitalization of all local
firms. The second benchmark captures the percentage of local firms held by all local institutions.
Measure 3 is defined as the difference of Absorb and the ratio of the number of existing shares held
by local institutions to the total number of existing shares of a firm.
Table 3.7 summarizes the three measures for the full sample and two subsample periods: 1980-
1996 and 1997-2013. The absorb effect is stronger in recent sample period due to the expansion
of financial institutions. For all three measures, local institutions tend to hold more newly issued
shares when firms are located in high AM Ratio states. In addition, the absorb effect is stronger
for large firms. Small firms do not issue as much equity as large firms so the absorb effect is
comparatively weak. When double sorted on AM Ratio and firm size, local institutions hold more
newly issued shares of large firms located in states with adequate local funding.
In summary, we find that indeed because of local institutional dollars (ease of accessing to
institutional money), firms rely less on internal cash flows and have the ability to raise more equity
via institutional funding. Nevertheless, low cash flow firms do not issue debt even when they are
located in states with ease of access to local funding.
13The breakpoint of 3% ensures that real equity issuance is captured while share repurchase or option exercise is
not considered.
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3.5 Further Evidence
3.5.1 Firm Relocation and Local Institutions
So far, we have provided valid evidence on the importance of local institutional funding. When
firms are located in states with abundant local dollars, they experience high valuation and increase
investment and equity issuance. Local institutional funding eases the financial constraints of eq-
uity dependent firms. Given its importance, in this subsection, we perform several analyses on a
subsample of firms that relocate over the sample period. We examine whether local institutional
funding is a determinant reason that drives firms to move.
To start with, we examine firm relocation trend. We compare AM Ratio of a firm’s new location
and old location 1 year to 5 years after it moves. Based on the unreported evidence, firms move
from high AM Ratio states to low AM Ratio states. One explanation for this finding is that the
concentration of the money managing industry has weakened in recent years. In the proceeding
section, we show that equity dependent firms benefit more from local institutional funding. Thus,
these firms have the most incentive to chase local equity financing. We then examine whether access
to local funding drives equity dependent firms to relocate. We introduce two dependent variables:
AM Ratio Change and AM Ratio Change Dummy.14 Both variables consider the difference in AM
Ratio between the new and old states. Our key variables of interests are KZ Index and KZ Dummy.15
Both variables capture the relocation decision of equity dependent firms. Our relocation sample is
composed of 488 firms from 1980 to 2013. As reported in Table 3.8, none of the coefficients of KZ
Index and KZ Dummy is significantly positive. Even though local institutional funding contributes
more to equity dependent firms, it is not a major incentive for them to relocate. Based on previous
studies, there are several reasons that motivate firms to move. Cost cutting is one of the main
motivations, such as moving away from centralized areas, tax savings, and moving close to major
customers. Other reasons include owners’ personal preference and loss/increase of profitability.
We then examine local holding changes of financial institutions in firms’ new and old locations.
14AM Ratio Change captures the difference of AM Ratio of a firm’s new location 1 year after relocation and AM
Ratio of a firm’s old location 1 year before relocation. AM Ratio Change Dummy is set to one if AM Ratio Change
is positive, zero otherwise.
15KZ Dummy is set to one if a firm’s KZ Index is higher than the top 20% breakpoints, zero otherwise.
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Local institutional holding (LH) is defined as the ratio of the local institutional holding to the total
institutional holding of a firm. This variable controls for the growing trend of financial institutions.
We summarize local institutional holding changes for the full sample, for firms that move from low
AM Ratio states to high AM Ratio states (positive move), and for firms that move from high AM
Ratio states to low AM Ratio states (negative move). We compare local institutional holding 1
year before firms relocate and 1 to 3 years after firms relocate for institutions in both old and new
locations. As shown in Panel A of Table 3.9, when firms relocate, financial institutions in their
old locations significantly reduce holdings of the moving firms. This effect is stronger when firms
move from low AM Ratio states to high AM Ratio states. In comparison, financial institutions in
the new locations hold more shares of the moving firms, especially when firms experience negative
move.
To summarize, our analyses on firm relocation subsample provide further support for the pre-
vious findings. Even though local institutional funding does not drive firms to relocate, they still
benefit from the mismatched clusters between financial institutions and firms.
3.5.2 Persistence of the Valuation Effects
We next examine the real effects of local institutions. We focus on both stock market performance
persistence and operating performance. In our earlier analyses, we show that firms exhibit high
valuation when they are located in states with ease of access to local funding. We also document
that firms increase investment and issue more shares. However, the real effects of adopting these
corporate policies are still unclear. The high valuation can be a temporary overvaluation resulted
from inefficient and blind investment. In the long run, this overvaluation will be adjusted to firm
intrinsic value. If so, we expect stock returns to reverse in the long term. On the other hand, the
high valuation can be driven by efficient investment and asset allocation. If so, the high valuation is
expected to be persistent. In this subsection, we examine whether the high valuation is temporary
or persistent and whether firms become more profitable.
To examine the persistence of the valuation effect, we perform the Fama-Macbeth regressions
of the monthly excess stock returns on funding easiness measure. The results are reported in Panel
A of Table 3.10. The coefficients of AM Ratio are insignificant for the full sample and for the
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two subsamples based on credit rating and KZ index. Stock market performance does not vary
significantly for firms located in states with different levels of mismatch. There is no evidence
of significant return reversal. Firms in high AM Ratio states do not significantly outperform or
underperform firms in low AM Ratio states. The evidence on stock market performance confirms
that the high valuation is indeed persistently high. Given more investment, more equity issuance,
and persistently high valuation, we expect firms to be more profitable. We then test the relation
between AM Ratio and operating performance. As shown in Panel B of Table 3.10, firms located
in states with sufficient local funding supply indeed have higher earnings and are more profitable.
To sum up, firms take advantage of the ease of access to capital and allocate resources efficiently.
Our results are consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Firms in high AM Ratio states act
differently from firms in low AM Ratio states in corporate decision making. The mismatched clus-
ters between financial institutions and firms have real effects on firms: persistently high valuation
and more earnings.
3.5.3 Valuation Effects with Shocks to Local Institutions
In this subsection, we utilize the 2000 tech bust as a natural experiment to establish the causal effect
of AM Ratio on firm valuation and stock market performance. We firstly identify the affected states
where the average percentage of tech stocks held by local financial institutions is ranked at the top
10% states in 2000. Our analysis is performed on a subsample of non-tech stocks where we exclude
tech firms and industries that are highly correlated with tech industry. Financial institutions that
held a large portion of tech stocks would be strongly affected by the tech bubble. However, the tech
bubble is unlikely to directly affect the fundamentals of non-tech firms. This provides an exogenous
shock to financial institutions and firms located in the top 10% states. We perform a Dif-in-Dif
test to examine the market valuation and stock market performance of non-tech firms located in
the affected states during the period of 2000 to 2002. We restrict our sample period from 1990 to
2008 to ensure that the results are not affected by the 2008 financial crisis.
Table 3.11 reports the results of the regression analyses. In Panel A, we compare the market
valuation of non-tech firms located in the top 10% states with the market valuation of firms for
the rest of the sample and firms located in the bottom 10%, 20%, and 30% states. The coefficients
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of the interaction terms are significantly negative for these 4 model specifications. During the tech
bubble period, non-tech firms located in the states where financial institutions are strongly affected
by this event experience a significant drop in their market valuation. We further examine the
stock market performance of non-tech firms during this period. The results are reported in Panel
B. Consistent with the valuation effects, firms in the affected states experience significantly lower
returns during 2000 to 2002.
The tech bust analysis provides strong support for the causal relation between AM Ratio and
firm valuation. This exogenous shock directly affects financial institutions that held a high portion
of tech stocks in their portfolio but does not systematically impact non-tech firms during the tech
bubble period. This event influenced these firms through institutional investors.
3.6 Conclusion
Using the unique location information of U.S. institutions and firms from 1980 to 2013, we develop
an effective measure, AM Ratio, which captures the potential funding available from local institu-
tions. It also measures the mismatch of location clusters between financial institutions and firms.
Our results imply that high AM Ratio proxies for low cost of external financing and low financing
frictions.
Our analyses of AM Ratio and firm valuation suggest that firms benefit from being located in
states with ease of access to local institutional funding. We find robust evidence that the market
valuation of firms is high when the state-level AM Ratio is high. The valuation effect is stronger
for equity dependent firms.
Furthermore, firms invest more and issue more equity when located in high AM Ratio states.
Firm investment in such states is less dependent on internal cash flow and is more sensitive to
investment opportunities. Their equity issuance sensitivity to cash flow is increasingly negative
as AM Ratio increases. We further provide direct evidence that a large portion of newly issued
shares are held by local institutions. As a result, local institutional funding mitigates the financial
constraints of firms through equity issuance channel. Our findings on firm performance support
the efficient market hypothesis that high valuation of firms is not a temporary overvaluation but a
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result of efficient allocation of resources. Local institutional funding and the mismatch of location
clusters indeed have real effects on firms.
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Figure 3.1
Total AUM of Local Institutions to State GDP by State
This figure presents a map of the time-series average of the ratio of total AUM of local institutions
to state-level GDP for each state.
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Figure 3.2
Total Market Capitalization of Local Firms to State GDP by State
This figure presents a map of the time-series average of the ratio of total market capitalization of
local firms to state-level GDP for each state.
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Figure 3.3
AM Ratio by State
This figure presents a map of the time-series average of AM Ratio for each state. AM Ratio is defined
as the ratio of the aggregate AUM of institutions in a state to the total market capitalization of
public firms in the same state.
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Figure 3.4
Size Ratio and AUM Ratio of the Bottom 5 States
This figure presents Size Ratio and AUM Ratio of the bottom 5 states ranked by AUM Ratio. Size
Ratio is defined as the ratio of the state-level market capitalization to the total market capitalization
of all firms. AUM Ratio is defined as the ratio of the state-level AUM to the total AUM of all financial
institutions.
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Figure 3.5
Size Ratio and AUM Ratio of the Top 5 States
This figure presents Size Ratio and AUM Ratio of the top 5 states ranked by AUM Ratio. Size Ratio
is defined as the ratio of the state-level market capitalization to the total market capitalization of
all firms. AUM Ratio is defined as the ratio of the state-level AUM to the total AUM of all financial
institutions.
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Table 3.1
Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for the state aggregate asset under management (AUM) of 13F institutions,
the number of firms, the number of 13F institutions, the state aggregate market capitalization of firms, AM Ratio, and
two local bias measures for 1980, 1997, and 2013. The summary statistics are reported for top 5, middle 5, and bottom
5 states ranked by the state-level total AUM. AM Ratio is defined as the ratio of the aggregate AUM of institutions in
a state to the total market capitalization of public firms in the same state. Local bias is measured using two methods.
The first method (State LB1) is defined as the difference of the ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms
held by local institutions to the total AUM of local institutions and the ratio of the total market capitalization of local
firms to the total market capitalization of all firms. The second method (State LB2) is defined as the difference of the
ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms held by local institutions to the total AUM of local institutions and
the ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms held by all institutions to the total AUM of all institutions.
1980
State AUM Number Number of State Market Cap
( in $ billion) of Firms 13F Institutions ( in $ billion) AM Ratio State LB1 State LB2
National Aggregate 196.23 4484 223 1202.00 0.163
State Average 6.54 88 7 40.07 0.262 0.069 0.072
Top 5 States
NY 68.88 608 62 244.28 0.282 -0.003 0.034
MA 31.89 169 30 35.80 0.891 0.026 0.029
CA 17.25 529 24 148.46 0.116 0.070 0.082
IL 14.41 234 15 104.84 0.137 0.097 0.100
TX 10.39 362 11 189.62 0.055 0.072 0.085
Middle 5 States
GA 1.31 76 4 16.73 0.079 0.017 0.019
IA 1.07 31 2 3.28 0.327 0.001 0.003
DC 0.98 20 3 4.76 0.207 0.046 0.046
MN 0.94 112 3 24.47 0.038 0.081 0.077
IN 0.90 69 1 11.15 0.081 0.011 0.009
Bottom 5 States
FL 0.15 180 1 15.86 0.009 0.141 0.145
UT 0.12 37 1 3.87 0.030 0.016 0.018
KY 0.09 29 1 5.95 0.014 -0.005 -0.003
LA 0.08 31 1 13.50 0.006 0.249 0.251
NH 0.05 13 1 2.27 0.021 0.011 0.012
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Table 3.1 - Continued
Summary Statistics
1997
State AUM Number Number of State Market Cap
( in $ billion) of Firms 13F Institutions ( in $ billion) AM Ratio State LB1 State LB2
National Aggregate 4501.30 7818 1317 9946.57 0.453
State Average 93.78 153 27 207.22 0.380 0.061 0.063
Top 5 States
NY 1228.99 695 325 1483.79 0.828 0.006 0.022
MA 872.80 409 116 274.96 3.174 0.006 0.005
CA 614.71 1270 162 1193.72 0.515 0.011 0.019
PA 309.14 346 59 428.12 0.722 0.024 0.027
IL 214.25 323 74 671.44 0.319 0.052 0.056
Middle 5 States
VA 14.86 201 23 255.94 0.058 0.025 0.025
DE 14.54 25 10 102.73 0.142 -0.006 -0.006
TN 13.29 97 15 99.05 0.134 0.081 0.080
NM 12.16 20 3 6.30 1.929 0.000 0.000
DC 6.29 26 8 105.76 0.060 -0.004 -0.007
Bottom 5 States
MT 0.45 13 2 2.98 0.151 0.009 0.009
ND 0.31 6 2 2.53 0.121 0.000 0.000
MS 0.26 32 1 42.00 0.006 0.631 0.631
SD 0.24 10 2 6.47 0.037 0.019 0.020
NV 0.15 67 4 23.71 0.006 0.000 0.000
2013
State AUM Number Number of State Market Cap
( in $ billion) of Firms 13F Institutions ( in $ billion) AM Ratio State LB1 State LB2
National Aggregate 11865.40 4805 3049 20686.58 0.574
State Average 232.65 94 60 405.62 0.711 0.019 0.020
Top 5 States
MA 2588.12 294 219 564.23 4.587 0.009 0.006
NY 2258.86 572 768 2931.25 0.771 0.031 -0.004
CA 1346.12 720 371 4047.77 0.333 0.002 0.018
PA 1320.97 199 134 571.81 2.310 0.004 0.002
IL 845.51 331 172 1174.92 0.720 0.014 0.017
Middle 5 States
TN 45.48 59 35 215.76 0.211 0.051 0.050
AZ 43.47 51 14 149.84 0.290 -0.006 -0.004
KY 25.06 29 18 90.26 0.278 0.008 0.008
OR 19.19 35 24 126.32 0.152 0.014 0.013
UT 14.04 31 9 42.43 0.331 0.006 0.006
Bottom 5 States
WY 1.46 3 3 1.31 1.114 0.003 0.003
HI 1.45 12 4 10.20 0.142 0.023 0.023
ID 0.97 13 4 31.18 0.031 0.003 0.003
ND 0.78 3 4 6.15 0.127 0.043 0.043
SD 0.33 9 3 6.60 0.051 0.017 0.017
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Table 3.3
AM Ratio, Local Bias, and Firm Valuation
This table reports panel regressions of MB on AM Ratio, local bias, and firm-level control variables, as well as year
and industry fixed effects. MB is defined as the log of market equity value to book equity value. AM Ratio is defined
as the ratio of the aggregate AUM of institutions in a state to the total market capitalization of public firms in the
same state. Local bias is measured using two methods. The first method (State LB1) is defined as the difference of the
ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms held by local institutions to the total AUM of local institutions
and the ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms to the total market capitalization of all firms. The
second method (State LB2) is defined as the difference of the ratio of the total market capitalization of local firms
held by local institutions to the total AUM of local institutions and the ratio of the total market capitalization of
local firms held by all institutions to the total AUM of all institutions. When R&D variable is missing, it is set to
zero. R&D Dummy is set to one if R&D variable is missing, otherwise it is set to zero. R&D-to-Sales is defined
as research and development expenditures scaled by sales. ROE is defined as net income divided by lagged book
equity. The sample period is from 1980 to 2013. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the industry level,
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, ** , and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
AM Ratio 0.040*** 0.039**
(2.87) (2.06)
State LB1*AM Ratio 1.241***
(2.66)
State LB1 -0.237* 0.290
(-1.88) (1.57)
State LB2*AM Ratio 1.009*
(1.92)
State LB2 -0.260** 0.211
(-2.10) (0.98)
R&D Dummy -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.224*** -0.224***
(-7.07) (-7.07) (-6.97) (-6.96)
R&D to Sales 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(2.07) (2.06) (2.03) (2.04)
ROE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.96) (4.96) (5.50) (5.49)
N 103000 103000 102413 102413
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.137 0.135 0.135
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.8
Firm Relocation Trend
This table reports panel regressions of AM Ratio Change or AM Ratio Change Dummy on KZ Index or KZ Dummy
and firm-level control variables, as well as year and industry fixed effects. AM Ratio Change is defined as the
difference of AM Ratio of a firm’s new location 1 year after relocation and AM Ratio of a firm’s old location 1
year before relocation. AM Ratio Change Dummy is set to one if AM Ratio Change is positive, zero otherwise. KZ
Dummy is set to one if a firm’s KZ Index is higher than the top 20% breakpoints, zero otherwise. AM Ratio is defined
as the ratio of the aggregate AUM of institutions in a state to the total market capitalization of public firms in the
same state. Cash Flow is defined as net income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization expenses,
all scaled by lagged assets. Q is defined as market value of equity plus total assets, less book value of equity, all
scaled by total assets. When R&D variable is missing, it is set to zero. R&D Dummy is set to one if R&D variable
is missing, otherwise it is set to zero. R&D-to-Sales is defined as research and development expenditures scaled by
sales. ROE is defined as net income divided by lagged book equity. Income Change is defined as the difference of
the ratio of the personal income per capita to the total personal income per capital of a firm’s new location 1 year
after relocation and of a firm’s old location 1 year before relocation. Tax Change is defined as the difference of the
tax rates between new location and old location. The sample period is from 1980 to 2013. t-statistics, based on
standard errors clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *
,**, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AM Ratio Change AM Ratio Change Dummy
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
KZ Index -0.001** -0.001
(-2.19) (-1.52)
KZ Dummy -0.050 -0.039
(-0.96) (-0.79)
Cash Flow 0.052** 0.030***
(2.38) (3.29)
Q -0.067*** -0.014**
(-4.79) (-2.07)
R&D Dummy -0.087 0.019
(-0.95) (0.33)
R&D to Sales 0.009 0.009***
(1.56) (4.22)
ROE -0.000 -0.008
(-0.07) (-1.48)
Income Change 1.089*** 1.836**
(3.68) (2.46)
Tax Change -0.002 0.026***
(-0.13) (4.57)
N 488 455 488 455
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.268 0.083 0.117
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.10 - Continued
AM Ratio and Firm Performance
Panel B: Profitability
Full Sample Credit Rating KZ index
Rating Below BBB- Rating Above BBB- Top 20% Bottom 20%
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AM Ratio 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.002*** 0.001* 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.004
(2.35) (2.10) (1.88) (1.69) (2.78) (1.89) (1.60) (0.88) (0.53) (0.78)
Cash Flow 1.305*** 1.263*** 1.306*** 1.275*** 1.114*** 1.012*** 1.452*** 1.352*** 1.394*** 1.427***
(37.15) (26.94) (36.19) (23.91) (15.27) (32.86) (22.65) (18.10) (16.39) (8.67)
Q -0.013** -0.004 -0.011 -0.001 -0.012* -0.003** -0.042*** -0.025** 0.007 0.025
(-2.14) (-0.57) (-1.59) (-0.16) (-1.94) (-2.37) (-3.16) (-2.32) (0.39) (0.99)
R&D Dummy -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.001 -0.030** -0.034
(-2.70) (-2.89) (-0.24) (-2.50) (-1.26)
R&D-to-Sales 0.015*** 0.012*** -0.246** 0.054*** 0.020***
(3.79) (4.97) (-2.08) (3.81) (3.10)
StateQ 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.001 0.015** 0.010
(3.30) (2.82) (-0.81) (2.06) (1.43)
Asset -0.055 -0.031 -1.879*** -0.301 0.541
(-0.36) (-0.20) (-3.15) (-1.64) (0.83)
Leverage -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.030
(-0.41) (0.11) (-0.86) (0.37) (0.66)
Ret -0.011 -0.014 0.001 -0.002 -0.062
(-1.04) (-1.08) (0.67) (-0.29) (-1.21)
N 124848 111315 99684 87084 25164 24231 24967 22108 23469 20489
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.214 0.239 0.216 0.461 0.713 0.440 0.488 0.131 0.115
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.11
Tech Bust Effects
This table reports panel regressions of firms located in the states that are substantially affected by the tech bust.
MB is defined as the log of market equity value to book equity value. Stock return is defined as the monthly excess
returns. Affected State is defined as one if the average proportion of tech stocks held by financial institutions of a
state is ranked at top the 10% among all the states, zero otherwise. We compare the MB and stock returns of the
top 10% states with all the rest states, and the bottom ranked 10%, 20%, and 30% states. IT Bubble is set to one
if the time period is between 2000 to 2002. When R&D variable is missing, it is set to zero. R&D Dummy is set
to one if R&D variable is missing, otherwise it is set to zero. R&D-to-Sales is defined as research and development
expenditures scaled by sales. ROE is defined as net income divided by lagged book equity. Size is the log of market
capitalization . Beta is estimated by running regression of stock returns on market returns for the previous 36
months. Illiquidity is defined as the average of the absolute value of stock return divided by dollar trading volume
on a given day within month. Momentum is defined as cumulative return of months (-12, -2). We control for year
(month) and industry fixed effects. The sample period is from 1990 to 2008. The sample excludes tech stocks and
industries highly correlated with tech industry. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the industry level,
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, ** , and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: MB
Top 10% States VS
The Rest States Bottom 10% States Bottom 20% States Bottom 30% States
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Affected States*IT Bubble -0.169** -0.200** -0.172* -0.190**
(-2.53) (-2.40) (-2.05) (-2.35)
R&D Dummy -0.174*** -0.203 -0.202** -0.218***
(-8.37) (-1.60) (-2.28) (-4.16)
R&D-to-Sales 0.004*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.024***
(3.22) (3.24) (3.37) (3.38)
ROE 0.001*** 0.086** 0.071* 0.003
(21.14) (2.71) (1.79) (0.97)
N 34314 2834 4902 8661
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.183 0.148 0.137
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.11 - Continued
Tech Bust Effects
Panel B: Stock Return
Top 10% States VS
The Rest States Bottom 10% States Bottom 20% States Bottom 30% States
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Affected States*IT Bubble -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(-3.74) (-3.70) (-4.10) (-4.14)
MB -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-6.96) (-3.25) (-3.83) (-4.15)
Size -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-7.38) (-4.65) (-5.01) (-4.74)
Beta 0.001** -0.001 0.000 0.001
(2.42) (-0.65) (0.23) (0.94)
Illiquidity 0.649*** 0.650 0.410*** 0.495***
(4.04) (0.92) (14.19) (4.61)
Momentum 0.003*** 0.004* 0.003*** 0.001
(3.28) (2.09) (3.08) (0.81)
N 376830 30376 52768 94571
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.093 0.079 0.069
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
129
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
T
a
b
le
3
.1
V
a
ri
a
b
le
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
va
ri
a
b
le
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
D
efi
n
it
io
n
H
K
S
R
at
io
T
h
e
to
ta
l
b
o
ok
va
lu
e
o
f
al
l
fi
rm
s
lo
ca
te
d
in
st
at
e
i
to
th
e
a
gg
re
ga
te
in
co
m
e
of
a
ll
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
lo
ca
te
d
in
st
at
e
i
R
&
D
D
u
m
m
y
O
n
e
if
R
&
D
va
ri
ab
le
is
m
is
si
n
g,
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e
R
&
D
-t
o
-S
al
es
R
es
ea
rc
h
an
d
d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
sc
a
le
d
b
y
sa
le
s
R
O
E
N
et
in
co
m
e
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
la
g
ge
d
b
o
ok
eq
u
it
y
C
as
h
F
lo
w
N
et
in
co
m
e
b
ef
or
e
ex
tr
a
or
d
in
ar
y
it
em
s,
d
ep
re
ci
a
ti
on
a
n
d
am
or
ti
za
ti
on
ex
p
en
se
s,
a
ll
sc
a
le
d
b
y
la
gg
ed
as
se
ts
Q
M
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
eq
u
it
y
p
lu
s
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
,
le
ss
b
o
o
k
va
lu
e
of
eq
u
it
y,
al
l
sc
a
le
d
b
y
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s;
S
ta
te
Q
V
a
lu
e-
w
ei
gh
te
d
Q
o
f
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
in
ea
ch
st
at
e
A
ss
et
1
/t
ot
al
a
ss
et
s
R
et
A
n
n
u
al
iz
ed
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
s
L
ev
er
ag
e
T
h
e
su
m
o
f
lo
n
g
te
rm
d
eb
t
a
n
d
d
eb
t
in
cu
rr
en
t
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s,
al
l
sc
a
le
d
b
y
la
gg
ed
as
se
ts
S
iz
e
T
h
e
lo
g
of
fi
rm
m
a
rk
et
ca
p
it
al
iz
at
io
n
Il
li
q
u
id
it
y
T
h
e
av
er
ag
e
o
f
th
e
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
e
of
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
d
ol
la
r
tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
e
on
a
g
iv
en
d
ay
in
a
g
iv
en
m
on
th
M
om
en
tu
m
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
re
tu
rn
of
m
on
th
s
(-
1
2,
-2
)
B
et
a
E
st
im
at
ed
b
y
ru
n
n
in
g
re
gr
es
si
o
n
of
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
s
on
m
a
rk
et
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
th
e
p
re
v
io
u
s
36
m
on
th
s
on
a
m
on
th
ly
ro
ll
in
g
b
a
si
s
In
co
m
e
C
h
an
ge
T
h
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
o
f
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
th
e
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
p
er
ca
p
it
a
to
th
e
to
ta
l
p
er
so
n
a
l
in
co
m
e
p
er
ca
p
it
al
of
a
fi
rm
’s
n
ew
lo
ca
ti
on
1
ye
a
r
a
ft
er
re
lo
ca
ti
o
n
an
d
of
a
fi
rm
’s
ol
d
lo
ca
ti
o
n
1
ye
a
r
b
ef
or
e
re
lo
ca
ti
o
n
T
a
x
C
h
an
ge
T
h
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
o
f
ta
x
ra
te
s
b
et
w
ee
n
n
ew
lo
ca
ti
on
a
n
d
o
ld
lo
ca
ti
on
130
References
Adrian, T., and H. Shin, 2010. Liquidity and leverage, Journal of Financial Intermediation 19,
418-437.
Adrian, T., E. Etula, and T. Muir, 2014. Financial intermediaries and the cross-section of asset
returns, Journal of Finance 69, 2557-2596.
Adrian, T., E. Moench, and H. Shin, 2013. Dynamic leverage asset pricing, Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Staff Report 625.
Allen, F., and D. Gale, 1994. Limited market participation and volatility of asset prices, American
Economic Review 84, 933-955.
Almazan A., A. Motta, S. Titman, and V. Uysal, 2010. Financial structure, acquisition opportu-
nities, and firm locations, Journal of Finance 65, 529-563.
Almeida, H., M. Campello, and M. Weisbach, 2004. The cash flow sensitivity of cash, Journal of
Finance 59, 1777-1804.
Altman, E., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy,
Journal of Finance 23, 589-609.
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: Cross-section and time-series effects, Journal of
Financial Markets 5, 31-56.
Ayers, B., S. Ramalingegowda, and P. Yeung, 2011. Hometown advantage: The effects of moni-
toring institution location on financial reporting discretion, Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics 52, 41-61.
Baesel, J.B., and G.R. Stein, 1979. The value of information, inferences from the profitability of
insider trading, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 14, 553-571.
Baik, B., J. Kang, and J. Kim, 2010. Local institutional investors, information asymmetries, and
equity returns, Journal of Financial Economics 97, 81-106.
131
Baker, M., J. Stein, and J. Wurgler, 2002. When does the market matter? Stock prices and the
investment of equity-dependent firms, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bansal, R., and A. Yaron, 2004. Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset pricing
puzzles, Journal of Finance 59, 1481-1509.
Barber, B., and T. Odean, 2008. All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the buying
behavior of individual and institutional investors, Review of Financial Studies 21, 785-818.
Basak, S., and A. Pavlova, 2012. Asset prices and institutional investors, American Economic
Review 103, 1728-1758.
Becker, B., Z. Ivkovi, and S. Weisbenner, 2011. Local dividend clienteles, Journal of Finance 66,
655-684.
Becker, B., and V. Ivashina, 2013. Reaching for yield in the bond market, NBER Working Paper
Series, Harvard University.
Berk, J., and J. Binsbergen, 2015. Assessing asset pricing models using revealed preference,
Working Paper, Stanford University.
Bettis, J.C., J.L. Coles, and M.L. Lemmon, 2000. Corporate policies restricting trading by insiders,
Journal of Financial Economics 57, 191-220.
Betzer, A., and E. Theissen, 2009. Insider trading and corporate governance: The case of Germany,
European Financial Management 15, 402-429.
Bhattacharya, U., and H. Daouk, 2002. The world price of insider trading, Journal of Finance
573, 75-108.
Bhattacharya, U., and H. Daouk, 2005. When no law is better than a good law, Working Paper,
Indiana University.
Bhattacharya, U., H. Daouk, B. Jorgenson, and C.H. Kehr, 2000. When an event is not an event:
The curious case of an emerging market, Journal of Financial Economics 55, 69-101.
Blake, C., E. Elton, and M. Gruber, 1993. The performance of bond mutual funds, Journal of
Business 66, 371-403.
132
Brochet, F, 2010. Information content of insider trades before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
The Accounting Review 85, 419-446.
Brochet, F, 2013. Insider sentiment and market returns around the world, Working Paper, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology.
Brown, K., W. Harlow, and L. Starks, 1996. Of tournaments and temptations: An analysis of
managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry, Journal of Finance 51, 85-110.
Brown, P., M. Foo, and I. Watson, 2003. Trading by insiders in Australia: Evidence on the
profitability of directors’ trades, Company and Securities Law Journal 21, 248-261.
Brown, S., and W. Goetzmann, 1995. Performance persistence, Journal of Finance 50, 679-698.
Brunnermeier, M., and L. Pedersen, 2009. Market liquidity and funding liquidity, Review of
Financial Studies 22, 2201-2238.
Budsaratragoon, P., D. Hillier, and S. Lhaopadchan, 2012. Applying developed country regulation
in emerging markets: An analysis of Thai insider trading, Accounting and Finance 52, 1013-
1039.
Bushman, R., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith, 2005. Insider trading restrictions and analysts’ incentives
to follow firms, Journal of Finance 60, 35-66.
Busse, J., 2001. Another look at mutual fund tournaments, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 36, 53-73.
Calvet, L., J. Campbell, and P. Sodini, 2006. Down or out: Assessing the welfare costs of household
investment mistakes, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Campbell, J., and J. Cochrane, 1995. By force of habit: A consumption-based explanation of
aggregate stock market behavior, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Carhart, M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance 52, 57-82.
Carhart, M., R. Kaniel, D. Musto, and A. Reed, 2002. Leaning for the tape: Evidence of gaming
behavior in equity mutual funds, Journal of Finance 57, 661-693.
133
Carlton, D., and D. Fischel, 1983. The regulation of insider trading, Stanford Law Review 35,
857-895.
Carpenter, J., and B. Remmers, 2001. Executive stock option exercises and inside information,
The Journal of Business 74, 513-534.
Chen, Y., W. Ferson, and H. Peters, 2010. Measuring the timing ability and performance of bond
mutual funds, Journal of Financial Economics 98, 72-89.
Chen, Z., Y. Huang, Y. Kusnadi, and K.C. Wei, 2014. The real effect of the initial enforcement
of insider trading laws, Working Paper.
Chevalier, J., and G. Ellison, 1995. Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to incentives,
Journal of Political Economy 105, 1167-1200.
Chhaochharia, V., A. Kumar, and A. Niessen-Ruenzi, 2012. Local investors and corporate gover-
nance, Journal of Accounting and Economics 54, 42-67.
Cici, G., and S. Gibson, 2012. The performance of corporate bond mutual funds: Evidence based
on security-level holdings, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, 159-178.
Coase, R., 1960. Problem of social cost, The Journal of Laws and Economics 3, 1-69.
Cohen, L., C. Malloy, and L. Pomorski, 2012. Decoding inside information, Journal of Finance
67, 1009-1043.
Coles, J., N. Daniel, and L. Naveen, 2006. Managerial incentives and risk-taking, Journal of
Financial Economics 79, 431-468.
Coval, J., and T. Moskowitz, 1999. Home bias at home: Local equity preference in domestic
portfolios, Journal of Finance 54, 2045-2073.
Coval, J., and T. Moskowitz, 2001. The geography of investment: Informed trading and asset
prices, Journal of Political Economy 109, 811-841.
Cziraki, P., P. de Goeij, and L. Rennenboog, 2014. Corporate governance rules and insider trading
profits, Review of Finance 18, 67-108.
134
Davis, J., and J. Henderson, 2008. The agglomeration of headquarters, Regional Science and
Urban Economics 38, 445-460.
DeFond, M., M. Hung, and R. Trezevant, 2007. Investor protection and the information con-
tent of annual earnings announcements: international evidence, Journal of Accounting and
Economics 43, 37-67.
Degryse, H., F. de Jong and J. Lefebvre, 2014. An empirical analysis of legal insider trading in
the Netherlands, De Economist 162, 71-103.
Del Brio, E., A. Miguel, and J. Perote. 2002. An investigation of insider trading profits in the
Spanish stock market, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 42, 73-94.
Denis, D., and J. Xu, 2013. Insider trading restrictions and top executive compensation, Journal
of Accounting and Economics 56, 91-112.
DeVault, L., R. Sias, and L. Starks, 2014. Who are the sentiment traders? Evidence from the
cross-section of stock returns and demand, Working Paper, University of Arizona.
Djankov, S., R. Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 2008. The law and economics of
self-dealing, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 430-465.
Dougal C., C. Parsons, and S. Titman, 2015. Urban vibrancy and corporate growth, Journal of
Finance 70, 163-210.
Dye, R., 1984. Inside trading and incentives, Journal of Business 57, 295-313.
Eckbo, B., and D. Smith, 1998. The conditional performance of insider trades, Journal of Finance
53, 467-498.
Elton, E., M. Gruber, and C. Blake, 1995. Fundamental economic variables, expected returns,
and bond fund performance, Journal of Finance 50, 1229-1256.
Elton, E., M. Gruber, and C. Blake, 2001. A first look at the accuracy of the crsp mutual fund
database and a comparison of the CRSP and Morningstar mutual fund databases, Journal of
Finance 56, 2415-2430.
135
Fama, E., and J. MacBeth, 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests, The Journal of
Political Economy 81, 607-636.
Fama, E., and K. French, 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, Journal
of Financial Economics 33, 3-56.
Fama, E., and K. French, 2008. Dissecting anomalies, Journal of Finance 63, 1653-1678.
Fazzari, S., R. Hubbard, and B. Petersen, 1988. Financing constraints and corporate investment,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1988, 141-206.
Fazzari, S., R. Hubbard, and B. Petersen, 2000. Investment-cash flow sensitivities are useful: A
comment on Kaplan and Zingales, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 695-705.
Fernandes, N., and M. Ferreira, 2009. Insider trading laws and stock price informativeness, Review
of Financial Studies 22, 1845-1887.
Ferreira, M., and P. Matos, 2008. The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors
around the world, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 499-533.
Ferreira, M., A. Keswani, A. Miguel, and S. Ramos, 2012. The flow-performance relationship
around the world, Journal of Banking & Finance 36, 1759-1780.
Fidrmuc, J., A. Korczak, and P. Korczak, 2012. Why does shareholder protection matter for
abnormal returns after reported insider purchases and sales?, Journal of Banking and Finance
37, 1915-1935.
Finnerty, J., 1976. Insiders and market efficiency, Journal of Finance 31, 1141-1148.
Fishman, M., and K. Hagerty, 1992. Insider trading and the efficiency of stock prices, Rand
Journal of Economics 23, 106-122.
Gabaix, X., A. Krishnamurthy, and O. Vigneron, 2007. Limits of arbitrage: Theory and evidence
from the mortgagebacked securities market, Journal of Finance 62, 557-595.
Gang H., D. McLean, J. Pontiff, and Q. Wang, 2014. The year-end trading activities of institu-
tional investors: Evidence from daily trades, Review of Financial Studies 27, 1593-1614.
136
Garleanu, N., L. Pedersen, and A. Poteshman, 2009. Demand-based option pricing, Review of
Financial Studies 22, 4259-4299.
Gaspar, J., and M. Massa, 2007. Local ownership as private information: Evidence on the
monitoring-liquidity trade-off, Journal of Financial Economics 83, 751-792.
George, T., and H. Seyhun, 2002. Does insider trading enhances market efficiency, Working Paper,
University of Houston and University of Michigan.
Goetzmann, W., J. Ingersoll, M. Spiegel, and I. Welch, 2007. Portfolio performance manipulation
and manipulation-proof performance measures, Review of Financial Studies 20, 1503-1546.
Gompers, P., and A. Metrick, 1998. Institutional investors and equity prices, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Gompers, P. A., and A. Metrick, 1998. Institutional investors and equity prices, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 116, 229-259.
Grinblatt M., and M. Keloharju, 2001. How distance, language, and culture influence stockhold-
ings and trades, Journal of Finance 56, 1053-1073.
Gromb, D., and D. Vayanos, 2002. Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained
arbitrageurs, Journal of Financial Economics 66, 361-407.
Guercio, D., and P. Tkac, 2002. The determinants of the flow of funds of managed portfolios:
Mutual funds vs. Pension funds, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, 523-557.
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales, 2004. Does local financial development matter?, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 929-969.
Gutierrez R., W. Maxwell, and D. Xu, 2009. On economies of scale and persistent performance
in corporate-bond mutual funds, Working Paper, University of Oregon.
He, J., L. Ng, and Q. Wang, 2002. Quarterly trading patterns of financial institutions, Journal of
Business 77, 493-509.
He, Z., and A. Krishnamurthy, 2008. Intermediary asset pricing, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
137
He, Z., and A.Krishnamurthy, 2012. A model of capital and crises, The Review of Economic
Studies 79, 735-777.
He, Z., B. Kelly, and A. Manela, 2015. Intermediary asset pricing: New evidence from many asset
classes, Available at SSRN 2662182.
Henderson, V., and Y. Ono, 2008. Where do manufacturing firms locate their headquarters?,
Journal of Urban Economics 63, 431-450.
Hendricks, D., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser, 1993. Hot hands in mutual funds: Short run persis-
tence of relative performance, 1974:1988, Journal of Finance 48, 93-130.
Hong, H., and M. Yogo, 2012. What does futures market interest tell us about the macroeconomy
and asset prices?, Journal of Financial Economics 105, 473-490.
Hong, H., J. Kubik, and J. Stein, 2008. The only game in town: Stock-price consequences of local
bias, Journal of Financial Economics 90, 20-37.
Hotson, L., N. Kaur, and H. Singh, 2007. The information content of directors’ trades: Empirical
analysis of the Australian market, Investment Management and Financial Innovations 5,
122-133.
Huang, J., K. Wei, and H. Yan, 2007. Participation costs and the sensitivity of fund flows to past
performance, Journal of Finance 62, 1273-1311.
Huang, J., C. Sialm, and H. Zhang, 2011. Risk shifting and mutual fund performance, Review of
Financial Studies 24, 2575-2616.
Huddart, S., B. Ke, and C Shi, 2007. Jeopardy, non-public information, and insider trading
around SEC 10-K and 10-Q filings, Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 3-36.
Huij, J., and J. Derwall, 2008. “Hot hands” in bond funds, Journal of Banking & Finance 32,
559-572.
Ivkovi, Z., and S. Weisbenner, 2005. Local does as local is: Information content of the geography
of individual investors’ common stock investments, Journal of Finance 60, 267-306.
138
Jaffe, J., 1974. Special information and insider trading, Journal of Business 47, 410-428.
Jegadeesh, N., and S. Titman, 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications
for stock market efficiency, Journal of Finance 48, 65-91.
Jeng, L., A. Metrick, and R. Zeckhauser, 2003. Estimating the returns to insider trading: A
performance-evaluation perspective, Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 453-471.
Kacperczyk, M., C. Sialm, and L. Zheng, 2008. Unobserved actions of equity mutual funds, Review
of Financial Studies 21, 2379-2416.
Kang, J., and J. Kim, 2008. The geography of block acquisitions, Journal of Finance 63, 2817-
2858.
Kempf, A., S. Ruenzi, and T. Thiele, 2009. Employment risk, compensation incentives, and man-
agerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry, Journal of Financial Economics
92, 92-108.
Khanna, N., S. Slezak, and M. Bradley, 1994. Insider trading, outside search, and resource
allocation: Why firms and society may disagree on insider trading restrictions, Review of
Financial Studies 7, 575-608.
Korniotis, G., and A. Kumar, 2013. State-level business cycles and local return predictability,
Journal of Finance 68, 1037-1096.
Koski, J., and J. Pontiff, 1999. How are derivatives used? Evidence from the mutual fund industry,
Journal of Finance 54, 791-816.
Kyle, A., and W. Xiong, 2001. Contagion as a wealth effect, Journal of Finance 56, 1401-1440.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1997. Legal determinants of external
finance, Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1998. Law and finance, Journal of
Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 2002. Investor protection and
corporate valuation, Journal of Finance 57, 1147-1170.
139
Lakonishok, J., and I. Lee, 2001. Are insider trades informative?, Review of Financial Studies 14,
79-111.
Leland, H., 1992. Insider trading: Should it be prohibited?, Journal of Political Economy 100,
859-887.
Loughran, T., and J. Ritter, 2004. Why has IPO underpricing changed over time?, Financial
Management 33, 5-37.
Loughran, T., and P. Schultz, 2005. Liquidity: Urban versus rural firms, Journal of Financial
Economics 78, 341-374.
Loughran, T., and P. Schulz, 2004. Dissemination of information: Urban versus rural stock return
patterns, Working Paper, University of Notre Dame.
Manne, H., 1966. Insider trading and the stock market, Free Press.
Manove, M., 1989. The harm from insider trading and informed speculation, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 104, 823-845.
McCahery, J., Z. Sautner, and L.Starks, 2016. Behind the scenes: The corporate governance
preferences of institutional investors, Journal of Finance 71, 2905-2932.
McLean, R., and M. Zhao, 2014. The business cycle, investor sentiment, and costly external
finance, Journal of Finance 69, 1377-1409.
Mitchell, M., and T. Pulvino, 2012. Arbitrage crashes and the speed of capital, Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 104, 469-490.
Moneta, F., 2009. Measuring bond mutual fund performance with portfolio characteristics, Work-
ing Paper, Queen’s University.
Morey, M., and E. O’Neal, 2006. Window dressing in bond mutual funds, Journal of Financial
Research 29, 325-347.
Musto, D., 1997. Portfolio disclosures and year-end price shifts, Journal of Finance 52, 1563-1588.
140
Musto, D., 1999. Investment decisions depend on portfolio disclosures, Journal of Finance 54,
935-952.
Ng, L., and Q. Wang, 2004. Institutional trading and the turn-of-the-year effect, Journal of
Financial Economics 74, 343-336.
Noe, T., 1997. Insider trading and the problem of corporate agency, Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization 13, 287-318.
Ofek, E., and D. Yermack, 2000. Taking stock: Equity based compensation and the evolution of
managerial ownership, Journal of Finance 55, 1367-1384.
Pirinsky, C., and Q. Wang, 2006. Does corporate headquarters location matter for stock returns?,
Journal of Finance 61, 1991-2015.
Pope, P., R. Morris, and D. Peel, 1990. Insider trading: Some evidence on market efficiency
and directors’ share dealings in Great Britain, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 17,
359-380.
Qiu, J., 2003. Termination risk, multiple managers and mutual fund tournaments, European
Finance Review 7, 161-190.
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, 1998. Financial dependence and growth, American Economic Review
88, 559-586.
Ravina, E., and P. Sapienza, 2010. What do independent directors know? Evidence from their
trading, Review of Financial Studies 23, 962-1000.
Richardson, S., and R. Sloan, 2003. Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus
cash, Working Paper, University of Michigan.
Seyhun, H., 1988. The information content of aggregate insider trading, Journal of Business 61,
1-24.
Shin, J., 1996. The optimal regulation of insider trading, Journal of Financial Intermediation 5,
49-73.
141
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1997. The limits of arbitrage, Journal of Finance 52, 35-55.
Sirri, E., and P. Tufano, 1998. Costly search and mutual fund flows, Journal of Finance 53,
1589-1622.
Strauss-Kahn, V., and X. Vives, 2009. Why and where do headquarters move?, Regional Science
and Urban Economics 39, 168-186.
Sulaeman J., and C. Wei, 2014. Institutional presence, Working Paper, Southern Methodist
University.
Vayanos, D., 2004. Flight to quality, flight to liquidity, and the pricing of risk, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2002. Limited asset market participation and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Wang, Q., 2012. Bailouts reward risk taking, Working Paper, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Wheelock, D., and M. Wohar, 2009. Can the term spread predict output growth and recessions?
A survey of the literature, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 91, 419-440.
Wong, M., Y. Cheung, and L. Wu, 2000. Insider trading in the Hong Kong stock market, Asia-
Pacific Financial Markets 7, 275-288.
Zingg, A., S. Lang, and D. Wyttenbach, 2007. Insider trading in the Swiss stock market, Working
Paper, University of St. Gallen.
142
  
Xiaoqiong (Crystal) Wang 
 
Education_________________  ___________________________________            __________  
           Doctor of Philosophy in Finance (Minor: Econometrics), GPA , August   
        Sheldon B Lubar School of Business, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 
           Master of Science in Finance, GPA , December  
        Martin J. Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 
           Bachelor of Science in Finance, GPA , June  
        School of Securities and Futures, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics              
(SWUFE), China 
Areas of Interest______   _________________________________________             ________ 
           Research: Mutual Funds, Insider Trading, International Finance, Financial Institutions 
Teaching Experience__________  ___________________________________            ________ 
           Instructor, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, -Present 
        International Financial Management, Fall : Two Sections (Teaching Evaluation (TE): 
)   
        International Financial Management, Spring : Two Sections (TE: )   
        International Financial Management, Fall : Two Sections (TE: )   
        Principle of Finance, Summer 2015: One Section (TE: )                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
           Teaching Assistant, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, -  
        Introduction to Management Statistics, Summer -Spring  (TE: ) 
           Tutor, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, Fall  
        Introduction to Corporate Finance 
           Tutor, “Say Yes to Education”, Syracuse, NY, Fall  
        High School Math and Science 
 
 
 
 
  
Research Experience______________  ________________________________            _______ 
           Research Assistant, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, Fall 2013-Summer 2014 
       “The Determinants of Firm Characteristics: An Explanation of Location” Research Project 
       “Geographic Effects Still Matter?” Research Project 
       “Momentum and Liquidity” Research Project 
Working Papers_____________________________________        _______________             _   
           “Local Institutional Investors and Stock Prices” Job Market Paper 
           “Insider Trading, Informativeness, and Price Eﬃciency Around the World” with Lilian Ng and  
Qinghai Wang, 
           “Risk Taking and Performance of Bond Mutual Funds” with Lilian Ng  and Qinghai Wang  
Work in Progress___________________________________________________      _             _   
           “Mutual Fund Industry Concentration and Local Bias”  
           “Economic Consequences of MSCI Market Reclassification”  
Awards and Honors                                                                                                                      _  
           Sheldon B. Lubar Doctoral Scholarship, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, Spring  
           AFA Doctoral Student Travel Grant, American Finance Association, Boston, MA, Spring  
           Chancellor Award Scholarship, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, -
           Whitman Merit Scholarship, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, Fall  
           Second-Class Merit Scholarship, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu,     
Fall  
           Third-Class Merit Scholarship, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, 
Spring  
           School of Securities and Futures Excellent Academic Performance (Top %), SWUFE,   
Chengdu, -  
Conference/Seminar Presentations                                                                                              _  
           “Risk Taking and Performance of Bond Mutual Funds” 
                     - Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, Spring  (Presenter) 
                     - University of Texas at Austin, Department of Finance Alumni Conference, Austin, TX, 
Spring  
                     - Financial Management Association International Annual Meeting-European, Venice, Italy, 
Summer  
  
                     - Financial Management Association International Annual Meeting, Orlando, FL, Fall  
(Presenter) 
   “Insider Trading, Informativeness, and Price Eﬃciency Around the World” 
                     - Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China, Summer   
                     - York University, Brown Bag Seminar, Toronto, Canada, Spring  
                     - University of Ottawa, Second Annual Conference, Ottawa, Canada, Spring 
                     - Financial Management Association International Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, NV, Fall 
 (Presenter) 
                     - th Annual Conference on Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Seoul, Korea, Fall   
Professional Services                                                                                                                      _  
           Discussant 
          - “Earnings Management and Main Bank Monitoring: Evidence from Japan” Sakawa, H. 
and N. Watanabel, Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, Spring 
            
          - “Risk Aversion, Business Risk, and Market Discipline in the Insurance Industry: A Cross-
Country Analysis” Altuntas, M. and T. Stölzle, Financial Management Association 
International Annual Meeting, Orlando, FL, Fall   
Skills and Membership                                                                                                                 _  
           Programing: Visual Basic, SAS, Matlab, Minitab, GAUSS, Eviews, Latex, STATA 
           Membership: AFA, EFA, MFA, FMA 
References                                                                                                                                     _  
           Dr. Lilian Ng 
           Professor of Finance and Scotiabank Chair in International Finance 
           Schulich School of Business 
           York University 
           Toronto, ON, Canada M J P  
           Email: lng@schulich.yorku.ca  
           Phone: ( ) -  x  
 
           Dr. Qinghai Wang 
           Professor and Richard T. Crotty Orange County Endowed Chair 
           College of Business Administration 
           University of Central Florida 
           Orlando, FL  
           Email: Qinghai.Wang@ucf.edu 
           Phone: ( ) -  
 
 
  
           Dr. Donghyun Kim 
           Assistant Professor 
           Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business 
           University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
           Milwaukee, WI  
           Email: kim236@uwm.edu 
           Phone: ( ) -  
 
Selected Abstract                                                                                                                           _  
“Local Institutional Investors and Stock Prices” Job Market Paper 
          We study whether and how the geographic mismatch of investors and public firms affects 
corporate policies, firm valuation and firm performance. Both the U.S. money managing industry 
and public firms are clustered geographically, but there is considerable misalignment between the 
two. In this paper, we study whether and how the geographic mismatch between investors and 
public firms affects corporate financial policies, firm valuation, and firm performance. We 
measure the investor-firm misalignment at the state level based on the ratio of the aggregate asset 
under management (AUM) of institutions in a state to the total market capitalization of public 
firms in the same state (AM Ratio). We find that firm valuation is high when firms are located in 
states with high AM Ratios and the effects are stronger for firms with higher level of equity 
dependence. We show that a greater presence of local institutional investors mitigates the financial 
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that risk-taking behavior helps to explain the different performances of bond funds with and 
without controlling for the risk factors. Results suggest that risk taking leads to higher returns 
relative to benchmarks in normal credit risk periods, but lower returns in high credit risk periods, 
and that risk taking is persistent and is primarily driven by poor long-term past performance. 
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and Qinghai Wang 
          This paper examines insider trading activities and their informativeness across 44 countries 
with varying levels of insider trading regulations. While insider trades, particularly insider 
purchases, earn abnormal profits in most of the markets we study, insider trading is significantly 
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